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IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, et al.
(03-1238)
Ruling Below: (Alvarez v. IBP, Inc, 339 F.3d 894 (9t Cir. Wash., 2003), cert granted 125 S. Ct.
1292; 161 L. Ed. 2d 104; 73 USLW 3494 (2005).
Employees at IBP, Inc. sued to recover lost pay for time they spent donning and doffing
specialized protective clothing before and after work and their lunch breaks. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the key conclusions of a federal district judge in Washington, holding
that walking time should be compensated under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The court stated
that the work day begins with the first act of compensable work. Because wearing protective
clothing is a part of the principal work activity, required by law, any and all time between
donning and doffing that equipment should be compensated.
Questions Presented: Whether time spent by employees walking between clothes-changing
stations and their actual work stations constitutes non-compensable activity within the meaning
of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Portal-to-Portal Act.
Gabriel ALVAREZ, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V.
IBP, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Decided August 5, 2003
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
THOMAS, Circuit Judge: 1.
Perhaps the packing plant employees in
Pasco, Washington, should have heeded
Henry David Thoreau's warning to "beware
of all enterprises that require new clothes."
The central dispute in this class action
lawsuit is whether IBP, Inc. ("IBP") should
be required to compensate its employees for
the time it takes to change into required
specialized protective clothing and safety
gear. Under the circumstances presented by
this case, we conclude that it must. ...
IBP, Inc. is the world's largest producer of
fresh beef, pork, and related products. ...
Among IBP's many meat processing
facilities is a "kill and processing plant" in
Pasco, Washington ("the Pasco plant"). As
the moniker suggests, the Pasco plant
includes slaughter and processing work
sections, both of which play a direct role in
the carcass "disassembly process. . . ."
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.. . Pasco plant production line employees . .
. are required to be at their work stations and
prepared to work as the first piece of meat
comes across the production line. However,
before they are able to assume their work
stations all Pasco plant employees must
complete a number of preliminary tasks, and
before employees may leave the Pasco plant
at the end of a shift, most of these
preliminary tasks must be completed in
inverse form. Each Pasco plant job
classification has specific tool, supply, walk-
time, and gear requirements. . . . [F]or all
Pasco plant production line employees, a
general pattern obtains: At the start of a
shift, Pasco plant employees must gather
their assigned equipment, don that
equipment in one of the Pasco plant's four
locker rooms, and prepare work-related tools
before venturing to the slaughter or
processing floors. At the end of every shift,
employees must clean, restore, and replace
their tools and equipment, storing all of it at
the Pasco plant itself.
Until July of 1998, the Pasco plant's shifts
ran eight hours. . . . In July of 1998, IBP
restructured its shift time to include four
minutes of so-called "clothes" time, thereby
reducing the overall work time to seven
hours and fifty-six minutes. In the fall of
1999, the Pasco plant reduced its shift time
to seven hours and fifty-one minutes. Long-
running litigation between IBP and the
United States Department of Labor
(hereinafter "USDOL") in the 1990s spurred
much of IBP's shift-time reduction. In the
course of that litigation, damage and wage
issues comparable to those raised in this
case were decided. . . . See Reich v. IBP,
Inc., 38 F.3d 1123, 1127 (10th Cir. 1994)
(holding IBP liable for unpaid pre-shift and
post-shift donning, doffing, and cleaning of
special packinghouse industry safety
equipment and for time spent between
waiting to pick up and return knives). Once
a shift begins, the Pasco plant employees'
time is strictly regulated and monitored. As
a rule, employee rest- or meal-break time
begins as soon as the last piece of meat
passes on the production line, and, as a rule,
employees must be completely prepared to
resume work as soon as the break period
ends. When departing the processing and
slaughter floors-whether to go to the
cafeteria or to the restroom-employees are
permitted to leave only hats, haimets,
goggles, earplugs, and boots in place; outer
garments, protective gear, gloves, scabbards,
and chains must be removed. For many
Pasco plant employees, the operation of
IBP's mandatory donning and doffing rules
necessarily impinges-if not more-their
unpaid thirty-minute meal break time.
To help monitor employee arrival and
departure times, IBP instituted a mandatory,
computerized "swipe card" system at the
Pasco plant. IBP does not use the data its
swipe card system gathers in calculating
employee pay. Instead, IBP pays its Pasco
plant employees according to a "gang time
pay" model, which bases employee
remuneration entirely on the times during
which employees are actually cutting and
bagging meat. Under this "gang time"
framework, the period in which IBP
considers its employees to be performing
compensable work commences with the
processing of the first piece of meat and
ends with the processing of the last, notably
excluding any time spent abiding the Pasco
plant's required pre- or post-shift routines.
In 1999, believing parts of IBP's
compensation practices to be unlawful, the
Pasco plant's slaughter and processing
employees brought this class action suit
under § 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA"), see 29 US.C. § 216(b)
(1999) . .. in United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Washington. Three
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aspects of their work-day animated
plaintiffs' claim: (1) the pre-shift donning of
protective gear and the preparation of work-
related tools, including the attendant waiting
and walking; (2) the requisite donning and
doffing of protective gear during the thirty-
minute unpaid meal-break; and (3) the post-
shift doffing, cleaning, and storing of
protective gear and tools.
[A twenty-day bench trial followed.]
. . . [O]n September 14, 2001, the district
court issued thorough findings of fact and
conclusions of law. . . . [It found] that
FLSA required compensation for all of
plaintiffs' work time-e.g., donning,
doffing, and cleaning of "integral and
indispensable" protective gear; waiting and
some walking time during the workday-
both during pre-shift and post-shift times
and during the thirty-minute meal-break.
The district court also rejected IBP's . . .
FLSA-based defenses. . . . [T]he district
court found that 29 US.C. § 203(o) (1999),
which excludes "clothes changing" and
"washing" time from compensable time
when these activities are the subject of
collective bargaining, offered IBP no relief
because § 203(o)'s "changing clothes" and
"washing" exclusions did not reach donning,
doffing, and cleaning of specifically
protective, non-clothing-like gear; that IBP
lacked "good faith"; and that the Portal-to-
Portal Act did not operate to plaintiffs'
disadvantage because the donning, doffing,
and cleaning of protective gear was "integral
and indispensable" to their jobs, fulfilling
mutual obligations of employer and
employee. Walking and waiting time, the
district court continued, occurred during the
principal v
compensable.
vorkday and was thus
For IBP's FLSA . . . violations, the district
court awarded plaintiffs liquidated damages
... and prejudgment interest....
II.
It is axiomatic, under the FLSA, that
employers must pay employees for all
"hours worked." See 29 US.C. § § 206, 207
(1999); Turner v. City of Philadelphia, 262
F.3d 222, 224 (3d Cir. 2001). The threshold
question in this case is whether the activities
cited by the plaintiffs-donning and doffing,
waiting and walking-constitute "work"
under the FLSA. We agree with the district
court that, under the facts presented by this
case, they do.
"Work," the Supreme Court has long noted,
is "physical or mental exertion (whether
burdensome or not) controlled or required
by the employer and pursued necessarily and
primarily for the benefit of the employer."
See Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda
Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598, 88 L. Ed.
949, 64 S. Ct. 698 (1944). Definitionally
incorporative, Muscoda's "work" term
includes even non-exertional acts. See
Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S 126,
133, 89 L. Ed 118, 65 S. Ct. 165 (1944)
(noting that even "exertion" is not the sine
qua non of "work" because "an employer ...
may hire a man to do nothing, or to do
nothing but wait for something to happen").
Plaintiffs' donning and doffing, as well as
the attendant retrieval and waiting,
constitute "work" under Muscoda and
Armour's catholic definition: "pursued
necessarily and primarily for the benefit of
the employer," Muscoda, 321 US. at 598,
these tasks are activity, burdensome or not,
performed pursuant to IBP's mandate for
IBP's benefit as an employer. 323 U.S. at
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133; 321 US. at 598. The activities,
therefore, constitute "work."
That such activity is "work" as a threshold
matter does not mean without more that the
activity is necessarily compensable. The
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 relieves an
employer of responsibility for compensating
employees for "activities which are
preliminary or postliminary to [the]
principal activity or activities" of a given
job. 29 US.C. § 254(a) (1999). Not all
"preliminary or postliminary" activities can
go uncompensated, however. "Activities
performed either before or after the regular
work shift," the Supreme Court has noted,
are compensable "if those activities are an
integral and indispensable part of the
principal activities." Steiner v. Mitchell, 350
U.S. 247, 256 (1956).
The Supreme Court's approach to this
"principal," "integral and indispensable"
duty question is context-specific. To be
"integral and indispensable," an activity
must be necessary to the principal work
performed and done for the benefit of the
employer. Plaintiffs' donning and doffing of
job-related protective gear satisfies Steiner's
bipartite "integral and indispensable" test.
First, because the donning and doffing of
this gear on the Pasco plant's "premises is
required by law, by rules of [IBP], [and] by
the nature of the work," see 29 C.F.R. §
790.8(c) n.65 (1999), this donning and
doffing is "necessary" to the "principal"
work performed. From sanitary aprons to
metal-mesh gear, IBP "by rule," id.,
mandates the donning and doffing of clothes
and gear at various intervals throughout the
workday, requiring employees to wait for
and to retrieve that gear in particular areas at
particular times on the Pasco plant's
premises. See Steiner, 350 U.S. at 256.
United States Department of Agriculture
sanitation standards and Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (hereinafter
"OSHA") industry standards bolster this "by
rule" conclusion, demanding maintenance of
sanitary conditions, 9 C.FR. § 308.3, and
the provision of protective equipment at the
Pasco plant "wherever necessary by reason
of hazards or processes of [work]
environment." 29 C.FR. § 19 1 0 .13 2 (a)
(1999).
Second . . . the donning, doffing, washing,
and retrieving of protective gear is, at both
broad and basic levels, done for the benefit
of IBP. These plaintiff-performed activities
allow IBP to satisfy its [legal] requirements.
I . [and] prevent unnecessary workplace
injury and contamination, both of which
would inevitably impede IBP's
"disassembly" process. Under Steiner,
plaintiffs' donning, doffing, and cleaning
activities are "integral and indispensable" to
Pasco's "principal" activity.
This "integral and indispensable" conclusion
extends to donning, doffing, and cleaning of
non-unique gear (e.g., hard-hats) and unique
gear (e.g., Kevlar gloves) alike. Little time
may be required to don safety glasses and
the use of safety goggles is undoubtedly
pervasive in industrial work. But ease of
donning and ubiquity of use do not make the
donning of such equipment any less
"integral and indispensable" as that term is
defined in Steiner. Safety goggles are, like
metal-mesh leggings, required by IBP, and
they are, like metal-mesh leggings,
necessary to the performance of the
principal work. Both are "integral and
indispensable" under Steiner's exception to
the Portal-to-Portal Act's bar to
compensation of preliminary or postliminary
activity.
However, we agree with the district court's
alternative conclusion as to why the time
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spent donning and doffing non-unique
protective gear such as hardhats and safety
goggles is not compensable: The time it
takes to perform these tasks vis-a-vis non-
unique protective gear is de minimis as a
matter of law....
In sum . . . "donning and doffing" and
"waiting and walking" constitute
compensable work activities except for the
de minimis time associated with the donning
and doffing of non-unique protective gear.
III.
The FLSA contains an exception for "any
time spent in changing clothes." 29 U.S.C. §
203(o) (1999) (hereinafter "§ 3(o)"). IBP
argues that, even if compensable in a general
sense, the time employees spend donning
and doffing protective gear is non-
compensable under the "changing clothes or
washing" exclusion.
Distilled to its essence, this case requires us
to decide whether putting on and taking off
protective gear constitutes "changing
clothes" as that phrase is used in the statute.
Neither § 3(o) nor its legislative history
defines the phrase, and no case law assesses
the precise question we address here. In
light of this doctrinal, statutory, and
legislative lacunae, we give the relevant
language its "ordinary, contemporary,
common meaning." Perrin v. United States,
444 US. 37, 42 (1979).
. . . FLSA exemptions, the Supreme Court
has long counseled, "are to be narrowly
construed against the employers seeking to
assert them." Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc.,
361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960). Following the
Supreme Court's lead, we have also read
FLSA exemptions-such as § 3(o)-tightly,
refusing to apply FLSA exemptions "except
[in contexts] plainly and unmistakably
within the [given exemption's] terms and
spirit." Klem v. County of Santa Clara, 208
F.3d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2000). The
protective gear at issue does not "plainly and
unmistakably" fit within § 3(o)'s "clothing"
term. Absent such a plain and clear § 3(o)
fit, Arnold requires that we construe § 3(o)'s
against the employer seeking to assert it.
361 US. at 392. Thus, the exemption must
be construed against IBP.
Second, and perhaps more importantly,
specialized protective gear is different in
kind from typical clothing. The admonition
to wear warm clothing, for example, does
not usually conjure up images of donning a
bullet-proof vest or an environmental
spacesuit. Rather, personal protective
equipment generally refers to materials worn
by an individual to provide a barrier against
exposure to workplace hazards. OSHA has
recognized the difference in its regulations
defining "personal protective equipment[.]"
. . ."General work clothes (e.g. uniforms,
pants, shirts or blouses) not intended to
function as protection against a hazard are
not considered to be personal protective
equipment." 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030 (1999).
Of course, this OSHA definition was
promulgated in a different context.
Nonetheless, it provides a useful analytic
distinction. It also underscores the fact that,
from both a regulatory and common sense
perspective, "changing clothes" means
something different from "donning required
specialized personal protective equipment."
In short, the district court correctly
interpreted the "changing clothes" exception
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in § 3(o) as not including the time spent
putting on personal protective equipment.
IV.
IBP also disputes the district court's view of
the compensable work day. It claims that
the district court erred in determining that
the compensable work day began with the
first act of compensable work. Specifically,
IBP argues that workers should not be paid
for the time spent walking to and from the
Pasco plant stations after donning personal
protective equipment. Under § 4 of the
Portal-to-Portal Act, employees receive
compensation only for "hours worked," i.e.,
for work occurring during the "workday."
Under § 4, employees have no right to
receive overtime compensation for activities
that are "preliminary to or postliminary to [a
job's] principal activity or activities," 29
U.S.C. § 254(a) (1999), unless those
preliminary or postliminary activities are
"integral and indispensable [to] the principal
activities for which [the employees] are
employed." Steiner, 350 U.S. at 256; 29
US.C. § 254(a) (1999).
The district court properly reasoned that the
workday commenced with the performance
of a preliminary activity that was "integral
and indispensable" to the work, and the
district court also properly determined that
any activity occurring thereafter in the scope
and course of employment was
compensable. Thus, the district court
included "the reasonable walking time from
the locker to work station and back . . . for
employees required to don and doff
compensable personal protective equipment"
in its "compensable" time measure.
... The district court correctly held that
Pasco plant work time was continuous, not
the sum of discrete periods.
V.
IBP contends that it is shielded from liability
by FLSA's good faith defense provisions.
See 29 US.C. §§ 259, 260 (1999)....
The good faith provisions of § 259 do not
embrace IBP's conduct. To come within the
exception's reach, an employer's acts "must
have been taken in reliance on [an]
administrative ruling or interpretation."
Home Ins. Co., 672 F.2d at 264.... As the
district court rightly noted, [prior] litigation
provided IBP "nothing upon which to rely
other than its assumptions about what
clothes changing and washing were
including under 3(o)."
VI.
[The district court appropriately applied 29
U.S.C. § 255's three-year statute of
limitations to IBP's willful conduct.]
VII.
[The district court did not err in awarding
liquidated damages under the FLSA.]
VIII.
[The district court properly rejected IBP's
contention that it was exempt from the State
of Washington's overtime wage provisions.]
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Ix.
[The Washington Minimum Wage Act, like
the FLSA, requires employers to
compensate employees at, at least, a
minimum-wage rate. Some courts have held
that, under the FLSA, an employee's right to
recover minimum wage accrues each
workweek, not by individual hour. The
district court concluded that Washington
courts were "likely" to adopt the per-hour
standard for hourly employees. We agree.]
X.
[Under Washington Administrative Code,
plaintiffs are owed compensation for the full
thirty-minute period where IBP has intruded
upon or infringed the mandatory thirty-
minute term to any extent.]
XI.
[The district court did not abuse its
discretion in its compensation calculation.]
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part
and reverse in part the judgment of the
district court. We remand for recalculation
of damages....
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Tum v. Barber Foods
(04-0066)
Rulings Below: (Tum v. Barber Foods, 360 F.3d 274 (1" Cir. Me., 2004), cert granted 125 S.
Ct. 1295, 161 L. Ed. 2d 104, 73 USLW 3494).
Employees of Barber Foods sued their employer for alleged violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"), seeking to recover wages for time they spent donning and doffing
specialized protective clothing before and after work. The First Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of a Maine federal district court, holding that only time spent actually
donning and doffing legally required gear was compensable. Neither waiting in line for required
equipment nor walking between stations was compensable, under the Portal-to-Portal Act's
exceptions to the FLSA.
Questions Presented: Whether time employees spend walking to and from stations where
required safety equipment is distributed is compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act and
Portal-to-Portal Act, and whether employees have a right to compensation for time spent waiting
at the required safety equipment stations.
Abdela TUM, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants,
V.
BARBER FOODS, Inc., Defendant, Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit
Decided March 10, 2004
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs-appellants are a group of hourly
wage employees ("Employees") who
brought suit against their employer, Barber
Foods, for alleged violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), 29
U.S.C. § 216(b). Employees sought
compensation for alleged unrecorded and
uncompensated work performed by them for
Barber Foods.
The district court granted partial summary
judgment for the defendant. A trial was held
on the issue of whether the time spent
donning and doffing required clothing
constituted "work" and whether such time
was de minimis. The jury found for the
defendant. Employees appeal from the grant
of summary judgment and from the district
court's decision and they challenge two of
the district court's jury instructions. Barber
Foods cross-appeals, arguing that the district
court erred in ruling that the donning and
doffing of required clothing and equipment
is an integral part of the Employees' work
for Barber Foods and is not excluded from
compensation under the Portal-to-Portal Act
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as preliminary or postliminary activity.
After initial review by the panel, we
affirmed. Tum v. Barber Foods, Inc., 331
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003). Plaintiffs filed a
petition for rehearing, after which we
received an amicus brief from the Secretary
of Labor ("the Secretary"). Having
considered the arguments, we now grant
rehearing but affirm.
I. Background
Located in Portland, Maine, Barber Foods is
a secondary processor of poultry-based
products. ... Barber Foods has two shifts,
each with six production lines, consisting of
three "specialty" lines and three "pack-out"
lines....
The production lines are staffed primarily by
rotating associates, employees who
generally rotate to different positions on the
lines every two hours....
All associates are expected to be on the
production floor ready to work when their
shift begins. They are paid from the time
they actually punch in to a computerized
time-keeping system from time clocks
located at the entrances to the production
floor.
A. Equipment
Rotating associates are required to wear lab
coats, haimets, earplugs, and safety glasses.
The lab coats, hairnets, and earplugs must be
on before they can punch in and until they
punch out. Safety glasses and any items that
they choose but are not required to wear,
such as gloves, aprons, and sleeve covers,
can be donned after punching in and doffed
before punching out.
Shipping and receiving associates are
required to wear steel-toed boots, hard hats,
and back belts. They generally don these
items before punching in and doff them after
punching out. Their time clock is located on
the production floor, so they must also don
and doff lab coats, haimets, and earplugs in
order to enter the production floor to punch
in and out.
Employees may have to wait to obtain and
dispense with clothing and equipment. At
busier times, there may be lines at the coat
racks, glove liner bins, and cage window.
There may also be lines at the time clocks.
B. Time Keeping
Barber Foods uses a computerized time-
keeping system. The system downloads
clock punches into the payroll software.
Time clocks are located at the entrances and
exits to the production floor and at various
other locations in the facility....
Employees get paid from the moment they
punch in. In an attempt to stagger check-in
times, Barber Foods allows Employees
twelve minutes of "swing time," meaning
that Employees can punch in up to six
minutes early and get paid for that additional
time or punch in up to six minutes late and
not be charged with an attendance violation.
C. History of Dispute
Seven current employees and thirty-seven
former employees brought suit in district
court claiming that Barber Foods violated
the FLSA by forcing its hourly employees to
work "off the clock" by not paying
Employees for the time it takes to obtain,
don, and doff their gear. . . . [T]he district
court ... found that the donning and doffing
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of clothing and equipment required by
Barber Foods or by government regulation is
an integral part of Plaintiffs' employment.
This finding removed the donning and
doffing of required gear from the Portal-to-
Portal Act and its exclusion of
compensability for preliminary or
postliminary activity. 29 C.F.R. § 790.8. A
trial was held on the issue of whether the
time spent donning and doffing required
clothing was de minimis and thus did not
constitute work under the FLSA.
. . . The jury found that each of [the]
donning and doffing times [was] de minimis,
making the donning and doffing time non-
compensable. Employees do not challenge
the jury's findings.
Employees appeal the following findings: .
. (1) that the time employees must
necessarily spend walking and waiting in
connection with obtaining, donning, doffing,
and disposing of the sanitary and protective
gear required by Barber Foods and/or
federal regulation is not compensable; (2)
that the time spent donning and doffing
clothing, equipment, and gear which is not
expressly required by Barber Foods is non-
compensable. In addition, Employees
challenge two district court jury instructions.
III. Discussion
The FLSA requires an employer to record,
credit, and compensate employees for all of
the time which the employer requires or
permits employees to work, 29 US.C. § 201,
et seq., commonly defined as "physical or
mental exertion (whether burdensome or
not) controlled or required by the employer
and pursued necessarily and primarily for
the benefit of the employer and his
business." Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v.
Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598
(1944).
However, even when an activity is properly
classified as "work," the Portal-to-Portal
Act, 29 US.C. § 254, exempts from
compensation activities which are
preliminary or postliminary to an employee's
principal activity or activities unless they are
an "integral and indispensable part of the
principal activities for which covered
workers are employed and not specifically
excluded by section 4(a)(1) [of the Portal-to-
Portal Act]." Lindow v. United States, 738
F.2d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir 1984). In
addition, some activities that may qualify as
"work" and fall outside of the Portal-to-
Portal Act nevertheless do not require
compensation because the activities require
such little time that they are adjudged de
minimis. Dunlop v. City Elec. Inc. 527 F 2d
394 (5th Cir. 1976).
A. Donning and Doffing of Gear
The district court found that the donning and
doffing of required gear is an integral and
indispensable part of Employees' principal
activities. See generally Steiner v. Mitchell,
350 U.S. 247 (1956) (holding that activities
should be considered integral and
indispensable when they are part of the
principal activities for the particular job
tasks). We agree with the district court's
conclusion as to the required gear. In the
context of this case, Employees are required
by Barber Foods and or government
regulation to wear the gear. Therefore, these
tasks are integral to the principal activity
and therefore compensable. See Alvarez v.
IBP, Inc., 339 F. 3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2003).
As relates to the non-required gear,
Employees contend that any activity which
promotes safety and sanitary conditions
necessarily benefits the employer. We think
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this takes the argument too far. The donning
and doffing of non-required gear is not
compensable under these facts. Not
everything an employee does in her
workplace is compensable under the FLSA.
These optional items are required neither by
the employer nor by the regulations and are
worn by Employees at their own discretion.
B. Walking Time
Employees argue that the district court
improperly excluded from compensable time
the periods Employees walk from one area
where they obtain an initial piece of clothing
or equipment (required by Barber Foods
and/or USDA regulations) to another area
where they obtain additional items, the
period they spend walking from getting their
garb to the time clocks, and the period they
spend walking to the area where they
dispose of clothing and equipment after they
punch out.
The Portal-to-Portal Act specifically
addresses walking time, generally
exempting from compensation "walking,
riding, or traveling to and from the actual
place of performance of the principal
activity or activities which such employee is
employed to perform." The Act also
generally exempts from compensation
activities which are preliminary or
postliminary to an employee's principal
activity or activities. On their face, these
provisions would appear to exempt from
compensation the walking at issue here.
Employees argue that the Portal-to-Portal
Act excludes only that walking time which
occurs before an employee commences her
principal activity or activities. The Code of
Federal Regulations ("Code") states that
Congress intended the term "principal
activities" to be broad. 29 C.FR. § 790.8(a)
(2002). However, the Code regulations state
that just because the changing of clothes
may in "certain situations be so directly
related to the specific work the employee is
employed to perform that it would be
regarded as an integral part of the
employee's 'principal activity[,]' this does
not necessarily mean, however, that travel
between the washroom or clothes-changing
place and the actual place of performance of
the specific work the employee is employed
to perform, would be excluded from the type
of travel to which section 4(a) [Portal-to-
Portal Act] refers."
Compensability issues are determined under
the FLSA and its accompanying regulations.
Both parties agree that the Portal-to-Portal
Act does not apply to questions of
compensability during the "workday." The
Secretary urges an expansion of the ordinary
"workday" rule in favor of a broader,
automatic rule that any activity that satisfies
the "integral and indispensable" test itself
starts the workday, regardless of context....
[N]othing in Steiner requires the result that
the Secretary urges, and the Secretary's rule
threatens to undermine Congress's purpose
in the Portal-to-Portal Act, which (with rare
exceptions) sought to exclude preliminary
and postliminary waiting and walking time
from compensability.
. . . We affirm the determination that the
employees' walking time is not
compensable.
C. Waiting Time
Employees claim that Barber Foods must
compensate them for all the time they spend
waiting in line to receive the required
clothing or equipment and to punch in at the
time clocks.
Whether waiting time is compensable under
318
the FLSA depends on whether an employee
is "waiting to be engaged" or "engaged to
wait." See generally Skidmore, 323 US. at
136-37. Idle time may be considered work
under the FLSA where it is controlled by the
employer and the time spent is dominated by
the need to serve the employer's needs. See
Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 US. 126,
133-34 (1944). The regulations elaborate on
this principle by stating that an employee is
engaged to wait, i.e., working, when "the
employee is unable to use the time
effectively for his own purposes. It belongs
to and is controlled by the employer. . . ."
. . . Employees argue that they should be
compensated for time spent waiting to punch
in at the time clocks. Waiting in line to
punch in at the time clock is explicitly
excluded from compensable activity by 29
C.F.R. § 790.8(c). There is no indication
that any of the time spent waiting is
controlled by the employer. Employees
have adduced no evidence to counter that
conclusion.
Second, we turn to the waiting time
associated with donning and doffing of
clothes. Even if we were to find that the
employees were engaged to wait under the
FLSA and its accompanying regulations, the
waiting time would qualify as preliminary or
postliminary activity under the Portal-to-
Portal Act.... When we look at 29 C.F.R.
§ 790.8, we find that while the Code does
not explicitly address the type of waiting
time at issue, the Code indicates that a
reasonable amount of waiting time is
intended to be preliminary or postliminary. .
. . [B]y excluding walking with ordinary
equipment and carrying light equipment, the
Code indicates that a line must be drawn,
otherwise an almost endless number of
activities that precipitate the employees'
essential tasks would be compensable. We
find that a short amount of time spent
waiting in line for gear is the type of activity
that the Portal-to-Portal Act excludes from
compensation as preliminary.
E. Jury Instructions
[Employees challenged two jury instructions
referring to the definition and scope of
"donning" and "doffing." Both instructions
were accurate, and neither was prejudicial,
so the challenges are without foundation.]
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the
district court judgment.
AFFIRMED.
CONCURRING:
BOUDIN, Chief Judge:
The central issue in this case is whether
walking and waiting time, incident to the
donning and doffing of required clothes and
equipment, are compensable where
(according to findings in the district court)
the time spent in donning and doffing is
minimal but the combined walking and
waiting time may be extensive. There may
be no "right" answer short of the Supreme
Court's reading of its own precedents, but
the problem can at least be understood if the
history and underlying tensions are candidly
arrayed.
The original Fair Labor Standards Act made
compensable time spent in "work," but it
defined the concept only in the most general
terms....
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. . . [The Supreme Court's interpretations]
contradicted actual pay practice within the
industries and created large overhanging
liabilities for employers. To the extent that
workers received more than the minimum
wage, the decisions also upset underlying
bargains. A flood of lawsuits followed.
Congress responded with the Portal-to-
Portal Act to cut off these claims for the past
and to provide in the future (with exceptions
not here relevant) that compensation was not
required for [preliminary or postliminary
activities].
A decade later, this new legislative balance
was reset (and perhaps upset) in a small way
by a new Supreme Court decision. In
Steiner, the Justices held that the Portal-to-
Portal Act did not cover the time spent
donning and doffing of special clothing and
time spent showering, in facilities required
by state law, to protect workers dealing with
dangerously caustic and toxic materials....
Steiner was an understandable reaction-
after all, the dangers were extreme and
unique to the job . . . ; but the tension with
the Portal-to-Portal Act's underlying policy
has been less easy to escape as Steiner has
been extended.
However, the more serious problem for
employers arises in cases such as this one by
attempts to extend Steiner further to walking
and waiting incident to such donning and
doffing....
. . . [T]hus extended, the tension with the
Portal-to-Portal Act becomes acute: after all,
why is this complex of donning, doffing,
waiting and travel within the Barber plant
very different from the preliminary activities
which were involved in the Mt. Clemens
case-one of the targets of the Portal-to-
Portal Act....
[T]wo positions are juxtaposed. One is
the . . . mechanical combination of Steiner
with a rigid "everything after is work"
principle. The other is to treat required
donning and doffing as compensable where
more than de minimis but, where it is not,
leaving both it and any associated walking
and waiting time as non-compensable.
Neither outcome is impossible analytically
and neither is clearly dictated by Supreme
Court precedent or underlying policy.
So where does the balance of advantage lie?
On Barber's side, as already noted, the
history and language of the Portal-to-Portal
Act tend to favor Barber, as do two of the
three circuit decisions; the question is how
far Steiner has qualified the statute. ...
Finally, it appears that wages at the Barber
plant were set against a background practice
of treating as non-compensable the donning,
doffing, walking and waiting involved in
this case. Unless those wages are the federal
minimum, a decision that now such time is
compensable will likely be offset by wage
adjustments in the future, leaving only a
one-time windfall for employees. It is hard
to begrudge this to workers doing difficult
and disagreeable work, but the situation
does bear an uncanny resemblance to that
which prompted the Portal-to-Portal Act. It
may be time for the Supreme Court to have
another look at the problem.
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"Local Attorneys Gearing up for Supreme Court"
GSA Business (S.C.)
March 23, 2005
Francis B. Allgood
Sometime this fall, the U.S. Supreme Court
will deliver a decision that may dictate
whether a manufacturer must pay employees
for the time it takes to put on protective
clothing and walk to their workstations.
David R. Wylie and Christopher Lauderdale,
attorneys with Jackson Lewis LLP in
Greenville, are representing the National
Chicken Council, American Meat Institute
and the National Association of
Manufacturers. They petitioned the
Supreme Court, claiming there are
inconsistent interpretations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. "It's a battle of language of
the statute enacted by Congress 60 years ago
and the way the Labor Department wants to
interpret it," Lauderdale says.
Interest by the Supreme Court was sparked
by two separate rulings: Abdela Tum v.
Barber Foods Inc. in Portland, Maine, and
IBP Inc. v. Gabriel Alvarez in Pasco, Wash.
For IBP-now known as Tyson Fresh Meats
Inc.-the company was ordered to pay $3.1
million to 815 employees for the time it
takes to put on protective clothing and walk
to their workstations. Barber Foods, on the
other hand, won its case, following a
rehearing decision that provided some
conflicting opinions.
The argument before the court is that there is
contradicting language among decisions
made by the high courts and Congress for
what's compensable.
In 1946, the definition of "work" under the
FLSA was extended to include time spent by
employees walking to their workstations and
other activities, such as changing clothes. In
response, Congress passed the Portal-to-
Portal Act in an attempt to stop such claims
from being compensable, asserting it would
create "unexpected liabilities" for the
employer.
But in 1956, in Steiner v. Mitchell, the
Supreme Court found exception to the
Portal-to-Portal Act. Employees exposed to
toxic chemicals while working in a battery
plant were required to change clothes prior
to their shift and shower immediately after
their shift. The court ruled that because the
workers were in hazardous conditions,
showering and changing clothes was
compensable. "Steiner almost swallowed
the rule of the Portal-to-Portal Act,"
Lauderdale says.
Kevin Russell, an attorney with Goldstein &
Howe PC in Washington, D.C., represents
the employees in Tum v. Barber Foods. He
says employees must wait in line to get their
lab coats, ear plugs, safety glasses and other
gear from a distribution cage, then change
clothes and walk to their work area before
they clock in. "The employer has no
incentive to making that line move quicker,"
Russell says. "It's not a huge amount of
money for the employer, but it is significant
to the low-paid worker."
In the original Tum v. Barber Foods case,
the court ruled the time it takes to change
into uniform was compensable, but ruled
against the time it takes to wait in line to get
the equipment and the time it takes to walk
from the changing room to the workstation.
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If the worker is paid for changing clothes,
but is not compensable for leaving the
changing room for her workstation,
inevitably there's a conflict.
"It's a scheme that doesn't make a whole lot
of sense," Russell admits. Lauderdale says
in the beef industry, where heavy equipment
is donned by workers, changing clothes has
been compensable and is not being
challenged. Lightweight protective gear,
such as a bump cap and clean outerwear
garments worn in poultry processing plants,
don't warrant the same standard. "It's not
just limited to the poultry issue," Lauderdale
says.
As recently as a week ago, a similar case
was settled in Timmonsville.
Honda of South Carolina Manufacturing Inc.
will pay a $2 million settlement for the time
it took employees to prepare for work. The
suit, filed in U.S. District Court in Florence,
asks Honda to pay overtime for the 7.3
minutes it took each time to change into and
out of uniforms from July 1, 2001, to July
31, 2003.
On Aug. 1, 2003, Honda changed its policy
to allow workers to prepare for work at
home. The agreement states that Honda
denies the allegations, but Honda and other
automotive manufacturers have seen similar
lawsuits before.
In January 2003, Honda agreed to pay $1.2
million in back pay at a plant in Lincoln,
Alabama.
In April 2003, Mercedes-Benz
International paid $687,588 in back
to workers in Vance, Alabama.
U.S.
wages
David George, president of Data Driven
Manufacturing Inc., which offers Six Sigma
consulting and data analysis services, says
the manufacturers he works for have always
ruled compensation begins at the employee's
workstation.
"I've never seen it come into play," George
says. "If you are scheduled to be at your
workstation, that includes being dressed
appropriately. Whether you are having to
wear proper shoes or eye protection, you
come ready to work or you change at work."
According to George, most employees at
General Electric Gas Turbines in Greenville
wear their uniforms to work. The only
equipment donned at GE are special boots
for some workers. At Associated Fuel Pump
Systems Corp. in Anderson, the company
pays for a portion of up to 11 sets of
uniforms per employee, and offers to do a
week's worth of work laundry.
But human resource manager Donna Baker
says uniforms are optional, not required.
Basic equipment, such as protective
eyewear, takes only seconds to put on, she
says. "In my mind, this has more to do with
companies that have clean rooms where
(employees) have to dress," says Baker, who
has kept abreast of the recent court rulings.
Lauderdale says the concern is how the
Supreme Court's ruling may impact not only
meat processors, but other manufacturers,
and state and local governments.
Cases involving law enforcement and fire
officials have also revealed conflicting
arguments.
"Everybody's got to dress. Whether its a
tuxedo, a waitress uniform or just a coat and
tie," says Clay Johnston, owner of Wright-
Johnston Uniforms in Columbia.
Specializing in public safety uniforms with a
small industrial business, Johnston admits
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he's never heard of such cases.
Wright-Johnston is a supplier for the
Greenville Police Department.
"Putting on a belt holster may take 30
seconds, not much more than that," Johnston
says.
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"Tyson Asks Court to Resolve Pay Dispute"
Legal Times
April 26, 2004
Tony Mauro
Tyson Foods, the world's largest supplier of
meats, is trying to enlist the Supreme Court
in its dispute with slaughterhouse workers
over their claim that they should be paid for
the time it takes to change into protective
clothing and walk to and from their work
stations.
In a petition filed by Carter Phillips of
Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, the company
is hoping to reverse a ruling that awarded
workers at its Pasco, Wash., plant more than
$3 million in damages for its failure to pay
workers for the time at issue. The case is
called IBP Inc. v. Alvarez, No. 03-1238.
IBP was taken over by Tyson in 2001, after
the suit was filed.
Citing conflicting rulings in circuits across
the country, a brief filed by the National
Chicken Council and other industry groups
also urges the high court to grant review.
"The issue raised by this case regarding the
compensability of walking time is extremely
important" to the meat industry, says David
Wylie of Haynsworth Baldwin Johnson &
Greaves in Greenville, S.C., author of the
industry brief.
The case is one of dozens that the Court will
discuss at its private conference April 30.
The Court could announce on May 3
whether it will review the case.
The original lawsuit was brought in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of
Washington on behalf of 815 beef slaughter
and processing workers, citing violations of
federal and state labor laws. They sought
compensation for the time they spend
donning and doffing protective clothing they
are required to wear for health and safety
reasons, and for the time then needed to
walk between locker rooms where they
change and their work stations at the
beginning and end of their shifts. U.S.
District Judge Robert Whaley sided with the
workers.
IBP appealed, citing sections of federal law
that allow employers not to pay workers for
time spent "changing clothes" or walking to
and from work areas. The Labor
Department also weighed in, with then-
Labor Solicitor Eugene Scalia filing a brief
agreeing that the walking time should be
compensated. On the clothing issue, the
department reversed a Clinton-era
interpretation and sided with the company,
finding that companies did not have to
compensate workers for the time spent
putting on and taking off the garments and
protective gear.
The San Francisco-based U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed the
District Court, rejecting IBP's arguments.
The statute, wrote Judge Sidney Thomas,
could not be read to "lead to the conclusion
that a workday may be commenced, then
stopped while the employee is walking to
his station, then recommenced when the
walking is done." On the clothing issue, the
panel agreed that the specialized gear
required by the employer was "different in
kind from typical clothing," and therefore
the workers' time should be compensated.
Thomas also noted that since the publication
of Upton Sinclair's The Jungle in 1906, the
324
meatpacking industry has been heavily
regulated, yet still remains "one of the most
dangerous jobs in America."
On a lighter note, Thomas also said,
"Perhaps the packing plant employees in
Pasco, Wash. should have heeded Henry
David Thoreau's warning to 'beware of all
enterprises that require new clothes.' "
Thomas was joined by circuit Judge Dorothy
Nelson and Judge Susan Illston of the
Northern District of California, sitting by
designation.
Phillips, in his brief for IBP, notes that the
Boston-based 1st Circuit "squarely rejected"
the 9th Circuit's reasoning in a decision last
year, and a decision by the Denver-based
10th Circuit also ruled differently in a case
involving IBP.
The brief for the workers in the case argues
that there is no significant circuit conflict on
the issue and that the 9th Circuit ruling is
correct and should not be disturbed. "The
few opinions to date are intensely fact-
bound," writes William Rutzick of Schroeter
Goldmark & Bender in Seattle. "They
involve only a few industries and small
amounts of time."
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"Workers Sue for Back Pay at Barber"
Portland Press Herald (Maine)
December 28, 2000
Peter Pochna
Several employees at Barber Foods have
filed a lawsuit against the poultry-packing
plant, claiming that the company has
violated federal labor law by requiring
workers to perform tasks for which they are
not paid.
The claim strikes at the company's
reputation as a generous employer that
strives to take care of its many foreign-born
workers. Barber has 750 full-time
employees, 44 percent of whom are foreign-
born.
Four employees are named as plaintiffs in
the collective-action case that eventually
could include hundreds more workers. At
stake are millions in wages dating back three
years.
The lawsuit filed Dec. 12 in U.S. District
Court claims that the company does not pay
its hourly employees for the time they spend
at the St. John Street plant gathering and
putting on safety equipment before shifts,
and storing the equipment at the end of the
day. For some of the workers, that amounts
to nearly an hour of overtime pay each day
that they aren't getting, the lawsuit states.
Worker advocates say the company is taking
advantage of employees who don't speak
English well and don't understand their
rights.
"I think people are fed up with how they are
being treated," said Kathy Poulos, a Portland
advocate for refugee and immigrant rights.
"We want these procedures to be revised and
to come into compliance with the law. We
want people paid for the hours they work."
Vicki Mann, a spokeswoman for Barber,
said the company tries to treat its employees
fairly. She cited the numerous services the
company offers its workers, such as the four
on-site classrooms where English, math,
science and computer skills are taught.
"It's very unfair" to accuse the company of
mistreating its workers, Mann said. "We
pride ourselves on treating all our employees
fairly."
She said Barber officials are investigating
the allegations made in the lawsuit.
"Obviously, we are taking this very
seriously," Mann said. "It has always been
our intention to comply with the law."
Barber Foods is a locally owned company
founded in 1955 by Gus Barber and still
owned by the Barber family. It offers a
wide variety of products, including frozen
chicken entrees. It distributes to grocery
stores, restaurants and other businesses
throughout the United States and Canada as
well as some other foreign markets.
Many of the jobs at the plant involve work
on "specialty lines," where employees
perform tasks such as wrapping chicken
parts and packing them in trays. Workers
typically earn between $ 9 and $ 13 an hour.
The 21-page lawsuit states that "Barber
foods has willfully engaged in a pattern and
practice of unlawful conduct by declining to
record and pay for all of the time it requires
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or permits its employees to work, in
violation of the" Fair Labor Standards Act.
The case only covers three years because the
statute of limitations blocks any claims for
previous years.
Tadeusz Olszynski, one of the plaintiffs, is a
machine operator who has worked for
Barber since 1991. He immigrated to
Portland from Poland 12 years ago.
Before punching the clock each day, he must
put on extensive safety equipment, such as
gloves, earplugs, safety glasses, a haimet, a
hat, steel-toed boots and a safety belt. He
claims he should earn about an hour more of
overtime wages per day. He believes the
company owes him at least $ 10,000.
"They don't pay for what they are supposed
to pay for," Olszynski said. "People have
been scared to bring this up. But I think
now many others will join this lawsuit."
The other plaintiffs are Abdela Tum, who
has worked at Barber since 1990, Celso
Florendo, an employee since 1994, and
Najib Sayed, who worked there from 1994
to February of this year.
The law firm of Gordon, Silberman,
Wiggins and Childs, based in Washington,
D.C., is representing the workers. The firm
specializes in employment litigation.
Poulos, who helped organize the legal
action, is in the process of informing all the
workers at the plant about the suit. This
involves distributing forms in numerous
different languages. Olszynski estimates
that about 1,000 current and former workers
will join the suit.
In order for the case to be considered a
class-action lawsuit, the plaintiffs' lawyers
must convince the court that there is a
substantial group of people who may have
been harmed by the defendant's actions.
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"Court Rules Tyson Fresh Meats Must Pay $3.1 Million
to Wallula, Wash. Workers"
Tri-City Herald (Washington)
August 9, 2003
Jeff St. John
Tyson Fresh Meats Inc. must pay more than
$ 3.1 million to workers at its Wallula beef
plant for time they spent putting on and
taking off mandatory safety gear on the job,
a federal appeals court has ruled.
Workers at the plant and their union
representatives, who have sought the back
pay for four years, said Friday that the ruling
was a victory for themselves and
meatpacking workers across the nation.
"This band of workers here have really been
setting the bar for workers in the
meatpacking industry," said Lorene Scheer,
organizing director for Teamsters union
Local 556 in Walla Walla, which represents
workers at the Wallula plant.
The ruling by the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, filed Tuesday, upholds a 2001 U.S.
District Court order to pay more than 800
workers up to $ 10,000 apiece for the time
they spent donning and doffing their gear.
The class-action lawsuit, Alvarez v. IBP
Inc., began in 1999, before IBP was
purchased by Tyson Foods Inc. and changed
its name to Tyson Fresh Meats earlier this
year. The suit claimed IBP violated the
federal Fair Labor Standards Act and related
state laws by not paying workers adequately
for the time it takes to dress in safety gear
and clean and store tools.
Workers who use knives can spend up to 30
minutes a day putting on and taking off the
specialized equipment, which includes
safety boots and metal mesh vests, aprons,
leggings, sleeves and gloves, said
Melquiadez Pererya, Local 556 president.
Tyson Fresh Meats said in a news release
that it will seek a rehearing of the case and,
if necessary, appeal the ruling to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
The court's decision "is in direct conflict
with other recent federal court decisions,
regulations and policies of the U.S.
Department of Labor, and over 50 years of
industry precedent," Tyson spokesman Gary
Mickelson said in the statement.
The 9th Circuit Court also has asked U.S.
District Court Judge Robert H. Whaley to
calculate into any final award the pay owed
to workers who were forced to cut short the
30-minute unpaid lunch break they were
given each day, said Kathy Goater, a Seattle
attorney representing the workers.
Because workers weren't allowed to eat
lunch with their protective gear on, but
weren't given any extra time to remove and
put on the gear either, they should be
compensated for free time lost during the
lunch breaks, she said.
Workers sought payment for the lost lunch
time in the lawsuit, and adding that
compensation to any final award could
increase the amount owed to workers to
about $ 7.4 million, she said.
"It's a huge victory for these workers," she
said. "They truly deserve this award, and
we're thrilled for them."
328
The ruling may also lend weight to a second
class-action lawsuit filed by Wallula plant
workers who weren't included in the 1998
lawsuit, she said. This second lawsuit,
Chavez v. IBP Inc., is scheduled to be heard
by Judge Whaley in September 2004, she
said.
Tyson Fresh Meats workers who gathered
outside the Wallula plant Friday said that
they were less concerned about getting a
check in the mail than about setting an
example for other meatpacking workers.
"We finally got justice," Maria Chavez, one
of the workers in the lawsuit, said in
Spanish. "This is a little compensation for
what we've suffered."
The 59-year-old Pasco woman has worked
at the Wallula plant since 1983, and said
she'll use whatever money comes to her for
her retirement.
Worker Arturo Aguilar of Kennewick said
the ruling was "an example for other
workers" and a matter of pride for union
employees at the Wallula plant. "This is
something you can't touch," he said,
"something priceless."
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Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher
(04-805)
Ruling Below: Dagher v. Saudi Refining, Inc., 369 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted 125
S. Ct. 1372, (U.S. June 1, 2005). The Solicitor General was invited to file a brief expressing the
views of the United States, 125 S. Ct. 1372 (2005).
Plaintiffs, a class of 23,000 Shell and Texaco service station owners represented by Fouad
Dagher and others, sued three oil companies alleging that these companies had conspired to fix
the nationwide prices for the Shell and Texaco brands of gasoline through the creation of a
national alliance consisting of 2 joint ventures. The district court granted the oil companies
summary judgment for lack of standing and because the owners failed to raise a triable issue of
fact as to whether the Sherman Act's per se prohibition against price fixing was applicable to the
economic arrangements between the companies. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed as
to the owners' failure to create a triable issue of fact. The Ninth Circuit found that the absence of
persuasive evidence showing a pro-competitive justification for initiating the price-fixing
scheme, when viewed along with the owners' evidence showing anti-competitive effects, was a
convincing showing as to the applicability of the per se rule.
Question Presented: Whether it is per se illegal concerted action under § 1 of the Sherman Act
for an economically integrated joint venture to set the selling price of its own products.
Fouad N. DAGHER, Plaintiff-Appellant
V.
SAUDI REFINING, INC., Defendant-Appellee
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Decided June 1, 2004
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted]
OPINION: REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs Fouad N. Dagher, et al., appeal
from the district court's award of summary
judgment to the defendants, Texaco, Inc.,
Shell Oil Co., and Saudi Refining, Inc.
(SRI), et al. The plaintiffs represent a class
of 23,000 Texaco and Shell service station
owners who allege that the defendants
conspired to fix the nationwide prices for the
Shell and Texaco brands of gasoline through
the creation of a national alliance consisting
of two joint ventures. The district court
granted two summary judgment motions:
one to dismiss defendant SRI because the
plaintiffs lacked antitrust standing; the other
to dismiss the complaint against the
remaining defendants because the plaintiffs
failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to
whether the Sherman Antitrust Act's per se
prohibition against price fixing is applicable
to the economic arrangements between the
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defendants. We affirm the district court's
ruling as to the plaintiffs' standing to sue
SRI, but reverse the district court's decision
that the plaintiffs failed to create a triable
issue of fact under the Sherman Act.
There is a voluminous record documenting
the economic justifications for creating the
joint ventures. After analysis by teams
made up of representatives of all three
companies, the defendants concluded that
numerous synergies and cost efficiencies
would result. The defendants concluded that
nation-wide there would be up to $800
million in cost savings annually. The
Federal Trade Commission and several State
Attorneys General approved the formation
of the joint ventures, subject to
modifications demanded by both the federal
agency and the various Attorneys General.
The creation of the alliance ended
competition between Shell and Texaco
throughout the nation in the areas of
downstream refining and marketing of
gasoline. Texaco and Shell signed non-
competition agreements which prohibited
them from competing with either Equilon or
Motiva and committed them "not to engage
in the manufacturing and marketing of
certain products in the [relevant] geographic
areas, including fuel, synthetic gasoline, and
electricity." The two joint ventures
established fixed ratios for profit sharing and
for bearing the risk of losses....
The various agreements between the oil
companies allowed Texaco and Shell to
consolidate and unify the pricing of the
Texaco and Shell gasoline brands within the
Equilon and Motiva joint ventures. Before
creating the two joint ventures, Shell,
Texaco, and Star all independently set prices
for their wholesale and retail sales, generally
through decisions made by their corporate
pricing units. Testimony in the record
reveals that, either immediately before the
formation of the joint ventures or sometime
shortly thereafter, "a decision was made that
the Shell and Texaco brands would have the
same price in the same market areas.". . .
The alliance consolidated pricing of the
Texaco and Shell brands such that a single
individual at each joint venture was
responsible for setting a coordinated price
for the two brands....
The price optimization program may have
allowed Equilon and Motiva to raise
gasoline prices at a time when the price of
crude oil was low and stable. During a time
when crude oil prices reached near-historic
lows-the price of crude oil decreased from
$ 10 to $ 12 per barrel between September
1998 and February 1999-Equilon raised its
prices $ .40 per gallon in Los Angeles and $
.30 per gallon in both Seattle and Portland.
II. Standard of Review
We review a district court's grant of
summary judgment de novo. United States
v. City of Tacoma, 332 F.3d 574, 578 (9th
Cir. 2003). Taking the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmovant, we must
consider whether there are any genuine
issues of material fact and whether the
district court properly applied the pertinent
substantive law.
* * *
331
IV. Liability Under the Sherman Antitrust
Act
The Sherman Antitrust Act makes illegal
"every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations[.]" 15 U.S.C.
Price fixing is the quintessential example of
a per se violation of § ....
Notwithstanding the above, it is plain that §
I's blanket prohibition on price fixing, like
the Act itself, cannot be read literally. Cf
Profl Engineers, 435 US. at 687 ( § I of
the Sherman Act "cannot mean what it
says"). There are some price fixing
arrangements that violate the letter of the
Sherman Act but are legal nonetheless. For
instance, when two competing companies
agree to merge and to combine their product
lines, or to eliminate the old product lines
and create an entirely new one, they
generally agree to adopt a uniform pricing
scheme. The Supreme Court has permitted
such arrangements....
It is not the case, however, that the mere
existence of a bona fide joint venture means
that participating companies may use the
enterprises to do anything they please with
full immunity from per se analysis under §
1, including price fixing.. . . For instance, if
in reliance on the existence of a valid joint
venture between Coca Cola and Pepsi
designed to research new types of soda
flavors, the two companies imposed a price
floor on all soda sold nationwide, the price
fixing would constitute an illegal "naked
restraint on trade." Along these lines, the
Supreme Court has recognized that even
joint ventures that are lawful in their general
operations may violate the Sherman Act
when they engage in specific
anticompetitive conduct....
The defendants' argument to the contrary-
that joint ventures such as Equilon and
Motiva are incapable of violating the
Sherman Act-ignores the lesson of Citizen
Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 US.
131. ... In Citizen Publishing. . . two daily
newspapers in Tucson, Arizona . . . entered
into a joint venture agreement, which
"provided that each paper should retain its
own news and editorial departments, as well
as its corporate identity." 394 U.S. at 133.
The joint venture established a new
company, Tucson Newspapers, Inc., "which
was to manage all departments of their
business except the news and editorial units.
The Supreme Court held that the confluence
of these anti-competitive restraints, in the
context of a joint venture between two
formerly vigorous competitors in the market
area targeted by the venture, constituted a
per se violation of the Sherman Act....
The district court distinguished Citizen
Publishing in three ways. Each is
unsatisfactory. First, the court found that
the Tucson newspapers in Citizen
Publishing effectively eliminated "all
competition," whereas Equilon and Motiva
"continue to compete with several major oil
companies in their relevant markets." This
distinction runs contrary to Supreme Court
precedent.
Second, the district court found that the
Citizen Publishing newspapers "combined
for the specific purpose of restricting
competition and fixing prices," in contrast to
a complete lack of evidence establishing
such intent for the alliance ventures. That
distinction, if true, would speak only to the
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validity of Equilon and Motiva as a whole-
it would not justify the defendants' adoption
of a price fixing scheme. ...
Third, the district court believed that the
only reason the non-competition agreement
in Citizen Publishing was unlawful was
because the agreement joined the only two
competitors in the market. The Western oil
market, by contrast, is a diverse market with
"several competitors," while the Equilon
joint venture has a much narrower non-
competion agreement. This distinction
returns to an analysis of market power, an
analysis which the Supreme Court has held
is inappropriate in this type of case....
The Supreme Court has upheld joint
ventures and other corporate combinations
involving fixed prices, but generally has
done so only when it appeared plain to the
Court that the restraints undertaken by the
joint ventures were "necessary" to the
legitimate aims of the joint venture. See
BMI, 441 US. at 23 (approving an otherwise
invalid price restraint only because "the
agreement on price is necessary to market
the product at all"); NCAA, 468 U.S. at 117
("Our decision not to apply a per se rule to
this case rests in large part on our
recognition that a certain degree of
cooperation is necessary if the type of
competition that petitioner and its member
institutions seek to market is to be
preserved.")....
In considering the relationship of the
enterprise's pricing actions to the venture's
legitimate objectives, we find it significant
that the defendants here did not simply
consolidate the pricing decisions within the
joint ventures-they unified the pricing of
the two brands from the time the alliance
was formed by designating one individual in
each joint venture to set a single price for
both brands. Normally, a business
determines the prices it will charge for its
various products by considering numerous
factors, just a few of which include the costs
of production and marketing and the
contours of the relevant product markets. In
this case, the defendants have stressed that,
in addition to the differences in the product
themselves, the gasolines marketed under
the Texaco and Shell labels have different
reputations and consumer bases. It thus
seems likely that independent price analyses
would result, at least in some circumstances,
in the rational decision to sell the different
brands at different prices. Instead, the
defendants chose to fix those prices
uniformly.
The defendants have thus far failed to offer
any explanation of how their unified pricing
of the distinct Texaco and Shell brands of
gasoline served to further the ventures'
legitimate efforts to produce better products
or capitalize on efficiencies. . . . The
absence of persuasive evidence showing a
procompetitive justification for initiating the
price-fixing scheme, when viewed along
with the plaintiffs' evidence showing anti-
competitive effects, convinces us that the
plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing as
to the applicability of the per se rule.
The defendants offer only two justifications
for the unitary pricing scheme. First, the
defendants argue-as does our dissenting
colleague-that, as a general rule, any bona
fide joint venture must be able to set prices
for its products at whatever level it chooses:
"without the ability to price its products,
neither venture would have had the authority
to make fundamental decisions affecting its
financial performance." Appellees' Brief, at
16. Second, the defendants argue that
Equilon and Motiva fixed uniform Texaco
and Shell prices in order to "prevent issues
of price discrimination from arising under
the Robinson-Patman Act[.]" Id. We
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address the latter justification first.
A cursory examination of the Robinson-
Patman Act, 15 US.C. § 13, which was
designed to prevent sellers from engaging in
price discrimination, reveals its
inapplicability here. . . . As another Circuit
has explained,
. . . "[I]t is fairness, as Congress
perceives it, that Robinson-
Patman is all about." The Act's
goal is to abolish unwarranted
favoritism among all functional
competitors, big or small. Its
objective is to assure "that
businessmen at the same
functional level start on equal
competitive footing so far as
price is concerned"; "to assure
that all sellers regardless of size,
competing directly for the same
customers . . . receive
evenhanded treatment from
their suppliers." . . .
Alan's of Atlanta, Inc. v. Minolta Corp., 903
F.2d 1414, 1422 (11th Cir. 1990).
The quoted passage makes it clear that the
defendants' Robinson-Patman argument is
wholly without merit. The Act would
unquestionably be inapplicable to a decision
by the defendants to sell the distinct Texaco
and Shell brands of gasoline at different
prices. Any such decision would necessarily
be predicated on the differences between the
two brands, not upon the identity of the
buyers....
The first of the defendants' two arguments-
that a joint venture must be able to set
whatever price it chooses for its products-
proves too much. If that were true, any
number of companies could create joint
ventures as fronts for price-fixing. The
simple answer is that the Supreme Court has
declined to immunize joint ventures from
per se antitrust scrutiny....
Finally, the defendants claim-as does our
dissenting colleague-that an application of
the per se rule here would mean that joint
ventures could not set prices for their
products. We reject this argument. We of
course recognize that joint ventures may
price their products; that is not the question.
The question is whether two former (and
potentially future) competitors may create a
joint venture in which they unify the pricing,
and thereby fix the prices, of two of their
distinct product brands. We have held that
the Sherman Act's per se rule applies when
the defendant fails to demonstrate a
sufficient relationship between the price
fixing scheme and furthering the legitimate
aims of the joint venture-a relationship that
justifies the otherwise prohibited price
restraints. Thus far in this litigation, the
defendants have failed to produce sufficient
evidence demonstrating that their price
fixing scheme was ancillary rather than
naked and, thus, that they are entitled to
summary judgment.
DISSENT: FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge,
Concurring and Dissenting:
I agree that the plaintiffs lacked standing as
to SRI and, therefore, concur in the result of
part III of the majority opinion. However, I
dissent from part IV.
While this case does involve a very
complicated set of transactions, it presents a
rather straightforward antitrust law question.
That is, where former competitors create a
bona fide joint venture to which all of their
assets and operations in segments of their
businesses are contributed, will there be a
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per se violation of the antitrust laws, if the
joint venture entity sets the prices of the
goods it sells? I think the answer is no....
It is plain enough that the mere creation of a
joint venture is not a per se antitrust
violation. No doubt, like mergers, joint
ventures are combinations ofrbusiness assets
but "such combinations are judged under a
rule of reason" analysis. Copperweld Corp.
v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 US. 752,
768, 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2740, 81 L. Ed. 2d 628
(1984). Especially should that be true of the
LLC type of venture, which is not only a
separate entity, but which also functions as a
separate economic unit for all practical
purposes. In fact, to slightly paraphrase the
Supreme Court statement in Arizona v.
Maricopa County Med Soc'y, 457 US 332,
356, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2479, 73 L. Ed. 2d 48
(1982):
[Equilon is] . . . analogous to
partnerships or other joint
arrangements in which persons
who would otherwise be
competitors pool their capital
and share the risks of loss as
well as the opportunities for
profit. In such joint ventures,
the partnership is regarded as a
single firm competing with
other sellers in the market.
Nor does the mere fact that Equilon sets
prices for the products it manufactures and
sells suffice to demonstrate that its actions
were price fixing for antitrust purposes. See
Broad Music, Inc., v. Columbia Broad Sys.,
Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8-9, 99 S. Ct. 1551, 1556-
57, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1979). Rather,
"literalness is overly simplistic and often
overbroad. When two partners set the price
of their goods or services they are literally
'price fixing,' but they are not per se in
violation of the Sherman Act." Id. at 9, 99
S. Ct. at 1557. So just what could make the
operation of Equilon a per se violation of the
antitrust laws? Surely it is not a claim that
the venture is a sham.
. . . Independent Operators argue, in this
case the fixing of prices by the venture is
neither essential nor "reasonably ancillary to
the legitimate cooperative aspects of the
venture." Freeman v. San Diego Ass'n of
Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1151 (9th Cir.
2003). The majority agrees; I cannot
understand why. The situation here is far
from the kind of situation we faced in
Freeman. There, the reason for the venture
was the unifying of disparate multiple listing
databases. Id. at 1140-41. That done, there
was a new database entity, and the
corporations that formed it for that purpose
went on operating their own businesses. But
they all also agreed to fix a price for support
services. That was essentially unrelated to
the database itself, and was unnecessary, and
unjustified. Id. at 1151. It was the latter
"price fix" that ran afoul of antitrust
principles. Here we have nothing of the
kind.
In this case, nothing more radical is afoot
than the fact that an entity, which now owns
all of the production, transportation,
research, storage, sales and distribution
facilities for engaging in the gasoline
business, also prices its own products. It
decided to price them the same, as any other
entity could. What could be more integral to
the running of a business than setting a price
for its goods and services? I am at a loss for
an answer to that question, and nothing
written about this case to date imparts
additional wisdom or better information.
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"Oil Giants Take on Gas Station Owners;
Supreme Court to Determine Fate of Antitrust Ruling"
Houston Chronicle
July 06, 2005
Alexis Grant
WASHINGTON-The Supreme Court will
hear a price-fixing case that has pitted big
oil companies against the owners of gas
stations and could have an effect on some of
the biggest names in American business.
The issue is whether a joint venture created
by Texaco and Shell Oil Co. can sell
gasoline at the same price to all distributors
under laws designed to preserve
competition.
Antitrust experts say the case, which was
accepted at the end of the court's recent
term, is likely to be one of the more
significant business issues it considers when
it goes back to work in October.
The case comes from the San Franscisco-
based 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals,
which ruled in favor of the gas station
owners. Big names on the side of the oil
companies include the U.S. government,
Visa USA, Coca-Cola Co. and Microsoft
Corp.
"Beyond the implications for these very
major industry players, the 9th Circuit's
decision has far-reaching implications for all
kinds of joint ventures," said David Price, an
attorney with the Washington Legal
Foundation, who filed a brief in favor of the
oil companies. "It would create potential for
antitrust liability when a joint venture makes
routine decisions, like pricing."
Two brands, one price
The class action lawsuit filed on behalf of
23,000 service station owners argued that
the joint venture violated antitrust laws
making it illegal to limit competition by
setting a common price for a product made
by competing companies.
The creation of two refining and marketing
joint ventures in 1998 allowed Texaco and
Shell to continue to sell their brands
separately but save an estimated $ 800
million each year by sharing refining
capacity and the cost of selling the fuels. At
the pump, consumers saw Texaco and Shell
as two different brands of gas, but the gas
was sold at the same wholesale price by the
joint venture.
The joint venture at the heart of the lawsuit,
Equilon, operated in the western United
States. Texaco and Shell were partners with
Saudi Refining in a similar joint venture
called Motiva that operated in the eastern
U.S.
The oil companies argue that setting a price
for gas produced under Equilon was a
necessary part of doing business, even if it
was sold under two brand names.
Price spikes
According to the 9th Circuit Court, the
companies that joined to create Equilon
sharply increased the price of their gasoline
in some West Coast cities, including Los
Angeles, at a time when oil prices were at
near-historic lows of $ 10 to $ 12 per barrel.
Additional costs were passed by distributors
to consumers.
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Texaco's stake in the joint venture was sold
to Shell Oil Co. after Texaco was taken over
by ChevronTexaco Corp.
Daniel Shulman, an attorney for the
plaintiffs, called the move price-fixing and
said it falls under the "per se" rule of
antitrust law, which makes it illegal
regardless of the circumstances.
"The Supreme Court has said for 50 years
that joint ventures are not entitled to any
type of special protection," Shulman said.
But those backing the oil company argue the
situation should be judged according to the
"rule of reason," which allows joint ventures
to set prices if they are efficient. The idea is
that such combinations may produce new
products, made less expensively or more
plentiful for consumers.
Error made?
In a brief, the U.S. government urged the
high court to overturn what it saw as an
error by the appeals court and treat Equilon
as a separate company created to refine and
sell fuel more efficiently, which it said
should exempt it from price-fixing rules.
The appeals court's decision poses a threat to
the proper enforcement, both private and
public, of the antitrust laws, wrote Paul
Clement, acting solicitor general.
Shulman countered that Equilon should not
qualify as efficient because it did not create
a product that was different from what
Texaco and Shell produced independently.
The American Antitrust Institute, a nonprofit
group that aims to increase competition
among businesses, has not yet taken a stance
on the issue. But its president, Bert Foer,
said a reversal by the high court has the
potential to set a precedent that could hurt
consumers.
The two cases, which will be combined for
argument before the court, are Texaco v.
Dagher and Shell Oil Co. v. Dagher.
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"FTC, DOJ Pitch Joint Venture Ruling"
Daily Deal
June 1, 2005
Cecile Kohrs Lindell
The nation's two antitrust enforcement
bodies, the Federal Trade Commission and
the Department of Justice's Antitrust
Division, jointly asked the Supreme Court
on Tuesday, May 31, to overturn a
California appeals court ruling that a joint
venture may not set the same price for
separate brands made by its parent
companies.
The case of Texaco Inc. v. Dagher et al.
centers on Equilon, one of two joint ventures
formed by Texaco Inc. and Shell Oil Co. to
market and distribute gasoline made by the
two companies. Fouad N. Dagher,
representing individual owners of Shell or
Texaco gasoline retailers, argues that
Equilon's sale of Shell and Texaco products
at the same price amounts to price-fixing,
which is illegal.
Central District of California Judge George
H. King ruled for the oil companies, only for
Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals in San Francisco to
overturn him last June.
The appellate ruling, which asserts that a
joint venture approved by the FTC and four
states may not set its own price for the
products it sells, has caused a stir in the
antitrust bar. "The implications for all kinds
of extremely common business practices for
joint ventures is huge," said Roy Englert, a
partner at Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck
& Untereiner LLP who specializes in
appellate work.
The FTC-DOJ brief notes that "under the
terms of the consummated joint venture,
petitions granted Equilon an exclusive
license to sell gasoline under their brand
names [Shell and Texaco] in the Western
United States, and they agreed to split
Equilon's profits (or losses) in a fixed ratio
based on the assets each contributed to the
joint venture."
Englert noted that the joint brief, sought by
the Supreme Court, is unusually direct in
urging the top court to hear, and then
reverse, the lower-court ruling. "The
agencies tend to be institutionally
conservative in their briefs," he said,
explaining that most briefs take a "on-the-
one-hand, on-the-other-hand" look at the
reasons for or against hearing a case.
But the clarity of the joint recommendation
makes it more likely that the Supreme Court
will hear the case, probably next year. "The
chances are very, very high that the Supreme
Court will grant cert," Englert said.
If the Supreme Court lets the appellate
decision stand, it would "[interfere] with
common business activity, and a lot of
common business practices would have to
be reconsidered," Englert said.
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"Gasoline Price-Fixing Suit Reinstated"
Ventura County Star
June 2, 2004
David Kravets
A federal appeals court on Tuesday
reinstated a lawsuit accusing
ChevronTexaco Corp. and Shell Oil Co. of
operating a price-fixing conspiracy.
The suit accuses the companies' joint
ventures-Motiva Enterprises and Equilon
Enterprises-as being part of a plan by the
oil giants to inflate fuel prices beginning in
1998 and ending as early as 2001, when
Texaco sold its stake to win approval of its
purchase of Chevron.
Judge Stephen Reinhardt, while noting that
Texaco and Shell charged the same for
gasoline after the formation of the joint
ventures, ruled that "the very purpose of the
alliance was to eliminate competition in
order to realize efficiency gains and gain
market share."
Reinhardt, in a 2-1 ruling, said it was up to a
jury to decide whether two competitors that
agreed to charge the same for gasoline
created the alliance "to restrict competition."
Between September 1998 and February
1999, when crude oil was at historic lows of
$10 to $12 per barrel, Equilon increased the
Shell and Texaco brands 40 cents per gallon
in Los Angeles and 30 cents in Seattle and
Portland, Reinhardt said.
U.S. District Judge George King dismissed
the case in 2002, which was brought by
23,000 gasoline vendors. King ruled that a
jury could not find that the companies
"formed Equilon and Motiva merely to
achieve an ulterior anticompetitive purpose
or that the ventures are patently
anticompetitive."
In a sharp dissent Tuesday, Judge Ferdinand
Fernandez agreed.
A lawyer for the vendors, Daniel Shulman,
said the companies fixed prices in violation
of federal law.
"They're not allowed to do that," he said.
The distributors, he said, paid $1 billion or
more in excessive charges, which they will
seek to recoup. "They are either going to
pay or we're going to litigate it," he added.
While the distributors passed the alleged
excess costs to consumers, antitrust law
allows them to recover the illegal fees,
Shulman said.
If the vendors prevail, consumers are not
eligible for refunds, said Joseph Alioto,
another attorney for the vendors.
Jeff Moore, a spokesman for San Ramon-
based ChevronTexaco, said the oil concern
is "confident, when this matter is finally
resolved, it will be determined that the joint
venture formed by Texaco and Shell, which
received regulatory approval by the Federal
Trade Commission after extensive review,
and was also approved by several state
attorneys general, never violated any
antitrust laws."
Cameron Smyth, a spokesman for Houston-
based Shell-the U.S. branch of the
Dutch/Shell Group, said the company was
reviewing the decision and had no comment.
The case is Dagher v. Motiva Enterprises,
02-56509.
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"Gas Pains; L.A. Lawyer Tom Bleau Takes
Service Station Woes to the Court"
New Times Los Angeles
November 30, 2000
Bob Burtman
Tom Bleau takes his work personally. The
Los Angeles lawyer represents service-
station dealers in California, and he has
difficulty suppressing his outrage at their
plight. "When they're on the brink," Bleau
says, the companies "push up their
prices."Bleau filed two federal lawsuits
against the Shell-Texaco joint venture, and
he recently won a crucial injunction in one
of them after dealers were presented with
new leases that essentially guaranteed their
demise. The injunction prevents the
company from terminating dealers who
refuse to sign until the court case is
resolved. "No dealer in his right mind wants
to sign these leases," he says.
It's not easy to sue a major oil company, no
matter how obvious the transgression. With
a seemingly unlimited legal budget, a Shell
or an Exxon can throw banks of lawyers and
other resources at a case that the cash-
strapped dealers can't possibly afford to
match. Even when the dealers' attorney
works on contingency, the company can
delay and obfuscate for years with relative
impunity. In a still unresolved 1991 federal
class-action case filed in Miami against
Exxon, for example, the list of motions
alone ran more than 100 pages.
Invariably the companies request that
documents and testimony produced in a
dealer case be sealed, claiming that the
release of proprietary information could
damage their business. In the event the
cases settle, the seal becomes permanent.
Alabama attorney Jim Gunther would love
to share documents from his cases against
BP, but he can't. "I've got smoking-gun kind
of evidence," Gunther says, "but they put
that "confidential' stamp on everything."
Smoking guns rarely escape the files, but
more are emerging, including a damaging
deposition by a former Shell marketing
executive in a Miami case. The testimony
indicates that while the dealers thought they
were getting a break on rent if they sold
more gallons under the rent rebate program,
the company was making it back by
charging them more for gas. The hidden
rent component in their wholesale gas price
has been the basis for one of many fraud
charges against Shell.
That deposition has now made its way to
other states. A judge in an Indiana case
became so incensed by Shell's consistent
refusal to obey the rules and produce
documents as ordered that he allowed a legal
team from Texas to travel to Indianapolis
and copy whatever it wanted from the case
file (though the material is still officially
sealed).
Lawyers for the dealers generally have taken
the shotgun approach in suits, tossing as
many charges as possible into every case
and seeing if anything sticks. Results to
date have been decidedly mixed. Some of
the Shell suits seem to be gaining
momentum, and the dealers have won a few
scattered victories, but a recent verdict in a
San Diego Chevron case may have a chilling
effect on future litigation. A group of 22
California dealers won $3.4 million from
Chevron in 1995 after a jury found the
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company illegally manipulated prices to
pressure the dealers financially. But a three-
judge panel overturned the verdict, and a
judge recently awarded Chevron its
attorney's fees, which total $6.8 million.
Most of the dealers, bled dry after the eight-
year battle, will have to declare bankruptcy.
Another remedy for dealers can be found in
Congress. The federal Petroleum Marketing
Practices Act was designed to protect
dealers from predatory practices, but the law
has proved easy to dodge. Antitrust laws
provide some protection, and the disparity in
West Coast gas prices has spurred a Federal
Trade Commission investigation.
Democratic U.S. Senator Barbara Boxer of
California has been especially active in
calling for federal intervention. "Some big
oil companies appear to have embarked on
an all-out campaign to drive their own
franchisees out of business in an effort to
tighten their stranglehold over California's
gasoline industry," Boxer wrote in a letter to
FTC chairman Robert Pitofsky.
As the oil companies like to point out,
however, investigations usually die on the
vine. Millions in campaign contributions
and hordes of lobbyists flooding legislative
hallways probably help. In California, for
example, the major oil companies and their
trade groups have spent more than $4.7
million on lobbying alone since the
beginning of 1999. As Chevron spokesman
Jack Coffey hinted recently, the money is
spent "to be sure our business opportunities
can continue in the way we want them to
continue."
The state and local levels seem to provide
more opportunities for dealer relief. Six
states and Washington, D.C., have
divorcement laws on the books, which
generally prohibit refiners from running
their own retail outlets. San Francisco and
San Diego came close to passing
divorcement ordinances the last couple of
years, though furious lobbying beat them
back at the eleventh hour-the San Diego
County Board of Supervisors approved a
divorcement bill in 1998 but withdrew it
after an industry trade group sued the board
for $50 million.
Statewide initiatives have met similar
resistance. Democratic state Senator Steve
Peace of San Diego sponsored an "open
supply" bill in 1999 that would have allowed
dealers to buy gas from any wholesaler
selling the same brand (currently, they must
buy directly from the company at whatever
price the company sets). The bill passed the
Senate but died in the Assembly Utilities
and Commerce Committee-thanks to South
Central L.A. Democrat Roderick Wright, the
committee's chairman, who refused to bring
it to a vote. Last May a state task force on
California's high gas prices recommended
both divorcement and open supply as
remedies, but no such legislation has yet
appeared on the horizon.
Given the cool climate for reform, the courts
remain the likeliest avenue for the dealers in
their fight for survival. They recognize the
long odds of going to war with Goliath,
though most say all they really want is to be
bought out at a fair price or compensated for
their years of service. "I'm just trying to
minimize my losses as much as I can," says
L.A. Shell dealer Fred Dagher, a plaintiff in
both Bleau lawsuits.
But unless they're brought to their knees in
court, the companies aren't likely to pay up
voluntarily. As a Shell motion in a Texas
case clearly states, "Shell does not owe a
duty of good faith and fair dealing to
plaintiffs."
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Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.
(04-1329)
Case Below: (Independent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 2937, 73 U.S.L.W. 3733 (U.S. June 20, 2005)(No. 04-1329)).
Illinois Tool was sued by a competing ink manufacturer claiming a violation of the Sherman Act.
Illinois Tool requires users of its patented printheads to purchase non-patented ink from them as
well. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment
for the defendant because plaintiff had not shown that defendant had market power over the
tying product. The Federal Circuit reversed, saying there is a rebuttable presumption of market
power in patent tying cases.
Question Presented: Whether, in an action under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1,
alleging that the defendant engaged in unlawful tying by conditioning a patent license on the
licensee's purchase of a non-patented good, the plaintiff must prove as part of its affirmative case
that the defendant possessed market power in the relevant market for the tying product, or market
power instead is presumed based solely on the existence of the patent on the tying product.
INDEPENDENT INK, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS, INC. and TRIDENT, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
Decided January 25, 2005
[Excerpt: Some citations and footnotes omitted]
OPINION: DYK, Circuit Judge.
Independent Ink, Inc. ("Independent")
appeals from the judgment of the United
States District Court for the Central District
of California in this patent tying antitrust
action. The district court granted summary
judgment on plaintiff Independent's
Sherman Act section I claim because
Independent had failed to produce any
evidence of market power over the tying
product. Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Trident, Inc.,
210 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (C. D. Cal. 2002). We
hold that a rebuttable presumption of market
power arises from the possession of a patent
over a tying product. Because no rebuttal
evidence was submitted by the patent
holder, we reverse the grant of summary
judgment on the Sherman Act section I
claim and remand for further proceedings.
As to Independent's Sherman Act section 2
claim, we affirm the district court's grant of
summary judgment.
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BACKGROUND
Defendant Trident, Inc. ("Trident") is a
wholly-owned subsidiary of defendant
Illinois Tool Works, Inc. ("ITW"). Trident
is a manufacturer of printheads and holds a
patent over its printhead technology. See
U.S. Patent No. 5,343, 226 ("the '226
patent"). Printer manufacturers (the
"OEMs") use Trident's printhead technology
to manufacture printers. The end users of
the printers are usually product
manufacturers, who use the printers to place
bar codes on cartons.
As disclosed by the '226 patent, ink jet
devices for printing bar codes consume a
large quantity of ink. The small cartridges
typical in other ink jet devices are
impractical for such applications. But the
use of a large supply of ink poses problems
for transferring the ink from the container to
the printhead. . . . The '226 patent discloses
an ink jet device and supply system using a
hand actuated peristaltic pump. The use of
hand pumping overcomes the usual
complexity and expense of such devices.
Trident also manufactures ink for use with
its patented printheads. Trident's standard
form licensing agreement allowing the
OEMs to use its patented product requires
"OEMs to purchase their ink for Trident-
based systems exclusively from Trident."
(Br. of Appellees at 8.) Specifically, the
licensing agreement grants the right to
"manufacture, use and sell ink jet printing
devices supplied by Trident" only "when
used in combination with ink and ink supply
systems supplied by Trident." (J. A. at 275.)
There is now no claim that the ink is
protected by any of Trident's patents. We
thus have an explicit tying agreement
conditioning the sale of a patented product
(the printhead covered by the '226 patent
[and possibly other patents as well]) on the
sale of an unpatented one (the ink).
Independent is a competing manufacturer of
ink. It manufactures ink usable in Trident's
printheads. Independent filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Central
District of California on August 14, 1998,
initially seeking a declaratory judgment of
non-infringement and invalidity against
Trident's patents. Independent subsequently
amended its complaint to allege that Trident
was engaged in illegal tying and
monopolization in violation of sections I
and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 US C. § 1 et
seq. Both parties moved for summary
judgment as to the section I claim, and
Trident moved for summary judgment as to
the section 2 claim. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of
Trident on both claims.
The district court held that for patent tying
to constitute a violation of the antitrust laws,
the plaintiff must affirmatively prove market
power. Indep. Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1162.
The district court, in a footnote, dismissed
several Supreme Court cases holding to the
contrary as "vintage," Id. at 1165 n. 10.
Addressing the Supreme Court's more recent
decision in Jefferson Parish Hospital
District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 US. 2, 16, 80 L.
Ed. 2d 2, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984), it declined
to follow the rule announced by the majority
in that case that "the sale or lease of a
patented item on condition that the buyer
make all his purchases of a separate tied
product from the patentee is unlawful."
Instead, relying on the concurring opinion in
Jefferson Parish, the dissent from a denial of
certiorari by two members of the Jefferson
Parish majority, and academic criticisms of
the presumption of market power, the
district court dismissed the majority opinion
of Jefferson Parish as dictum that should not
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be followed. Indep. Ink 210 F Supp. 2d at
1164-65. The district court found that
Independent submitted no affirmative
evidence defining the relevant market nor
proving Trident's power within it, and
therefore could not prevail in either antitrust
claim. Id. at 1173-77.
The parties settled all their remaining
claims, which were accordingly dismissed
with prejudice, and final judgment was
entered. This appeal followed. Because the
complaint originally contained a claim for
declaratory judgment of invalidity and non-
infringement of the '226 patent, we have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 US.C. §'
1295(a)(1).
DISCUSSION
I
The first issue before us is whether Federal
Circuit or Ninth Circuit law governs the
legality of patent tying under the Sherman
Act, an issue which may arise both in the
context of affirmative claims (as here) and
in the context of a patent misuse defense.
We have previously held that where an
affirmative antitrust claim or antitrust
misuse defense is based on "procuring or
enforcing a patent," the central antitrust
question is a matter governed by Federal
Circuit law. Nobelpharma AB v. Implant
Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1067-68
(Fed Cir. 1998) (en banc in relevant part).
We conclude that the antitrust consequences
of patent tying likewise is a question
governed by our law. However, as stated in
Nobelpharma, "we will continue to apply the
law of the appropriate regional circuit to
issues involving other elements of antitrust
law," such as defining the relevant market
and determining as a factual matter whether
power exists within that market. Id. at 1068.
II
We now address the Sherman Act section I
claim. This case first requires us to
determine whether patent tying is illegal per
se (or presumptively illegal) under the
Sherman Act, or whether the plaintiff is
obliged to prove as part of its affirmative
case that the patent confers market power in
the relevant market for the tying product.
This case comes to us with a long history of
Supreme Court consideration of the legality
of tying arrangements. Earlier Supreme
Court cases dealing with tying agreements
were extremely hostile to them, whether the
case involved intellectual property or other
tying products. The first case that found
tying to violate section I of the Sherman Act
was a patent tying case. Int'l Salt Co. v
United States, 332 US. 392, 92 L. Ed 20, 68
S. Ct. 12 (1947). n5 In Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 337 US. 293, 305, 93 L. Ed.
1371, 69 S. Ct. 1051 (1949), the Court
commented that "tying agreements serve
hardly any purpose beyond the suppression
of competition.". . .
Later Supreme Court cases reflected
divergent treatment, depending on whether
statutory intellectual property was involved.
Those cases not involving patents or
copyrights refined the test, holding that
tying was only unlawful if the defendant had
"market power" in the market for the tying
product. As articulated in United States
Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429
U.S. 610, 620, 51 L. Ed. 2d 80, 97 S. Ct. 861
(1977) ("Fortner II"), this requirement of
"market power" necessitated an inquiry into
"whether the seller has the power, within the
market for the tying product, to raise prices
or to require purchasers to accept
burdensome terms that could not be exacted
in a completely competitive market." The
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requirement of demonstrating sufficient
market power to raise prices was notably
more onerous than the Northern Pacific
requirement that there be some power to
"appreciably restrain free competition."
The Supreme Court further explained the
requirement for market power in the 1984
Jefferson Parish decision, which involved an
agreement requiring patients of a hospital to
use a particular anesthesiology firm. The
Court stated that "certain tying arrangements
pose an unacceptable risk of stifling
competition." 466 U.S. at 9. But the
"unacceptable risk of stifling competition"
arises, and consequent liability attaches,
only if there is anticompetitive "forcing."
As explained by the Court:
The essential characteristic of
an invalid tying arrangement
lies in the seller's exploitation of
its control over the tying
product to force the buyer into
the purchase of a tied product
that the buyer either did not
want at all, or might have
preferred to purchase elsewhere
on different terms. When such
"forcing" is present,
competition on the merits in the
market for the tied item is
restrained and the Sherman Act
is violated.
Id. at 12. The requirement of proving
"forcing" or "market power" in cases not
involving intellectual property necessitates a
definition of the market in which such
power is alleged to exist and showing an
"actual adverse effect on competition." Id.
at 29-31. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the
requirement of market power in such cases
in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Services, 504 U.S. 451, 462, 119 L. Ed 2d
265, 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992), where it held
that tying "violates l 1 of the Sherman Act if
the seller has 'appreciable economic power'
in the tying product market and if the
arrangement affects a substantial volume of
commerce in the tied market."
The Court's treatment of tying cases when
the tying product is patented or copyrighted,
however, has been more consistent. In the
1947 International Salt case, the defendant
held patents over "machines for utilization
of salt products." 332 US. at 394. It leased
these machines on the condition that the
lessee purchase from the defendant "all
unpatented salt and salt tablets consumed in
the leased machines." Id. The Supreme
Court held that this arrangement violated the
Sherman Act, holding that "the patents
confer no right to restrain use of, or trade in,
unpatented salt." Id. at 395-96. The Court
found that by tying the lease of machines to
the purchase of salt, and "contracting to
close this market for salt against
competition, [the defendant] engaged in a
restraint of trade for which its patents afford
no immunity from the antitrust laws." Id. at
396. The Court made no inquiry of the
defendant's market power, finding that "the
admitted facts left no genuine issue. . . . The
tendency of the [patent tying] arrangement
to accomplishment of monopoly seems
obvious." Id.
In United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38,
9 L. Ed 2d 11, 83 S. Ct. 97 (1962), relying
on International Salt, the Court made clear
that, where the tying product is patented or
copyrighted, market power may be
presumed rather than proven. Loew's
involved the tying of less popular films to
popular copyrighted films by movie
distributors in their licenses to television
stations. The Court stated that in tying cases
not involving intellectual property the
"standard of illegality is that the seller must
have sufficient economic power with respect
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to the tying product to appreciably restrain
free competition in the market for the tied
product." Id. at 45. However, "the requisite
economic power is presumed when the tying
product is patented or copyrighted." Id.
The Loew's Court confirmed that patent
tying is a distinct doctrine when it noted
defendants' argument "that their behavior is
not to be judged by the principle of the
patent cases . . . but by the general principles
which govern the validity of tying
arrangements of nonpatented products." Id.
at 48. The Loew's Court also stated that it
needed not inquire into whether the
distributors had market power. "The mere
presence of competing substitutes for the
tying product . . . is insufficient to destroy
the legal, and indeed the economic,
distinctiveness of the copyrighted product."
Id. at 49.
The subsequent Supreme Court cases that
have required proof of market power in
tying cases not involving intellectual
property have consistently reaffirmed the
holdings of International Salt and Loew's
that no proof of market power is necessary
in patent or copyright tying cases. The
Fortner II Court in 1977 expressly restated
the presumption of market power in cases of
patent tying, stating that "the statutory grant
of a patent monopoly in [international Salt]
. . . represented tying products .
sufficiently unique to give rise to a
presumption of economic power. 429 US.
at 619. Likewise, the Jefferson Parish Court
in 1984 stated that "if the Government has
granted the seller a patent or similar
monopoly over a product, it is fair to
presume that the inability to buy the product
elsewhere gives the seller market power."
466 U.S. at 16.
In sum, the Supreme Court cases in this area
squarely establish that patent and copyright
tying, unlike other tying cases, do not
require an affirmative demonstration of
market power. Rather, International Salt
and Loew's make clear that the necessary
market power to establish a section I
violation is presumed. The continued
validity of International Salt and Loew's as
binding authority, and the distinction
between patent tying and other tying cases
that was articulated in Loew's, have been
consistently reaffirmed by the Court ever
since.
IV
The defendants argue . . . that International
Salt and Loew's are no longer good law.
They offer three theories in support of this
contention. First, they point to Walker
Process, where the Court stated in a patent
antitrust case that it was "reluctant to extend
[per se illegality] on the bare pleadings and
absent examination of market effect and
economic consequences." 382 U.S. at 178.
But Walker Process was a section 2 case
asserting claims of monopolization, not a
section I claim for tying. Moreover, the
gravamen of Walker Process was the
inappropriate obtaining of the patent, id at
174, not the extension of that patent beyond
its terms to an unpatented article through a
tying arrangement, see Int'l Salt, 332 U.S. at
395-96. We conclude that Walker Process
does not articulate a rule applicable to patent
tying cases.
The defendants next point to Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Jefferson Parish,
which was joined by Chief Justice Burger,
Justice Powell and then-Justice (now Chief
Justice) Rehnquist, stating that it is a
"common misconception . . . that a patent or
copyright . . . suffices to demonstrate market
power." 466 U.S. at 37 n. 7 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Defendants argue that the 1984
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Jefferson Parish concurrence, coupled with
a dissent in the following year joined by two
members of the Jefferson Parish majority,
imply that a then-majority of the Court
indicated that International Salt and Loew's
were no longer good law. The district court
relied on this reasoning. Indep. Ink, 210 F.
Supp. 2d at 1164-65. It is not persuasive.
Justice White's opinion in Data General,
joined by Justice Blackmun, did not
expressly contradict International Salt,
Loew's, Jefferson Parish, or opine that a
showing of market power was required in
patent and copyright tying cases. Justice
White noted that the court of appeals
"viewed [a] copyright . . . as creating a
presumption of market power, and
seemingly concluded that forcing power is
sufficiently established to demonstrate per
se antitrust liability if some buyers find the
tying product unique and desirable." Data
Gen., 473 U.S. at 909. The only conclusion
Justice White drew was that the case raised
"several substantial questions of antitrust
law and policy, including . . . what effect
should be given to the existence of a
copyright or other legal monopoly in
determining market power." Id. This hardly
amounts to a repudiation of the presumption
of market power. More importantly, the
district court's practice of "nose-counting,"
as one sister circuit has called it, Felton v.
Sec', United States Dep't of Educ., 739
F.2d 48, 72 25 n. (2d Cir. 1984), is "a
pastime in which we do not commonly
engage." United States v. Curcio, 712 F 2d
1532, 1542 (2d Cir. 1983).
The defendants finally point to the numerous
academic articles criticizing the Supreme
Court cases relying on a presumption of
market power in patent and copyright cases.
We recognize that the Supreme Court
precedent in this area has been subject to
heavy criticism....
The fundamental error in all of defendants'
arguments is that they ignore the fact that it
is the duty of a court of appeals to follow the
precedents of the Supreme Court until the
Court itself chooses to expressly overrule
them. This message has been conveyed
repeatedly by the Court. The Court's
"decisions remain binding precedent until
[it] sees fit to reconsider them, regardless of
whether subsequent cases have raised doubts
about their continuing vitality." Hohn v.
United States, 524 U.S. 236, 252-53, 141 L.
Ed. 2d 242, 118 S. Ct. 1969 (1998). "If a
precedent of the Court has direct application
in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons
rejected in some other line of decisions, the
Court of Appeals should follow the case
which directly controls, leaving to the Court
the prerogative of overruling its own
decisions." Rodriguez de QuUas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477, 484, 104 L. Ed. 2d 526, 109 S. Ct 1917
(1989). Even where a Supreme Court
precedent contains many "infirmities" and
rests upon "wobbly, moth-eaten
foundations," it remains the "Court's
prerogative alone to overrule one of its
precedents." State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S.
3, 20, 139 L. Ed. 2d 199, 118 S. Ct. 275
(1997). None of the authorities that
defendants present, whether it be the
language of Walker Process, the
concurrence in Jefferson Parish, or the
dissent from denial of certiorari in Data
General, constituted an express overruling
of International Salt or Loew's. We
conclude that the Supreme Court has held
that there is a presumption of market power
in patent tying cases, and we are obliged to
follow the Supreme Court's direction in this
respect. The time may have come to
abandon the doctrine, but it is up to the
Congress or the Supreme Court to make this
judgment.
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VWe must therefore address the scope of the
rule announced by the Supreme Court's
patent and copyright tying cases.
Independent submits that under
International Salt and its progeny, patent
tying is per se illegal in every case and
market power is irrebuttably presumed. In
this area, unfortunately, there is no Supreme
Court case directly addressing the issue, and
we are required to ascertain the rule from
dictum. Loew's expressly stated that "there
may be rare circumstances in which the
doctrine we have enunciated under § I of the
Sherman Act prohibiting tying arrangements
involving patented or copyrighted tying
products is inapplicable." 371 U.S. at 49-50.
Jefferson Parish confirmed that
International Salt created only a
presumption of market power: "If the
Government has granted the seller a patent
or similar monopoly over a product, it is fair
to presume that the inability to buy the
product elsewhere gives the seller market
power." 466 U.S. at 16 (emphasis added).
It would stretch the language of "fair to
presume" beyond the breaking point to say
that such a presumption is irrebuttable. We
are obliged to follow such clearly articulated
Supreme Court dicta.
Other circuits have similarly interpreted the
Supreme Court's patent and copyright tying
cases to create a rebuttable presumption of
market power. See, e.g., Digidyne Corp. v.
Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1344 (9th
Cir. 1984) (Copyright "created a
presumption of economic power sufficient
to render the tying arrangement illegal per
se.) The burden to rebut the presumption
shifted to defendant.
Thus, a patent presumptively defines the
relevant market as the nationwide market for
the patented product itself, and creates a
presumption of power within this market.
Once the plaintiff establishes a patent tying
agreement, it is the defendant's burden to
rebut the presumption of market power and
consequent illegality that arises from patent
tying.
VI
The district court found that, even if there
was a presumption of market power in
patent tying cases, any presumption of mark
et power was rebutted in this case because
it is undisputed that consumers
could place bar-coded labels on
their products before other
competitors manufactured bar-
coding printers, and Plaintiff
does not establish that the
various labeling systems are not
proper substitutes for
Defendants' printhead system or
dispute Defendants' arguments
that they are. Moreover . . . at
least two other competitors . . .
have designed printheads that
can print bar codes on kraft
paper. The fact that [two
competitors] have done so
indicates that any barriers to
entry, such as R & D and
manufacturing costs, are not so
great as to prevent competitors
from entering the market.
Indep. Ink., 210 F Supp. 2d at 1167. The
defendants argue that the district court was
correct because there is testimony here by
the president of an OEM that consumers use
labels as substitutes for Trident's printhead
technology, (J. A. at 983), and it is
undisputed that two competitors offer
competing printheads.
However, "the mere presence of competing
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substitutes for the tying product . . . is
insufficient to destroy the legal, and indeed
the economic, distinctiveness of the
[patented] product." Digidyne, 734 F.2d at
1345 (quoting Loew's, 371 U.S. at 49).
Rather, the definition of a market requires
careful consideration of both the product and
geographic markets. Bhan v. NME Hosp.,
Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1413 (9th Cir. 1991).
The presumption can only be rebutted by
expert testimony or other credible economic
evidence of the cross-elasticity of demand,
the area of effective competition, or other
evidence of lack of market power. On the
present record there is not sufficient
evidence to rebut the presumption of market
power resulting from the patent itself, or to
create a genuine issue of material fact on the
issue.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court's
grant of summary judgment on the Sherman
Act section I claim. Because plaintiffs
summary judgment motion appeared to rest
entirely on a theory that the presumption of
market power is irrebuttable, we remand to
the district court to permit defendants an
opportunity to supplement the summary
judgment record with evidence that may
rebut the presumption. Should the
defendants on remand fail to present
sufficient relevant evidence to create a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the presumption has been rebutted, partial
summary judgment on liability under section
I of the Sherman Act should be granted.
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"High Court to Re-Evaluate Precedent Affecting Antitrust Law"
The Recorder
June 21, 2005
Tony Mauro
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed
to consider overturning a 43-year-old
precedent that has been interpreted to make
it easy for competitors to sue patent holders
for antitrust violations.
In agreeing to hear the case of Illinois Tool
Works v. Independent Ink in the fall, the
court was responding to pleas by major
patent holders as well as the American
Intellectual Property Law Association and
the American Bar Association on behalf of
its 9,000 antitrust lawyer members and its
19,000 intellectual property members.
The Bush administration has not weighed in
yet, but in a recent speech, Assistant
Attorney General for Antitrust R. Hewitt
Pate said the case provided a "good
opportunity" to resolve an important
antitrust issue. Andrew Pincus of Mayer,
Brown, Rowe & Maw, lawyer for Illinois
Tool, informed the court of Pate's June 3
speech.
"This is an important case at the intersection
of patent and antitrust law," Pincus said on
Monday. "It is increasingly significant as
our economy is driven more and more by
intellectual property."
Under the 1962 ruling United States v.
Loew's Inc., the fact that a defendant holds a
patent on a product creates a presumption
that it exerts enough power over the
marketplace to be guilty of illegal "tying"
under the Sherman Act.
Illegal tying occurs when a company
requires customers who want one of its
products to buy another one. The
presumption makes it easier to make tying
claims and get them to trial when the target
of the claim is a patent holder.
In the case before the court, Illinois Tool
Works is accused of requiring customers to
buy its ink when they buy its patented
"printheads," which are used to apply bar
codes onto packaging. Independent Ink,
which markets compatible inks, made a
Sherman Act tying claim against Illinois
Tool, invoking the Loew's precedent. A
judge in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California sided with
Illinois Tool, but the Federal Circuit U.S.
Court of Appeals reversed.
In the circuit ruling, Judge Timothy Dyk
said that even if the Loew's decision rested
on "wobbly, moth-eaten foundations" that
have been overtaken by market realities, his
court is still bound by the Supreme Court
precedent that created the presumption. Dyk
added that it is up to the Supreme Court, not
lower courts, to overturn one of its
precedents, and up to Congress to change
the law if it wants to.
In his brief for the American Intellectual
Property Law Association, Patrick . . . says
the Federal Circuit ruling conflicts with
decisions by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits,
a conflict that reflects growing disagreement
over the basis of the presumption.
"The mere issuance of a patent does not
convey market power in a relevant market,
except in very rare cases," Coyne wrote.
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"Asserting Old Standard in Patent-Tying Case"
National Law Journal
February 28, 2005
Pamela A. MacLean
After a decade of reluctant flirting between
the antitrust and patent bars, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit acted as
matchmaker recently to the arranged
marriage of lawyers in both specialties.
And the progeny may be something only a
plaintiffs' lawyer would love.
The Federal Circuit put a stop to the slow
drift of legal commentators and a smattering
of federal courts away from the Supreme
Court notion that patents confer market
power in tying cases. The court forcefully
reasserted a long-standing Supreme Court
precedent that the burden of proof falls to
the defendant patent holder to show lack of
market power in an antitrust suit alleging
illegal product tying of a patented product.
Traditional antitrust cases not involving
intellectual property obligate the plaintiff to
show that a defendant company possesses
the market power to affect prices and limit
the ability to compete. In this case, the
Federal Circuit made clear that it is the
defendant's duty to rebut a presumption of
market power based on the ownership of a
patent. Wrote Judge Timothy Dyk: "Once a
plaintiff established a patent tying
agreement, it was the defendant's burden to
rebut the presumption of market power and
consequent illegality that arose from patent
tying," Independent Ink Inc. v. Illinois Tool
Works, No. 04-1196.
The decision of Jan. 25 rebuffs a host of
legal commentators and smattering of judges
around the country who have suggested in
recent years that the Supreme Court's 20-
year-old precedents on market power are
hopelessly out of date and have been all but
abandoned.
That all changed with the Independent Ink
decision.
"I expect that the presumption of market
power has been the dirty linen of circuit
folklore," said Herbert Hovenkamp, a
professor at the University of Iowa College
of Law. "Courts have bent over backwards
to distinguish [the presumption] away.
"There have been very few cases in the last
10 years that based a presumption-of-
market-power conclusion solely on the fact
that a product was patented. I expect there
will be more now. The Federal Circuit has
breathed new life into this," said
Hovenkamp, who has written extensively on
the need for the Supreme Court to update its
thinking on patent tying and market power.
"This is not a rational presumption," he
added. "It grew out of a time when the
Supreme Court was hostile to patents. The
court assumed that if you had a patent you
had a monopoly," he said.
The Jefferson Parish precedent
If the ruling is appealed, it could open the
way for the Supreme Court to confront for
the first time the meaning of a rebuttable
presumption of market power in a patent-
tying case and to potentially re-examine its
1984 decision on market power. Jefferson
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Parish v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
In that case, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
stated in a footnote in a concurring opinion
signed by three other justices that it is a
"common misconception . . . that a patent or
copyright . . . suffices to demonstrate market
power."
Jefferson Parish and a subsequent decision
by the court one year later with similar
language has been the slender reed used for
much of the commentary and some court
rulings pushing away from the presumption
that patent holders enjoy market power.
Among those who have suggested that the
power of the patent is overrated has been
Judge Richard A. Posner of the 7th Circuit.
He wrote in a 2001 article, "Most patents
confer too little monopoly power to be a
proper object of antitrust concern. Some
patents confer no monopoly power at all."
Hovenkamp wrote last year, "Most patents
confer absolutely no market power on their
owners. . . . The economic case for
presuming sufficient market power . . .
simply because the tying product is patented
. . . is very weak."
Not so fast, came the response in
Independent Ink.
"The time may have come to abandon the
doctrine, but it is up to the Congress or the
Supreme Court to make this judgment," Dyk
wrote.
Patents and antitrust law make for a legal
odd couple. Antitrust law is intended to
protect and foster competition, while patents
create a temporary monopoly for the owner.
Patent specialist Dennis Crouch of
McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff in
Chicago said the majority of patent cases
now also involve an antitrust claim. "When
someone is sued for infringement, the
defendant shoots back a counterclaim that
the plaintiff improperly used the patent and
violated antitrust law."
This has prompted closer ties between
antitrust and patent practitioners, both inside
companies and in private practice, Crouch
said.
In this case, Illinois Tool Works Inc. and its
subsidiary, Trident Inc., license a patented
device that prints bar codes on corrugated
boxes. Illinois Tool required users of its
patented printhead to use it in combination
with the company's ink and ink supply
systems.
Independent Ink sought a declaratory
judgment in 1998 that it did not infringe the
Illinois Tool patents. That was followed by
Trident's filing of a patent infringement suit.
Independent Ink responded with a claim that
Trident orchestrated an illegal tying
arrangement, restraining trade, in violation
of § I of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Companies create tying arrangements when
a seller ties the purchase of one product with
the obligation to buy a second product; in
this case the purchase of a patented
printhead was tied to buying ink made by
the same firm.
U.S. District Judge Nora Manella of Los
Angeles dismissed Independent Ink's claims
in a summary judgment in 2002. The
Federal Circuit overturned her decision and
reinstated Independent Ink's § 1 Sherman
Antitrust Act claim over tying the purchase
of printheads and ink. The panel gave
instructions to allow Illinois Tool to rebut
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the market power presumption, if it could.
Precedent was never revoked
Edward O'Connor, attorney for Independent
Ink, insisted that the Federal Circuit simply
reaffirmed a doctrine that is well
established. "The commentators are saying
the doctrine is dead or doesn't exist and have
extrapolated from the Patent Misuse Reform
Act. But the precedent was never revoked
by the Supreme Court."
Patent and copyright holders can be
justifiably nervous because the potential
costs can be enormous. Violations of
antitrust law carry treble damages.
O'Connor pointed out that his case involves
gross sales of the tied product, the ink, for
10 years. "When you start adding it up
you're talking about hundreds of millions of
dollars," he said.
"[The defendants] will probably try to take it
to the Supreme Court, but if the court
reversed, it would have to reverse three
Supreme Court decisions," said O'Connor of
O'Connor, Christensen & McLaughlin in
Irvine, Calif.
Illinois Tool's attorney, Jordan Sigale, a
partner in the Chicago office of
Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal, declined to
comment on a potential Supreme Court
appeal.
He did say, "Nobody believes, long term,
this is a viable rule. The trend since the
1970s has been to whittle back on per se
rules." He said the Department of Justice
and many people felt that the "Supreme
Court had moved away" from its 1984
Jefferson Parish opinion.
"One way or another this is a short-term
blip, a glitch," Sigale said. "In the short
term, businesses will be wary but in the long
term it will be corrected."
The Independent Ink decision set off red
lights in the intellectual property bar.
Edward Filardi, who heads the antitrust
committee of the American Bar
Association's Section of Intellectual
Property Law, said, "We are in the midst of
looking at this. My view is we will end up
supporting reversal of the [market power]
presumption.
"It places too much burden on patent
holders," said Filardi of Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom in New York.
"I think the policy and the writing of many
third parties and nonjudicial types has
created a dynamic where people think the
practices are OK," said Alexander Hadjis, a
patent specialist in the Washington office of
New York-based Weil, Gotshal & Manges.
"There has been less focus on precedent
than the rationale by the parties."
"No matter how you look at this case, the
Federal Circuit got it right. They had to do
what they did," he said.
Whether the Supreme Court would even
consider the case brought bets from both
sides.
Hal S. Shaftel of Proskauer Rose in New
York, an antitrust litigator who handles
patent issues, said the appellate court "is
speaking at the intersection of several
cutting-edge issues on the role of patents in
antitrust and the standards we are going to
assess in tying practices."
Shaftel said that not long ago the Supreme
Court opted to defer a question of how tying
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practices may violate antitrust law. The
issue of rebuttable presumption may attract
the court, he said.
"But I think the likelihood is the court will
allow, at the district court level, further
percolation of these issues. They may see
how courts start to scrutinize how a patent
holder can rebut the presumption and how
exacting a test is applied," Shaftel said.
Randal Picker, a University of Chicago Law
School professor, said, "What you're seeing
is an increasingly strong intersection of
patent and antitrust." A number of years
ago, the antitrust bar became very concerned
about the Federal Circuit. "The Federal
Circuit was patent friendly and antitrust
unfriendly, and that gave you a broad shield
from antitrust actions," he said.
He suggested that the Supreme Court
probably should take the opportunity to
review the case and see if its precedent is
outdated.
Deborah A. Coleman, a litigation partner
with Hahn Loeser + Parks in Cleveland who
has written about antitrust and infringement
said, "The Federal Circuit has provided an
important service to those like me who are
trying to counsel IP rights owners in regard
to restrictive terms in licensing contracts,
since the inconsistency between the Federal
Circuit decision and decisions of regional
circuits may compel the Supreme Court to
finally weigh in to provide clarity."
Shaftel said that on a day-to-day basis
practitioners will deal with the ruling by
developing the proof to rebut the assumption
of market power. "That's where the
reactions to the decision are going to
become apparent," he said.
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"What Antitrust Law May Tell Us about Abortion"
SCOTUSblog
July 3, 2005
Tom Goldstein
In previous posts, we identified as the "most
important" cases of the Term several that
present hot-button social issues such as
abortion. In light of Justice O'Connor's
retirement, the most overlooked case of the
term is a little-noticed antitrust case, Illinois
Tool Works v. Independent Ink. The case
presents a somewhat esoteric issue-
whether the tying of the sale of a patented
product to a non-patented product gives rise
to a presumption that the seller has market
power.
Despite the narrowness of the issue
involved, Illinois Tool Works may prove
quite noteworthy because the answer to that
question is already very well settled. In
International Salt Company v. United States
(1947) and United States v. Loew 's (1962)
the Supreme Court held that the answer is
"yes," courts should presume market power
when a patented product is tied with a non-
patented product.
The actual question presented by Illinois
Tool Works is thus whether the Supreme
Court should overrule International Salt and
Loew 's. The case will accordingly provide
the Court with its most direct explicit
opportunity in the near term to address the
circumstances in which one of its prior
precedents should be overruled or instead
adhered to as a matter of stare decisis.
To be sure, Illinois Tool Works is a
statutory case, and the standards for stare
decisis in the statutory context traditionally
differ from those in constitutional cases.
The Supreme Court traditionally has been
more willing to overrule constitutional
precedents, which in contrast to statutory
decisions cannot be formally overruled by
Congress.
Nonetheless, Illinois Tool Works remains
very significant. As Marty Lederman's
earlier post discussed, many significant
statutory precedents are potentially open to
overruling in light of Justice O'Connor's
retirement. For example, federal civil rights
and habeas corpus standards are almost all
creatures of statute rather than the
Constitution. Moreover, the gap between
the Court's standards for overruling statutory
and constitutional precedents is not as great
as is sometimes thought, for the basic
principle that the law should retain its
continuity applies equally in both contexts.
It was on that basis, for example, that the
Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey voted
to sustain Roe v. Wade and that the Court in
the Dickerson case voted to sustain
Miranda.
So, the Court's willingness to overrule its
prior precedents in Illinois Tool Works
could serve as a bellwether for its openness
to revisiting a broad swath of law decided
over the past decade by narrow majorities
that included Justice O'Connor.
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Volvo Trucks North America v. Reeder-Simco GMC
(04-905)
Case Below: Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., v. Volvo GM Heavy Truck Corp., 374 F.3d 701 (8th Cir.
2004), cert. granted 125 S.Ct. 1596, 161 L.Ed.2d 276, 73 U.S.L.W. 3529 (U.S. March 7, 2005) (No.
04-905).
Reeder-Simco GMC, a dealer in large trucks, sued Volvo under the Robinson-Patman Act (RPA),
claiming that Volvo had engaged in price discrimination by providing larger price concessions to
Reeder's competitors. Dealers request price concessions from manufacturers when bidding on sales
to third parties. The difference between concessions to separate dealers will affect the final price of
the trucks. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the United States District Court for the Western District of
Arkansas in ruling for Reeder. Volvo appeals, arguing primarily that Reeder is not a "purchaser"
for purposes of the RPA.
Question Presented: The Robinson-Patman Act prohibits specified forms of price discrimination
"between different purchasers" where the effect of "such discrimination" may be harm to
competition "with any person who knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination." The
question presented is: Whether an unaccepted offer that does not lead to a purchase-so that there
is not "discriminat[ion] between different purchasers" as the statutory language contemplates-may
be the basis for liability under the Act.
Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., Appellee,
V.
Volvo GM Heavy Truck Corporation, now known as Volvo Trucks
North America, Inc., Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit
Decided July 12, 2004
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted]
OPINION: BYE, Circuit Judge. a commercially reasonable manner under the
Arkansas Franchise Practices Act (AFPA),
Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. (Volvo) Ark. Code Ann. § § 4-72-201 through 4-72-
appeals from a judgment entered in the 209. We affirm.
district court in favor of Reeder-Simco
GMC, Inc. (Reeder) on claims alleging I
unfair price discrimination under the
Robinson-Patman Act (RPA), 15 U.S.C. § This is an appeal from the denial of a motion
13, and a failure to deal in good faith and in for judgment as a matter of law (JAML)
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following a jury verdict; consequently we
recite the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict holder, Reeder. See
Jones v. Swanson, 341 F.3d 723, 731 (8th
Cir. 2003).
Reeder sells new and used trucks, including
heavy-duty trucks, out of a dealership
located in Fort Smith, Arkansas. Volvo
manufactures a broad line of heavy-duty
trucks for both over-the-road and vocational
use (dump trucks, mixer trucks, etc.). In
1995, Reeder signed a franchise agreement
with Volvo to become an authorized Volvo
truck dealer for a five-year term expiring
March 31, 2000. The agreement provided
for automatic one-year extensions of the
franchise if Reeder met certain sales
objectives established unilaterally by Volvo.
The majority of heavy-duty trucks sold by
dealers are manufactured only after a retail
customer has solicited and accepted bids
from several dealers. During this
competitive bidding process, dealers seek
concessions from Volvo for a price below
the initial wholesale price (80% of the
published retail price) which then allows the
dealers to offer lower prices to their
customers. This is an industry-wide
practice. To remain competitive with other
truck manufacturers, Volvo does not reveal
its method of calculating concessions. The
crux of this case is Reeder's claim that
Volvo gave other dealers more favorable
price concessions than Volvo granted
Reeder, which concomitantly reduced
Reeder's profits on successful bids and
increased the number of Reeder's
unsuccessful bids.
Reeder filed this action in February 2000
alleging Volvo violated the RPA and AFPA
and tortiously interfered with Reeder's
contracts....
Reeder presented the following evidence at
trial. In December 1997, Volvo announced
the "Volvo Vision" in an email distributed to
its dealers, including Reeder. The email had
a list of Volvo's challenges, which included
"too many dealers" and "under performing
dealers." App. 576. The Volvo Vision
called for "fewer dealers, larger markets."
Id. The email further indicated Volvo
wanted to more than double the average
market size of its dealers and decrease the
number of dealer owners from 146 to 75.
In March 1998, Volvo held its annual North
American Dealer Conference in Marco
Island, Florida. Marc Gustavson, a Volvo
executive, was the conference's keynote
speaker. He elaborated on the Volvo Vision
by indicating 50% of current Volvo truck
dealers would not be in business in the next
few years. Unlike Volvo's past annual
dealer conferences, where Volvo featured
motivational speakers who got dealers
"revved up" to sell more trucks, id. at 1119,
the featured guest speaker of the 1998
conference was Jon Krakauer, author of Into
Thin Air: A Personal Account of the Mt.
Everest Disaster. Krakauer spoke of falling
short of his goal to reach the summit of Mt.
Everest and told the dealers sometimes they
had to learn to give up without achieving
their goals.
Prior to and during this same time frame
(1996-1998), Reeder noticed an increase in
the sales objectives Volvo expected of it,
coupled with a decrease in the pricing
concessions it obtained from Volvo. After
learning of the Volvo Vision and its stated
goal of reducing the number of authorized
Volvo dealers, as well as mistakenly
receiving faxes from Volvo intended for
other dealers which listed larger concessions
than Reeder was getting, Reeder came to
suspect it was one of the dealers Volvo
sought to eliminate.
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A. Head-to-Head Competition with Another
Dealer for the Same Customer.
Reeder presented evidence that in the
summer of 1999, it bid on the sale of twelve
trucks to Hiland Dairy Company located in
Springfield, Missouri. Reeder requested a
12% concession, but Volvo authorized only
7.5%. Another Volvo authorized dealer,
Southwest Missouri Truck Center in
Springfield, successfully obtained the
Hiland Dairy contract when Volvo granted it
an 8.5% concession. As a result of the
difference in price concessions, Southwest
could offer the Missouri customer a price of
$ 62,890 per truck, while Reeder's price per
truck was $ 63,632.69. Had Reeder
obtained the account, it would have realized
a gross profit of $ 30,000 on the sale.
B. Contemporaneous Sales of Like Grade
and Quality Trucks in Which Favored Volvo
Dealers Received Greater Price Concessions
than Reeder.
In March 1998, Reeder successfully bid on
the sale of thirty trucks to Lane Freight
located in Tulsa, Oklahoma, involving a
mixture of over-the-road day-cab and
sleeper-cab trucks. Reeder initially
requested a 12.5 1% concession on this sale.
When Volvo denied the request, Reeder
asked for a 10% concession on the day-cab
trucks and 8.4% on the sleepers. Volvo
ultimately granted a 9% concession on both
truck types. Two months earlier, Volvo had
granted a dealer located in Tyler, Texas, a
12.3% concession on the sale of twelve
trucks of like grade and quality to
Brookshire Grocery located in Tyler. As a
result of the difference in concessions, the
price Reeder's customer paid for each truck
was $ 2,606 higher than the price the Texas
dealer provided to its customer. Had Volvo
offered Reeder the 12.3% concession the
Texas dealer received, Reeder would have
realized $ 52,120 in additional profits. [The
court noted other examples.]
C. Unsuccessful Sales Following Volvo's
Refusal to Grant Requested Price
Concessions.
In a third category of evidence Reeder
presented to prove price discrimination,
Reeder recounted numerous situations in
which it unsuccessfully requested particular
concessions from Volvo to close sales, while
during the same time frame Volvo granted
higher concessions to other Volvo dealers
who were able to close sales. For example,
in . . . May 1998, Reeder sought a price
concession of 21% on a sale of five trucks.
Volvo approved only 2%. Reeder did not get
its contract, During the same time, Volvo
gave another dealer a 10.6% concession on a
sale of three trucks of like grade and quality.
The other dealer got its contract.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of
Reeder on both claims and awarded
damages of $ 1,358,000 on the RPA claim
and $ 513,750 on the AFPA claim. The trial
court trebled the RPA damages pursuant to
15 U.S.C. § 15a and awarded Reeder
attorney fees. Volvo brought a motion for
JAML following trial. The district court
denied the motion, and Volvo filed a timely
appeal with this court.
II
"We review the denial of a motion for
JAML de novo." Naucke v. City of Park
Hills, 284 F. 3d 923, 929 (8th Cir. 2002).
Although our review is de novo, a party
seeking posttrial JAML based on the
sufficiency of the evidence "faces an
onerous burden [because we must] view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the
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jury's verdict [and reverse only] when there
is a complete absence of probative facts to
support the conclusion reached." Inacom
Corp. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 254 F.3d
683, 689 (8th Cir. 2001).
A. The RPA Claim
The RPA provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any
person engaged in commerce . .
. to discriminate in price
between different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and
quality, where either or any of
the purchases involved in such
discrimination are in commerce,
. . . and where the effect of such
discrimination may be
substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of
commerce, or to injure, destroy,
or prevent competition with any
person who either grants or
knowingly receives the benefit
of such discrimination, or with
customers of either of them.
15 US.C. § 13(a).
There are three types of violations under the
RPA. Primary-line violations occur when a
seller's price discrimination adversely
impacts competition with its own
competitors. Secondary-line violations
occur when a seller's price discrimination
injures competition among its customers.
Tertiary-line violations occur when a
discriminating seller's purchasers do not
compete directly, but their customers
compete within a unified market region.
Godfrey v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 161 F.3d
1137, 1140 (8th Cir. 1998) (Godfrey I). In
the instant case, Reeder avers a secondary
line violation, claiming Volvo's price
discrimination injured competition among
Volvo's customers, i.e., Reeder and other
Volvo dealers.
To prove its claim, Reeder had to show 1)
Volvo discriminated in price between
Reeder and the favored dealers, 2) this price
discrimination substantially affected
competition between Reeder and the favored
dealers, 3) the truck sales occurred in
interstate commerce, and 4) the trucks sold
by Reeder and the other dealers were of like
grade and quality. Godfrey v. Pulitzer
Publ'g, Inc., 276 F.3d 405, 408 (8th Cir.
2002) (Godfrey II). In addition, because the
RPA prohibits price discrimination
"between different purchasers," 15 U.SC. §
13(a), Reeder had to show there were actual
sales at two different prices to two different
Volvo dealers, i.e., a sale to itself and a sale
to another Volvo dealer. Fusco v. Xerox
Corp., 676 F.2d 332, 335 (8th Cir. 1982).
In other words, as a threshold matter Reeder
had to show it was a "purchaser" within the
meaning of the RPA. Id, at 334.
1. Two-Purchase Requirement
Volvo contends competitive bidding
situations do not implicate the RPA because
an unsuccessful bidder is not a purchaser.
Volvo emphasizes that much of Reeder's
proof involved situations where Reeder did
not purchase trucks from Volvo....
We agree an unsuccessful bidder is not a
purchaser within the meaning of the RPA.
In Fusco, we said a purchaser is one who
actually makes a purchase, not "one who
[merely] seeks to purchase, a person who
goes into the market-place for the purpose of
purchasing." 676 F.2d at 335 (quoting
Shaw's, Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F.2d
331, 333 (3d Cir. 1939)). "Thus, a sale at
one price plus either an offer to sell at a
higher price or a refusal to sell at any price
is generally thought not to violate the
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[RPA]. " Id. (citing MC. Mfg. Co. v. Texas
Foundries, Inc., 517 F.2d 1059, 1065 n.11
(5th Cir. 1975)). When Reeder
unsuccessfully bid on contracts because
Volvo's price concessions were not
favorable enough to obtain the contracts,
Reeder did not actually purchase trucks from
Volvo. Thus, Reeder was not a purchaser in
those instances, but merely went into the
market-place for the purpose of purchasing.
Volvo may have offered to sell trucks to
Reeder at a higher price than it offered to
other dealers, but mere offers to sell do not
violate the RPA.
This conclusion is consistent with the
conclusion of many courts that hold price
discrimination in the competitive bidding
process does not violate the RPA because
only one of the two competitors actually
makes a purchase.
In this case, however, Volvo concedes
Reeder was more than an unsuccessful
bidder. Reeder gave four examples where it
actually purchased Volvo trucks following
successful bids on contracts. Reeder
compared those successful sales to actual
sales made by other dealers during the same
time period (Reeder purchased fifty-five
trucks and compared those purchases to
other dealers' purchases of twenty-two
trucks). Although Volvo challenges the
sufficiency of these actual purchase-to-
purchase comparisons on other grounds
(addressed below), these successful bids
clearly gave Reeder "purchaser" status. As a
result, it follows Reeder was entitled to
pursue a claim for price discrimination
under the RPA.
2. Actual Competition
Volvo argues Reeder failed to show it was in
actual competition with the favored dealers.
The standard for showing actual competition
is whether, "as of the time the price
differential was imposed, the favored and
disfavored purchasers competed at the same
functional level, i.e., all wholesalers or all
retailers, and within the same geographic
market." Best Brands Beverage, Inc. v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 842 F.2d 578, 585
(2d Cir 1987). Here there is no dispute the
dealers all competed at the same functional
level, but Volvo contends Reeder did not
compete within the same geographic market
as the favored dealers. We disagree.
Although Reeder had an assigned
geographic area (ten counties in western
Arkansas and two counties in eastern
Oklahoma), it was free to sell outside that
area, and did so. Reeder introduced evidence
that it looked to the entire continental United
States in making its sales, and had sold or
delivered trucks in Arkansas, Oklahoma,
Missouri, Texas, Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, North Carolina,
Georgia, Colorado, and Oregon. Reeder
also established that end-buyers of the trucks
are very mobile and price-shop nationwide.
Reeder's evidence focused upon sales and
bids made in the southwest region of the
United States. Reeder presented evidence of
sales or bids it made in three states in the
southwest region (Arkansas, Missouri, and
Oklahoma) and compared the sales or bids
to those made by other dealers in four states
in the southwest region (Arkansas, Missouri,
Texas, and Tennessee). Reeder presented at
least two instances where it competed
directly with a favored dealer-the head-to-
head competition with Southwest Missouri
Truck Center in Springfield, Missouri, for a
twelve-truck deal to Hiland Dairy, and a
concession request from Reeder for a five-
truck deal to Tommy Davidson which also
involved a bid made by a Volvo dealer in
Springdale, Arkansas. . . . From this
evidence a jury could reasonably decide
Reeder was in actual competition with
favored dealers.
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3. Like Grade and Quality; Reasonably
Contemporaneous in Time
To establish an RPA violation, Reeder had
to show the comparative sales involved
trucks of like grade and quality. Id. at 408.
Products are not of like grade and quality "if
there are substantial physical differences in
products affecting consumer use, preference
or marketability." Checker Motors Corp. v.
Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 876, 889 (S.D.
N.Y 1968), affd, 405 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.
1969). Volvo argues the sales-to-sales
comparisons made by Reeder involved
trucks with different major components that
affected consumer preference and
marketability. In support of its position
Volvo points to trial testimony which
showed differences in truck components
influence consumers' decisions to buy-
particularly engine types and gear ratios.
Reeder offered testimony, however, showing
that any differences in components were
inconsequential-in all cases the trucks
were the same model and same year, with
comparable engines and largely similar
components. Also, Reeder provided
evidence that the differences in components
were taken into account in the calculation of
the price quotes and concessions, so the jury
could reasonably conclude that when the
comparisons involved trucks with somewhat
different components, the differences did not
substantially affect the concessions Volvo
offered.
We note the RPA says the commodities
involved must be of like grade and quality,
not identical grade and quality. We have
previously indicated the concept "was
designed to serve as one of the necessary
rough guides for separating out those
commercial transactions insufficiently
comparable for price regulation by the
statute." Moog Indus. v. Fed. Trade
Comm'n, 238 F.2d 43, 50 (8th Cir. 1956)[.]
Here, the jury was instructed on the concept
of like grade and quality, and Volvo does
not argue the district court erred in its
instructions. The jury found by special
interrogatory the comparisons involved
trucks of like grade and quality. We
acknowledge there was conflicting evidence
on the substantiality of the differences in
components, but there was ample evidence
supporting the jury's determination the
differences were immaterial....
Reeder also had to show the comparative
sales were reasonably contemporaneous in
time, but "there is no requirement that the
two sales be made at precisely the same time
or place." DeLong Equip., 990 F.2d at 1202
(11th Cir. 1993). The four sales-to-sales
comparisons offered by Reeder were
between one and four months apart, with
one exception . . . Volvo argues the sales
were not contemporaneous because as little
as a single-month gap could make a
substantial difference in the price concession
it offered due to changes in model-year
availability or backlog or both. . . . Volvo
never presented evidence, however, to show
the gaps between the sales comparisons
involved in this case did make a difference
in the price concessions it offered. Again,
the jury was instructed on the issue whether
the comparative sales occurred at about the
same time, found by special interrogatory
that they did, and Volvo does not challenge
the district court's instructions. Under the
standard we must apply in reviewing a
motion for JAML, we find no basis for
disturbing the jury's verdict.
4. Injury/Damages
a. Competitive Injury
The RPA prohibits price discrimination
"where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition. .
. or to injure, destroy, or prevent
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competition." 15 US.C. § 13(a). The RPA
"guards against injury to competition, not
injury to individual competitors." Rose
Confections, Inc. v. Ambrosia Chocolate
Co., 816 F2d 381, 387 n.3 (8th Cir. 1987).
The RPA does not, however, "require that
the discriminations must in fact have harmed
competition, but only that there is a
reasonable possibility that they 'may' have
such an effect." Corn Prods. Ref Co. v.
Fed. Trade Comm'n, 324 US. 726, 742, 89
L. Ed 1320, 65 S. Ct. 961, 40 F.TC. 892
(1945).
A plaintiff may demonstrate a reasonable
possibility of competitive injury in two
ways. "First, plaintiff may introduce direct
evidence that disfavored competitors lost
sales or profits as a result of the
discrimination." Rose Confections, 816
F 2d at 385 (citing Falls City Indus., Inc. v.
Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 437-38,
75 L. Ed. 2d 174, 103 S. Ct. 1282 (1983)).
In other words, while the RPA does not
guard against injury to individual
competitors, proving injury to individual
competitors is one way to demonstrate a
discriminatory practice likely injured
competition. "Second, [a plaintiff] can show
that the favored competitor received a
substantial price reduction over a substantial
period of time, which gives rise to a
permissible inference of competitive injury."
Id. (citing Fed Trade Comm'n v. Morton
Salt Co., 334 US. 37, 50-51, 92 L. Ed. 1196,
68 S. Ct. 822, 44 F T. C. 1499(1948)).
Volvo argues Reeder failed to demonstrate a
reasonable possibility of competitive injury
because Reeder did not prove the lower
concessions Volvo granted to other dealers
drew sales away from Reeder. We disagree.
The evidence presented by Reeder was
sufficient for the jury to conclude Volvo's
discriminatory concessions resulted in lost
profits and sales to Reeder and other dealers,
and that favored competitors received
substantial price reductions over a
substantial period of time. As stated above,
Volvo acknowledged in December 1997 that
it wanted to cut the number of its dealers in
half as part of its "Volvo Vision." At trial,
Volvo acknowledged it had, in fact,
succeeded in reducing the numbers of its
dealers. . . . From this evidence, the jury
could properly infer Volvo's intent to reduce
the number of its dealers manifested itself in
the discriminatory concession practices.
Reeder also presented evidence that it lost
profits and sales as a result of Volvo's price
concession practices. . . .
Reeder showed its sales of Volvo trucks had
been solid prior to the period of Volvo's
price discrimination (1996-2000). During
the period of discrimination, Reeder's sales
decreased substantially and its profit
margins were lower despite increased sales
efforts. In all, Reeder's gross profits fell
from $ 165,499 in 1996 to $ 26,327 in 2000.
At the same time, favored dealers' sales and
overall market sales stayed strong. Based on
this evidence, the jury could reasonably
conclude Reeder's average gross profit was
lower than the average of favored Volvo
dealers because Volvo discriminated against
Reeder in its price concessions.
Reeder also presented evidence that Volvo's
practice extended over a substantial period
of time (1996-2000). In addition, the
evidence established that dealer profit
margins were narrow during that time.
Thus, the jury could reasonably conclude
even small differences in price concessions
had a substantial impact on competition.
b. Actual Injury
Although Reeder only needed to prove
competitive injury may result to establish a
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violation of 15 US.C. § 13(a), it had to
make some showing of actual injury to itself
to recover treble damages under 15 U.S.C. §
15(a). Volvo argues Reeder did not show
actual injury because Reeder offered too few
examples of Volvo's discriminatory
practices, there was no evidence the favored
dealers sold the trucks to end-users at lower
retail prices, and no evidence the end users
selected the favored dealers' bids because of
the lower prices. We believe Volvo
construes too narrowly the requirements for
proving actual injury.
In addressing whether Reeder proved it was
actually injured by Volvo's price
discrimination, Volvo would have us limit
our analysis to the one instance of direct
head-to-head competition with Southwest
Missouri Truck Center for the Hiland Dairy
contract and the four sales-to-sales
comparisons Reeder offered to prove its
purchaser status, while disregarding all the
other evidence offered to prove actual
injury. We believe such an approach is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
teachings, both with respect to the role
circumstantial evidence plays in RPA claims
and the scope of injury to be remedied by
the RPA.
Reeder presented other substantial evidence
to prove competitive and actual injury.
Reeder presented numerous instances of its
unsuccessful sales due to Volvo's failure to
grant requested price concessions, and
evidence of Volvo's admitted intentions to
reduce the number of its dealers. Indeed,
Reeder showed Volvo successfully reduced
the number of its dealers and placed many
more on probation during a "record" sales
period. Reeder presented evidence that its
own sales and profits were substantially
reduced during this boom in the heavy truck
industry, despite an increase in its own sales
efforts. From this evidence the jury could
reasonably infer Volvo's discriminatory
practice and Reeder's injuries extended
beyond the five specific head-to-head and
sales-to-sales comparisons.
[T]here was sufficient evidence from which
the jury could infer favored dealers received
lower prices from Volvo than did Reeder,
and this price advantage allowed other
dealers to undercut Reeder's prices, hurting
Reeder's sales and profits. There was also
evidence Volvo was aware this
discriminatory practice could destroy
Reeder's business; indeed, the elimination of
some dealers like Reeder appeared to be
Volvo's intent. This is precisely the type of
injury the antitrust laws were meant to
prevent. See Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 125,
23 L. Ed. 2d 129, 89 S. Ct. 1562 (1969)
(permitting causality to be inferred from
circumstantial evidence where the injury
involved was "precisely the type of loss that
the claimed violations of the antitrust laws
would be likely to cause."). Moreover,
Reeder was not required to prove Volvo's
price discrimination was the only reason for
its injuries, or the only reason for heavy
truck customers' purchasing decisions-it
was enough that Reeder showed the price
discrimination was a "material" cause of its
injuries. Id. at 114 n.9
III
We affirm the judgment entered in the
district court in all respects.
DISSENT: HANSEN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I do not disagree with the court's
resolution of the state law issue, I write
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separately to express my view that Reeder
has failed to make out a claim under the
Robinson-Patman Act. Even viewing all of
the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict, I conclude that Reeder cannot
prove the necessary elements to recover
treble damages in this case. Specifically,
Reeder has not proven a violation of § 13(a)
because the facts fail to show injury or
likelihood of injury to actual competition
between Reeder and the "favored" Volvo
dealers. Furthermore, even if we assume
that Volvo violated § 13(a), there is
absolutely no indication that any such
violation was the cause of Reeder's injury,
for the purpose of recovering damages under
§ 15(a). I therefore respectfully dissent
from Section II(A) of the court's opinion.
There is little doubt that the facts of this case
fail to fit neatly into the framework that
courts have established in analyzing
Robinson-Patman Act secondary-line
claims. Much of my disagreement in this
case stems from what I perceive as the
court's attempt to fit a square peg into a
round hole. Traditional RPA cases involve
sellers and purchasers that carry inventory or
deal in fungible goods. By contrast, the
parties in this case operate in a unique
marketplace where special order products
are sold to individual, pre-identified
customers only after competitive bidding.
By its very nature, this process will never
produce the kind of competition the RPA
was designed to protect because it will never
result in the type of two purchase transaction
that itself creates a market for the goods that
are sold. Indeed, where, at the time of the
end purchase, only one possible seller and
one possible buyer exist, competition is
totally absent. It is the nature of competitive
bidding, not price discrimination, that makes
it so.
The court properly recognizes that a
competitive bidding situation will never
involve two "purchasers," and thus always
will fall outside of the purview of the RPA.
Despite this determination, however, the
court goes on to conclude that Reeder's
purchases with respect to four transactions
give it "purchaser status" as to separate
instances in which it did not make a
purchase, and therefore was not in fact a
purchaser. I disagree with this proposition.
Reeder cannot piggyback nonpurchaser
transactions onto purchaser transactions for
purposes of recovering under the RPA. My
concern does not stem from a strict
adherence to the two purchase requirement,
but rather from my belief that "purchaser
status" is inextricably intertwined with the
existence of actual competition and the
possible threat thereto. Because my primary
objection to the court's opinion is that it
overlooked this important aspect of actual
competition, I turn next to that issue.
Despite the fact that Reeder operates at the
same functional level as the "favored" Volvo
dealers and that they may do business in the
same or overlapping geographic areas, I
nevertheless conclude that Reeder has failed
to prove that it was in actual competition
with the "favored" Volvo dealers. There
certainly may exist a national market in
which heavy-truck dealers compete to
receive the opportunity to bid on potential
sales to customers. The Volvo dealers in
this case very well may have competed
against each other in this market on a regular
basis. However, any difference in price that
Volvo eventually may quote to a dealer who
actually bids on a potential sale has no effect
on this market. The evidence shows that an
end user's decision to request a bid from a
particular dealer or to allow a particular
dealer to bid is controlled by such factors as
an existing relationship, geography,
reputation, and cold calling or other
marketing strategies initiated by individual
dealers. Once bidding begins, however, the
relevant market becomes limited to the
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needs and demands of a particular end user,
with only a handful of dealers competing for
the ultimate sale. Thus, although Reeder
and other "favored" dealers may have
competed generally with each other in the
larger market for obtaining bids, there is
evidence of only two occasions where
Reeder competed with a "favored" Volvo
dealer for an actual sale....
It is my view that an injury to competition
can be proven only where the factors
necessary to state an RPA claim all are
present in the same relevant transaction. To
the extent that the court looks for the
existence of one factor in one transaction
and the existence of another factor in a
second transaction, I conclude that the proof
in this case is too tenuous and requires too
many inferences piled atop inferences to
reach the court's result.
Nevertheless, even if we assume that Volvo
violated § 13(a) of the RPA, I would reverse
Reeder's RPA damage award because
Reeder has failed to prove that it was
actually injured by Volvo's price
discrimination as required by § 15(a). See J.
Truett Payne, 451 US. at 562 ("To recover
treble damages, then, a plaintiff must make
some showing of actual injury attributable to
something the antitrust laws were designed
to prevent."). Although Reeder may have
established that it lost sales and profits to
other non-Volvo competitors, there can be
no inference of actual injury for the purpose
of the RPA without some evidence (and
there is none in this record) that the
discriminatory pricing caused those sales
and profits to be diverted from Reeder to
another Volvo dealer who received more
favorable terms from Volvo.
Although it is possible that Reeder lost sales
or profits to non-Volvo dealers because it
did not receive a sufficiently high
concession from Volvo in the first three
scenarios, the difference in concessions
offered to Reeder and the "favored" Volvo
dealers did not cause the lost sales or profits
on those deals. In order to prove that the §
13(a) violation caused its injuries, Reeder
essentially must show that absent a price
difference, it would not have lost those sales
or profits. However, even if Volvo had not
offered the "favored" dealers greater
concessions, i.e., not discriminated, there
still is no proof that Reeder would have
made the sales. Furthermore, as to the sales
that Reeder did make, it would be improper
to calculate lost profits based on what
Reeder otherwise characterizes as illegal
price discrimination.
The fact that the sales and profits were not
diverted from Reeder to "favored" Volvo
dealers demonstrates not only a lack of
causation of actual injury under § 15(a), but
also seriously undermines our court's
conclusion that there is any likelihood of
injury to competition between Reeder and
the "favored" Volvo dealers. . ..
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"High Court Takes Volvo Appeal on Discounts to Truck Dealers"
Transport Topics
March 14, 2005
Roger Gilroy
The Supreme Court said it would hear an
appeal by Volvo Trucks North America of a
federal appeals court decision that found the
truck manufacturer had illegally offered one
of its dealers smaller discounts than it
offered other dealers.
Two lower courts had backed the contention
of an Arkansas Volvo dealer, Reeder-Simco
GMC Inc., which said price concessions it
received from Volvo violated the federal
Robinson-Patman Act, which regulates
discounting practices in commercial
transactions.
"Volvo is pleased the Supreme Court agreed
to hear our case. This involves an issue that
is important to us and we did not take this
step lightly. We hope that the court will find
our arguments compelling and will act to
overturn the lower court's ruling," VTNA
spokesman Jim McNamara told Transport
Topics March 9.
Volvo's said the case is about whether it
violated the law by offering different prices
to two different dealers "when either those
dealers are not competing with each other,
or they are competing, but only one of the
two actually makes a purchase," said Roy
Englert Jr., VTNA's outside counsel with
Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck &
Untereiner LLP in Washington, D.C.
Joe Byars Jr., a lawyer with Christian &
Byars in Fort Smith, Ark., representing
Reecler-Simco, told Transport Topics the
main question was whether the federal law
would "prevent a manufacturer from
discriminating in price between dealers in
similar, reasonably contemporaneous
transactions, where the effect may be to
injure competition."
The Supreme Court agreed March 7 to hear
Volvo s appeal of the case sometime during
the nine-month term that would begin in
October, Bloomberg News reported.
Englert told Transport Topics the initial
briefs both sides filed in February with the
Supreme Court simply argued why the court
"should or shouldn't hear the case."
Volvo attorney Englert argued the appeals
court's interpretation of the law "cannot be
reconciled with the text of the statute or
prior interpretations of it by other courts of
appeals." He said VTNA would file another
brief outlining the merits of its position.
Byars argued for the dealer that the appeals
court "did not create 'new law,' but applied
the law, as announced in long-standing
precedent, to the specific facts in this case."
David Price, an attorney with the
Washington Legal Foundation, who filed
arguments supporting VTNA, said the case
came up now because the Supreme Court
"typically waits until there is a conflict
among the lower courts before it steps in to
resolve an issue."
In July, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
District affirmed Reeder-Simco's claim of
price discrimination.
The court said there was "sufficient
evidence" that allowed a jury to "infer
favored dealers received lower prices from
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Volvo than did Reeder, and the price
advantage allowed other dealers to undercut
Reader's prices, hurting Reeder's sales and
profits."
The court said Volvo was aware this
discriminatory practice "could destroy
Reeder's business; indeed, the elimination of
some dealers like Reeder appeared to be
Volvo's intent. This is precisely the type of
injury the antitrust laws were meant to
prevent."
A dissenting appeals court judge said, "The
parties in this case operate in a unique
marketplace where special-order products
are sold to individual, pre-identified
customers only after competitive bidding.
By its very nature, this process will never
produce the kind of competition the RPA
was designed to protect."
Earlier, the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Arkansas awarded
Reeder-Simco $1.4 million in damages plus
attorney fees, which were tripled as required
by law to about $4 million.
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"U.S. Supreme Court Grants Certiorari in
Significant Robinson-Patman Act Case"
Mondaq
May 12, 2005
William Hohengarten
The Supreme Court recently granted
certiorari in a case under the Robinson-
Patman Act that is of substantial interest to
the business community. The Robinson-
Patman Act makes it unlawful "to
discriminate in price between different
purchasers of goods of like grade and
quality, . . . where the effect of such
discrimination may be substantially to lessen
competition, . . . or to injure, destroy, or
prevent competition with any person who . .
. knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination." 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
In Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc. v. Volvo GM
Heavy Truck Corp., 374 F.3d 701 (8th Cir.
2004), a divided panel of the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld a multimillion
dollar treble damages award, plus attorneys'
fees, in a Robinson-Patman suit brought by
the respondent heavy truck dealer, Reeder,
against the petitioner manufacturer, Volvo.
The damages award rested on the "industry-
wide practice" whereby heavy truck
manufacturers grant discretionary discounts
to dealers that are bidding on orders from
specific customers. Reeder showed that
Volvo offered different discretionary
discounts to different dealers on different
potential retail sales. However, other federal
courts of appeals have held that Robinson-
Patman liability does not arise in this type of
competitive bidding market. Those courts
have reasoned that when a dealer who does
not obtain the most favorable discount is
unsuccessful in making a sale, there is no
"purchase" by the dealer, as required for
liability under the Act.
In departing from the rule adopted by other
circuits and upholding liability under these
circumstances, the decision of the Eighth
Circuit potentially expands Robinson-
Patman liability. The Eighth Circuit
allowed Reeder to compare discounts on its
purchases from Volvo for sales to specific
retail customers with the deeper discounts
obtained from Volvo by other dealers for
sales to different customers, even though
Volvo claimed there was no head-to-head
competition between Reeder and the other
dealers on those sales. In addition, the
Eighth Circuit allowed Reeder to obtain
damages for sales lost to dealers for other
manufacturers, even though Reeder was not
a "purchaser" on those sales.
The Supreme Court's decision in this case
will likely have major significance for any
industry in which manufacturers offer
discretionary discounts to dealers bidding
against other manufacturers' dealers for the
business of specific retail customers-a
practice that promotes interbrand
competition. In addition, as this is the first
Robinson-Patman case the Supreme Court
has taken in more than a decade, the Court's
reasoning on the liability and damages
issues could have a substantial impact on all
cases arising under the Act.
Briefs for petitioner Volvo and amici curiae
supporting Volvo and urging reversal are
due May 20. Briefs for respondent Reeder
and amici supporting respondent will be due
June 24. The case is No. 04-905, Volvo
Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-
Simco GMC, Inc.
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Lockhart v. United States
(04-881)
Ruling Below: (Lockhart v. United States, 376 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S.
Ct. 1928, 161 L. Ed. 2d 772, 73 U.S.L.W. 3630 (U.S. Apr. 25, 2005) (No. 04-881)).
James Lockhart is 67 years old and has roughly $80,000 in unpaid student loans. He defaulted
on his loans in 1991 when he became unemployed due to disability. The federal government
began withholding money from his Social Security disability benefit in 2002 in order to repay
those loans. That amount increased when Lockhart began receiving an old-age benefit.
Lockhart claims that the Government cannot reclaim the amount due on the loans because it has
been more than ten years since the loans became outstanding. Two federal laws appear to be in
conflict. One provides for aggressive collection of loans and removes the statute of limitations,
while the other prohibits the offset of Social Security benefits to pay debts that are more than ten
years old. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed the case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim for relief. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit held that, despite the confusion, Congress intended to repeal the ten year limit on Social
Security offsets, and therefore affirmed the judgment.
Question Presented: Do the Social Security Act and the Debt Collection Improvement Act bar
the United States from withholding social security benefits to collect student loan debt that has
been outstanding for more than ten years, as the Eighth Circuit has held, or does the Higher
Education Act eliminate any such bar, as the Ninth Circuit held below?
NOTE: In a conflicting case, the Eighth Circuit held last year in Lee v. Paige, 376 F.3d 1179
(8th Cir. 2004), cert. filed, 73 USLW 3531 (Feb 25, 2005) (NO. 04-1139) that the statute of
limitations still applies. That case follows on pages 373-374.
James LOCKHART, Plaintiff-Appellant
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., Defendants
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Decided July 23, 2004
[Excerpt: Some citations and footnotes omitted.
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OPINION: Noonan, Circuit Judge:
PROCEEDINGS
On March 20, 2002, Lockhart filed a
complaint against the United States, the
Attorney General and the Secretaries of
Education and the Treasury alleging that he
had received notice from the United States
Department of Education that it intended to
offset a portion of his monthly Social
Security benefits to secure repayment of his
government educational loans. Lockhart
asserted that, because "more than 10 years
have passed since [his] education loans
became outstanding," the attempt to collect
them by offset was "time barred under 31
U.S.C. § 3716(e)(1)."
This claim was buried in a barrage of other
contentions which the district court
understandably found confusing and which
Lockhart failed to clarify when ordered to
show cause why his case should not be
dismissed for failure to show a basis for
jurisdiction and to state a claim for which
relief could be granted. On June 4, 2002,
the complaint was dismissed in its entirety,
and judgment was entered for the
defendants.
Lockhart appeals.
JURISDICTION and STANDARD OF
REVIEW
We have jurisdiction over the final judgment
of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291. We review de novo both a dismissal
for want of subject matter jurisdiction and a
dismissal for failure to state a claim.
ANALYSIS
Construction of Lockhart's Complaint. In
compliance with precedent, we bend over
backwards to pluck a viable claim from
Lockhart's wide-ranging complaint. The
contention that the government's offset is
barred by statute is such a claim. By
implication, the claim also alleges federal
question jurisdiction.
The Statutes At Issue. Four statutes must be
considered. The Debt Collection Act of
1982 provided for administrative offset as a
way of collecting debts of the United States,
at the same time stating:
(e) This section does not
apply-
(1) to a
subchapter
outstanding
years; or
claim under this
that has been
for more than 10
(2) when a statute explicitly
prohibits using administrative
offset to collect the claim or
type of claim involved.
Pub. L. No. 97-365, 96 Stat. 1754 (1982)
(codified as amended in 31 U.SC. §
3716(e)).
Social Security benefits once appeared to
fall squarely within the Act's exception. §
3716(e) (2). The Social Security Act, 42
US C. § 407 was amended in 1983 to read:
(a) The right of any person to
any future payment under this
subchapter shall not be
transferable or assignable, at
law or in equity, and none of the
moneys paid or payable or
rights existing under this sub-
chapter shall be subject to
execution, levy, attachment,
garnishment, or other legal
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process, or to the operation of
any bankruptcy or insolvency
law.
(b) No other provision of law,
enacted before, on, or after
April 20, 1983, may be
construed to limit, supersede, or
otherwise modify the provisions
of this section except to the
extent that it does so by express
reference to this section.
Id. Notably, this amendment did not
mention offset by the government.
Arguably, offset is included under "other
legal process." Offset, however, is a form of
self-help that may not fall within the term.
Congress, having so recently amended the
Debt Collection Act to provide for
administrative offset, may not have intended
to deny this remedy to the government. To
decide this case we need not resolve the
question.
In 1991, the Higher Education Assistance
Act was amended to read as follows:
(1) It is the purpose of this
subsection to ensure that
obligations to repay loans and
grant overpayments are
enforced without regard to any
Federal or State statutory,
regulatory, or administrative
limitation on the period within
which debts may be enforced.
(2) Notwithstanding any other
provision of statute, regulation,
or administrative limitation, no
limitation shall terminate the
period within which suit may be
filed, a judgment may be
enforced, or an offset,
garnishment, or other action
initiated or taken by-. . . .
(D) the Secretary, the Attorney
General, the administrative head
of another Federal agency . . .
for the repayment of [a student
loan] . . . that has been assigned
to the Secretary....
20 US.C. § § 1091a(a)(I)-(2). As of 1991,
therefore, the statute of limitations contained
in the Debt Collection Act no longer
prevented the collection of student loans,
and the only restriction the government
arguably faced in collecting delinquent
student loans was that it could not use
administrative offset to reach social security
benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 407.
However, in 1996, Congress amended the
Debt Collection Act by adding:
(c)(3)(A)(i) Notwithstanding
any other provision of law
(including sections 207 and
1631(d)(1) of the Social
Security Act (42 US.C. 407 and
1383(d)(1)) . . . all payments
due to an individual under the
Social Security Act . . . shall be
subject to offset under this
section.
(ii) An amount of $ 9,000 which
a debtor may receive under
Federal benefit programs cited
under clause (i) within a 12-
month period shall be exempt
from offset under this
subsection.
31 US.C. § § 3716(c)(3)(A)(i)-(ii). This
statute explicitly removes any protection
under section 407 that Social Security
benefits may have had from offset, and thus
allows the government to reach Lockhart's
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benefit in order to collect on his debt.
This amendment was inserted in the Debt
Collection Act without removing the
language already quoted about the non-
applicability of "this section" to claims
outstanding for more than 10 years or to
statutes explicitly prohibiting administrative
offset. See 31 US.C. § §3716(e)(1)-(2).
A puzzle has been created by the codifiers.
But it seems clear that in 1996, Congress
explicitly authorized the offset of Social
Security benefits, and that in the Higher
Education Act of 1991, Congress had
overridden the 10-year statute of limitations
as applied to student loans. That the
codifiers failed to note the impact of the
1991 repeal on section 3716(e) does not
abrogate the repeal. Because the Debt
Collection Act's statute of limitation is
inapplicable here, the government's offset is
not time-barred.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment
entered against Lockhart.
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Dee Ella LEE, Appellee,
V.
Roderick PAIGE, Secretary of the Department of Education,
Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit
Decided July 23, 2004
Note: The following Eighth Circuit Court decision conflicts with the Ninth Circuit
Court's decision in Lockhart v. United States. Petition for cert. was filed February
25, 2005.
[Excerpt: Some citations and footnotes omitted]
OPINION: PER CURIAM.
Roderick Paige, Secretary of the United
States Department of Education, appeals
from a grant of summary judgment entered
in favor of Dee Ella Lee, contending that the
district court incorrectly barred the
department from garnishing Ms. Lee's social
security benefits on account of her
outstanding student loans. We affirm.
Ms. Lee defaulted on two student loans in
1984. The Department of Education took
assignment of the loans in the late 1980's
and has sought repayment ever since. In
October, 2001, the government began
withholding a portion of Ms. Lee's social
security benefits, applying the amount to
Ms. Lee's outstanding loan balance. She
filed suit to stop the government from
garnishing her benefits.
The dispute between Ms. Lee and Secretary
Paige requires the synthesis of three separate
acts: the Social Security Act, the Debt
Collection Act (as amended by the Debt
Collection Improvement Act), and the
Higher Education Act.
The Higher Education Act, passed in 1991,
eliminated statutes of limitations on the
government's right to seek repayment on
defaulted federal student loans. . . . At the
time that the Higher Education Act became
law, the Debt Collection Act authorized the
government to offset unpaid debt balances
from some federal payments but not from
social security benefits. Congress later
passed the Debt Collection Improvement
Act, which authorizes federal agencies to
recover money owed on delinquent student
loans (as well as some other debts) by
offsetting a debtor's social security benefits.
The Debt Collection Improvement Act left
unchanged, however, the original Debt
Collection Act's limitation on the right of
offset, under which government agencies are
not allowed to use the remedy of
administrative offset on claims that have
been outstanding in excess of ten years.
Though he concedes that the claims against
Ms. Lee had been outstanding for more than
ten years, Secretary Paige nonetheless
argues that the ten-year limitation in the
Debt Collection Act did not prohibit the
administrative offset of Ms. Lee's benefits
because that would be contrary to §
1091a(a)(2) which had eliminated statutes
of limitations. Instead, he maintains that the
ten-year disabling provision in § 3716(e)(1)
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should control all claims except those like
the collection of student loans, where
Congress eliminated all statutes of
limitation. Ms. Lee argues that the disabling
provision of § 3716(e)(1) was intentionally
left in the statute and that it controls this
case.
The district court agreed with Ms. Lee. The
court reasoned that when "Congress
removed all statute of limitations obstacles
in § 1091a, it could not have contemplated
that its actions would have any effect on
Social Security payments, because such
payments were not yet subject to offset," id.
at 984, and subsequent Congressional
approval of offsetting social security
benefits did not import § 1091a into the
social security context, because Congress
expressly left the ten-year disabling
provision intact. Had Congress intended to
limit the disabling provision to allow the
government unlimited offset opportunities
for the collection of delinquent student
loans, the district court reasoned, it would
have done so explicitly. In the absence of
Congressional language authorizing
application of § 1091a to social security
offsets, the district court concluded that the
specific limitations in § 3716(e)(1) prevail.
We review de novo a district court's
interpretation of a statute. Loehrer v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 98 F3d 1056,
1061 (8th Cir. 1996). We affirm the
judgment for the reasons given in the district
court's well-reasoned opinion. The
Department of Education remains free to
pursue payment on the defaulted loans from
Ms. Lee; it simply cannot take money from
her monthly social security check to reduce
the debt.
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"Justices to Decide if Social Security Can Be Seized"
Los Angeles Times
April 26, 2005
David Savage
In the latest installment of the baby
boomers-reach-retirement-age saga, the
Supreme Court said Monday that it would
decide whether the government could seize
Social Security benefits from individuals
who failed to repay decades-old student
loans.
At issue is $3.6 billion in student loans that
have gone unpaid for more than 10 years.
One federal law says Education Department
officials should aggressively try to collect
money from those who defaulted on their
government-backed loans by garnishing
their wages or seeking other sources of
money.
But a second law says the government
should not take Social Security benefits to
repay debts that are more than 10 years old.
Not surprisingly, lower courts are split on
which law to follow.
To resolve the dispute,.the justices voted to
hear the case of James Lockhart, a
Washington state man who went to four
colleges in the 1980s with the help of
federally guaranteed student loans. He
became disabled as a result of diabetes and
heart disease, and was unemployed in 1991
when he defaulted on nine student loans.
In 2002, Lockhart was living on his Social
Security disability benefit of $874 a month.
At the same time, he had $80,000 in unpaid
student loans.
To repay his debt, the government took $93
a month from his disability benefit. A year
later, Lockhart reached age 65 and began
receiving an old-age benefit instead of a
disability benefit. Now, the government is
taking $143 a month.
Under the law, the government can seize
15% of a recipient's monthly benefit to
repay the loans.
The Education Department said the seizures
had proved to be an effective means of
recovering unpaid students loans. In 2003,
the collection effort brought in $400 million
from reclaimed Social Security benefits.
Lockhart sued three years ago to block the
seizure, but he lost before a federal judge in
Seattle and the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals in San Francisco. Its judges
pointed to the education law that encouraged
the government to collect on the unpaid
loans.
In a different case, the U.S. 8th Circuit
Court of Appeals in St. Louis came to the
opposite conclusion by pointing to the Debt
Collection Act, which bars the government
from seizing Social Security benefits to pay
debts that are more than 10 years old.
The Public Citizen Litigation Group, a
public interest law firm, appealed on
Lockhart's behalf. Its lawyers argued that
many people, like Lockhart, had no income
other than Social Security, and that
Congress did not want agencies to seize the
benefits of such individuals.
The high court said it would hear the case of
Lockhart vs. US. in the fall....
375
"Government Can't Offset Student Loans
with Social Security"
Consumer Financial Services Law Report
August 25, 2004
A senior citizen prevailed over the
government's attempt to collect on her
outstanding student loans by seizing part of
her Social Security payments. The 8th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District
Court's decision that the government had no
right to offset because the loans were more
than 10 years old. (Lee v. Paige, No. 03-
3819 (8th Cir. 08/04/04).)
In making this determination, the 8th Circuit
analyzed the Social Security Act, the Debt
Collection Act and the Higher Education
Act. Congress passed the HEA in 1991.
The court pointed out that the HEA, 20 USC
1091a(a)(2), eliminated the statutes of
limitations on the government's right to seek
repayment on defaulted federal student
loans. At that time, the DCA, 31 USC 3716,
authorized the government to offset unpaid
debt balances from some federal payments
but not from Social Security benefits, the
court noted.
Congress then amended the DCA,
authorizing federal agencies to recover
money owed on delinquent student loans by
offsetting a debtor's Social Security benefits.
However, the DCA had a limitation on the
right of offset, which was not affected by the
amendments. Under 31 USC 3716(e)(1), the
government cannot offset claims that have
been outstanding for more than 10 years.
In this case, Dee Ella Lee defaulted on her
student loans in 1984, and the government
began garnishing her benefits in 2001.
Contrary to HEA
The government argued that the 10-year
limitation should not apply because it was
contrary to the HEA, which eliminated
statutes of limitations for collecting student
loans. The 10-year provision should control
all claims except student loans, the
government argued.
The District Court pointed out that when the
statute of limitations obstacles were
removed, student loans were not subject to
offset from Social Security payments.
When Congress amended the law to allow
offsetting, it could have removed the 10-
year limitation, but didn't.
"While the Department of Education
remains free to pursue payment on. the
defaulted loans from Ms. Lee, it simply
cannot take money from her Social Security
check to reduce the debt," the 8th Circuit
said.
The court affirmed the District Court's
opinion.
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United States v. Philip Morris
(No. 05-92)
Case Below: (US. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., Et al., 396 F3d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2005), petition for
cert. filed, (U.S. Jul. 18, 2005)(No. 05-92)).
As part of ongoing litigation against the tobacco industry for concealing the danger posed by
smoking and for marketing to minors, the United States sought disgorgement of past profits
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The government
estimates those profits to total $280 billion. The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia denied the manufacturers' motion for partial summary judgment on this issue. The
D.C. Circuit reversed, saying disgorgement is not within the express terms of the statute, nor
could the court include disgorgement as an expansion on those remedies already enumerated,
because the statute is directed toward future conduct.
Question Presented: Whether the district court's equitable jurisdiction to issue "appropriate
orders" to "prevent and restrain" violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1964(a), encompasses the remedial authority to order
disgorgement of illegally-obtained proceeds.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE
V.
PHILIP MORRIS USA INC., ET AL., APPELLEES
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit
Decided February 4, 2005
[Excerpt: some citations and footnotes omitted]
OPINION:
SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: A group of
cigarette manufacturers and related entities
("Appellants") appeal from a decision of the
District Court denying summary judgment
as to the Government's claim for
disgorgement under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO" or "the Act"), 18 US. C. § § 1961-
68. The relevant section of RICO, 18 US.C.
§ 1964(a), provides the District Courts
jurisdiction only for forward-looking
remedies that prevent and restrain violations
of the Act. Because disgorgement, a remedy
aimed at past violations, does not so prevent
or restrain, we reverse the decision below
and grant partial summary judgment for the
Appellants.
I. Background
In 1999 the United States brought this claim
against appellant cigarette manufacturers
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and research organizations, claiming that
they engaged in a fraudulent pattern of
covering up the dangers of tobacco use and
marketing to minors. The Government
sought damages under the Medical Care
Recovery Act ("MCRA"), 42 US.C. §
2651 -53, and the Medicare Secondary
Payer ("MSP") provisions of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395y to recover
health-care related costs Appellants
allegedly caused. The United States also
claimed that Appellants engaged in a
criminal enterprise to effect this cover-up,
and sought equitable relief under RICO,
including injunctive relief and disgorgement
of proceeds from Appellants' allegedly
unlawful activities. The Government sought
this relief under 18 US.C. § 1964(a), which
gives the District Court jurisdiction
to prevent and restrain
violations of [RICO] by issuing
appropriate orders, including,
but not limited to: ordering any
person to divest himself of any
interest, direct or indirect, in
any enterprise; imposing
reasonable restrictions on the
future activities or investments
of any person, including, but
not limited to, prohibiting any
person from engaging in the
same type of endeavor as the
enterprise engaged in, the
activities of which affect
interstate or foreign commerce;
or ordering dissolution or
reorganization of any enterprise.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(a).
Appellants moved to dismiss the complaint
in 2000. The District Court did dismiss the
MCRA and MSP claims, but allowed the
RICO claim to stand. United States v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 116 F Supp. 2d 131, 134
(D.D.C. 2000).
Section 1964(a) conferred jurisdiction on the
District Court only to enter orders "to
prevent and restrain violations of the
statute." In considering wither
disgorgement came within this jurisdictional
grant, the court relied on a decision of the
Second Circuit, the only circuit then to have
considered "whether . . . disgorgements . . .
are designed to 'prevent and restrain' future
conduct rather than to punish past conduct."
United States v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1182
(2d Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original). . . .
The District Court accepted the Second
Circuit's suggested holding that the
appropriateness of disgorgement depends on
whether the proceeds are available for the
continuing of the criminal enterprise, but
ruled that the question was premature, and
denied the motion for dismissal on the
RICO-disgorgement claim. Philip Morris,
116 F. Supp. 2d at 151-52. Neither party
sought leave to file an interlocutory appeal
of that ruling.
The case proceeded, and the Government
sought disgorgement of $ 280 billion that it
traced to proceeds from Appellants' cigarette
sales to the "youth addicted population"
between 1971 and 2001. This population
includes all smokers who became addicted
before the age of 21, as measured by those
who were smoking at least 5 cigarettes a day
at that age.
After discovery, Appellants moved for
summary judgment on the disgorgement
claim arguing that (1) disgorgement is not
an available remedy under § 1964(a), (2)
even if disgorgement were available, the
Government's model fails the Carson test
for permissible disgorgement that will
"prevent and restrain" future violations, and
(3) even if disgorgement were available, the
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Government's proposed model is
impermissible because it includes both
legally and illegally obtained profits in
violation of SEC v. First City Financial
Corp., 281 US App. D.C. 410, 890 F.2d
1215 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The District Court
denied this motion in a memorandum order
designated " # 550." On motion of the
defendants, the District Court certified Order
# 550 for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b)....
II. Analysis
A. Scope of Review
We review an order denying summary
judgment de novo. Obedient to Yamaha, we
will review Order # 550 denying summary
judgment applying anew the standards of
Rule 56, and will not simply review that part
of the District Court's thinking directed to
the applicability of the Carson standard or
the consistency of the Government's proffers
with that standard. Therefore, we must
address the issue, logically prior to the
Carson question, of whether disgorgement is
available at all. We hold that the language
of § 1964(a) and the comprehensive
remedial scheme of RICO preclude
disgorgement as a possible remedy in this
case.
B. The Availability of Disgorgement
The Government argues that § 1964
contains a grant of equitable jurisdiction that
must be read broadly to permit disgorgement
in light of Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,
328 US. 395, 90 L. Ed. 1332, 66 S. Ct. 1086
(1946), and its progeny. The Porter Court
considered reimbursement awards under the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942
("EPCA") and concluded that where a
statute grants general equitable jurisdiction
to a court, "all the inherent equitable powers
... are available for the proper and complete
exercise of that jurisdiction." Porter, 328
U.S. at 398. This grant is only to be limited
when "a statute in so many words, or by a
necessary and inescapable inference,
restricts the court's jurisdiction." Id. In this
case the text and structure of the statute
provide just such a restriction.
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly
observed: "Federal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction. They possess only that
power authorized by Constitution and
statute, which is not to be expanded by
judicial decree." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377, 128
L. Ed. 2d 391, 114 S. Ct. 1673 (1994)
(citations omitted). Reading Porter in light
of this limited jurisdiction we must not take
it as a license to arrogate to ourselves
unlimited equitable power. We will not
expand upon our equitable jurisdiction if, as
here, we are restricted by the statutory
language, but may only assume broad
equitable powers when the statutory or
Constitutional grant of power is equally
broad.
As our dissenting colleague correctly notes,
the Court in Porter was considering whether
a district court acting under the authority
granted in the EPCA had the authority to
order restitution for overcharges. ...
The Supreme Court did not have to make
much of a stretch to determine that the
phrase "enforcing compliance with such
provision," and expressly referring to "a
permanent or temporary injunction,
restraining order, or other order," would
include restitution for amounts collected
exceeding the ceilings determined under the
statute. The Government in the present case
asks us to work a far greater expansion of
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the statutory grant enabling the District
Court in a civil RICO action brought by the
Government under § 19 64(a). We further
note that the Court in Porter was ordering
restitution, under a statute designed to
combat inflation. Restitution of overcharge
works a direct remedy of past inflation,
directly effecting the goal of the statute.
The Court in Porter set forth two theories
under which "an order for the recovery and
restitution of illegal rents may be considered
a proper 'other order"' under the applicable
statute. 328 U.S. at 399. First, the recovery
of the illegal payment by the victim tenant
"may be considered as an equitable adjunct
to the injunction decree," as it effects "the
recovery of that which has been illegally
acquired and which has given rise to the
necessity for injunctive relief." Id. The
equitable jurisdiction of the Court having
been properly invoked, the Court then had
the power "to decide all relevant matters in
dispute and to award complete relief. . . ."
Id. Also, and more to the point, the Court
was authorized "in its discretion, to decree
restitution of excessive charges in order to
give effect of the policy of Congress." Id. at
400. The policy of Congress under the
EPCA was to prevent overcharges with
inflationary effect. The goal of the RICO
section under which the government seeks
disgorgement here is to prevent or restrain
future violations. We therefore must
consider the forward-looking nature of the
remedy in a way not applicable to a different
remedy in Porter for the accomplishment of
a different goal under a different statute.
Section 1964(a) provides jurisdiction to
issue a variety of orders "to prevent and
restrain" RICO violations. This language
indicates that the jurisdiction is limited to
forward-looking remedies that are aimed at
future violations. The examples given in the
text bear this out. Divestment, injunctions
against persons' future involvement in the
activities in which the RICO enterprise had
been engaged, and dissolution of the
enterprise are all aimed at separating the
RICO criminal from the enterprise so that he
cannot commit violations in the future.
Disgorgement, on the other hand, is a
quintessentially backward-looking remedy
focused on remedying the effects of past
conduct to restore the status quo. It is
measured by the amount of prior unlawful
gains and is awarded without respect to
whether the defendant will act unlawfully in
the future. Thus it is both aimed at and
measured by past conduct.
The Government would have us interpret §
1964(a) instead to be a plenary grant of
equitable jurisdiction, effectively ignoring
the words "to prevent and restrain"
altogether. This not only nullifies the plain
meaning of the terms and violates our canon
of statutory construction that we should
strive to give meaning to every word, but
also neglects Supreme Court precedent. In
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S.
479, 488, 134 L. Ed. 2d 121, 116 S Ct. 1251
(1996), the Court held that compensation for
past environmental cleanup was ruled out by
the plain language of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act which
authorized actions "to restrain" persons who
were improperly disposing of hazardous
waste. If "restrain" is only aimed at future
actions, "prevent" is even more so.
The order of disgorgement is not within the
terms of that statutory grant, nor any
necessary implication of the language of the
statute.
* * *
In RICO ... Congress has laid out elaborate
enforcement proceedings. One of those
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proceedings is a government action brought
under § 1964(a). That one does not provide
for disgorgement. That one provides only
for orders which "prevent or restrain" future
violations. Disgorgement does not do that.
It is true, as the Government points out, that
disgorgement may act to "prevent and
restrain" future violations by general
deterrence insofar as it makes RICO
violations unprofitable. However, as the
Second Circuit also observed, this argument
goes too far. "If this were adequate
justification, the phrase 'prevent and restrain'
would read 'prevent, restrain, and
discourage,' and would allow any remedy
that inflicts pain." Carson, 52 F 3d at 1182.
The remedies available under § 1964(a) are
also limited by those explicitly included in
the statute. The words "including, but not
limited to" introduce a non-exhaustive list
that sets out specific examples of a general
principle. Applying the canons of noscitur a
sociis and ejusdem generis, we will expand
on the remedies explicitly included in the
statute only with remedies similar in nature
to those enumerated. The remedies
explicitly granted in § 1964(a) are all
directed toward future conduct and
separating the criminal from the RICO
enterprise to prevent future violations.
Disgorgement is a very different type of
remedy aimed at separating the criminal
from his prior ill-gotten gains and thus may
not be properly inferred from § 1964(a).
The structure of RICO similarly limits
courts' ability to fashion equitable remedies.
Where a statute has a "comprehensive and
reticulated" remedial scheme, we are
reluctant to authorize additional remedies;
Congress' care in formulating such a
"carefully crafted and detailed enforcement
scheme provides strong evidence that
Congress did not intend to authorize other
remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate
expressly." . . . In a criminal RICO action
the defendant must forfeit his interest in the
RICO enterprise and unlawfully acquired
proceeds, and may be punished with fines,
imprisonment for up to twenty years, or
both. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a). In a civil case
the Government may request limited
equitable relief under § 1964(a). Individual
plaintiffs are made whole and defendants
punished through treble damages under 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c). This "comprehensive and
reticulated" scheme, along with the plain
meaning of the words themselves, serves to
raise a "necessary and inescapable
inference," sufficient under Porter, 328 US.
at 398, that Congress intended to limit relief
under § 1964(a) to forward-looking orders,
ruling out disgorgement.
Congress' intent when it drafted RICO's
remedies would be circumvented by the
Government's broad reading of its §
1964(a) remedies. The disgorgement
requested here is similar in effect to the
relief mandated under the criminal forfeiture
provision, § 1963(a), without requiring the
inconvenience of meeting the additional
procedural safeguards that attend criminal
charges, including a five-year statute of
limitations, 18 U.S.C. § 3282, notice
requirements, 18 U.S.C. § 1963(1), and
general criminal procedural protections
including proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Further, on the Government's view it can
collect sums paralleling-perhaps exactly-the
damages available to individual victims
under § 1964(c). Not only would the
resulting overlap allow the Government to
escape a statute of limitations that would
restrict private parties seeking essentially
identical remedies, but it raises issues of
duplicative recovery of exactly the sort that
the Supreme Court said in Holmes v.
Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503
US. 258, 269, 117 L. Ed 2d 532, 112 S. Ct.
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1311 (1992), constituted a basis for refusing
to infer a cause of action not specified by the
statute. Permitting disgorgement under §
1964(a) would therefore thwart Congress'
intent in creating RICO's elaborate remedial
scheme.
A note appended to the statute stating that
RICO "shall be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes" does not
effect this structural inference. Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (codified in a
note following 18 U.S.C. § 1961). This
clause may warn us against taking an overly
narrow view of the statute, but "it is not an
invitation to apply RICO to new purposes
that Congress never intended." Reves v.
Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 183, 122 L.
Ed. 2d 525, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993). The
text and structure of RICO indicate that
those remedial purposes do not extend to
disgorgement in civil cases.
The Second Circuit in Carson has
interpreted "prevent and restrain" not to
eliminate the possibility of disgorgement
altogether, but to limit it to cases where
there is a finding "that the gains are being
used to fund or promote the illegal conduct,
or constitute capital available for that
purpose." Carson, 52 F.3d at 1182. The
Fifth Circuit adopted this interpretation in a
case holding that disgorgement after the
defendant had ceased production of an
allegedly defective product would be
inappropriately punitive rather than directed
toward future violations. While we avoid
creating circuit splits when possible, in this
case we can find no justification for
considering any order of disgorgement to be
forward-looking as required by § 1964(a).
The language of the statute explicitly
provides three alternative ways to deprive
RICO defendants of control over the
enterprise and protect against future
violations: divestment, injunction, and
dissolution. We need not twist the language
to create a new remedy not contemplated by
the statute.
III. Conclusion
Because we hold that the District Court
erred when it found that disgorgement was
an available remedy under 18 U.S.C. §
1964(a), we reverse the District Court and
grant summary judgment in favor of
Appellants as to the Governments
disgorgement claim.
* * *
DISSENT:
TATEL, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
. . . Philip Morris asks us-and the court
now agrees-to decide an issue (1) not
briefed in the motion leading up to the
certified order, (2) not decided in the district
court's opinion accompanying the certified
order, (3) not raised by Philip Morris in its
request for certification, (4) not discussed in
the order granting certification, (5) not
raised by Philip Morris in its section 1292(b)
petition before this court, and (6) decided in
an entirely different order which Philip
Morris could at any time have asked the
district court to certify. This presents
serious questions on two separate fronts: our
jurisdiction over this appeal under section
1292(b), and our general policy of declining
to consider arguments not made to the
district court in the motion leading to the
order under appeal. Unlike the court, I
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cannot brush these concerns aside.
I would therefore dismiss the interlocutory
appeal....
But the court disagrees with my position.
The appeal stands before us, so in the
following sections I exercise a dissenter's
prerogative to address the merits.
II.
Like my colleagues, I begin with the
structure and language of RICO's remedial
provisions. RICO authorizes criminal
penalties and civil remedies against those
engaging in patterns of racketeering
behavior. 18 US.C. § 1963 sets out the
criminal penalties: guilty persons shall "be
fined under this title or imprisoned . . . or
both, and shall forfeit to the United States"
any illegally acquired interest. Section 1964
provides for the civil remedies. At issue in
this case is subsection (a), [supra].
Another subsection, § 1964(c), authorizes
injured persons to sue RICO violators for
treble damages and to recover attorneys'
fees. Finally, Congress directed that RICO
"shall be liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial purposes[.]"
The government argues that district courts
have authority to order any remedy,
including disgorgement, within their
inherent equitable powers. More narrowly,
the government argues that assuming the
district courts may only impose equitable
remedies for the purpose of keeping
defendants from committing RICO
violations, disgorgement-by reducing the
incentives for the tobacco companies to
violate RICO in the future-will accomplish
that purpose in this case. These two distinct
arguments present very different
consequences for district courts: under the
first theory, courts may order disgorgement
any time they find the remedy necessary to
ensure complete relief, while under the
second theory courts may order
disgorgement only to prevent ongoing or
future violations. In this case, the district
court accepted only the second argument.
See 321 F. Supp. 2d at 74-80. The court
today rejects both.
A.
In dismissing the argument that district
courts may impose any equitable remedy for
RICO violations, the court distinguishes-
unconvincingly, in my view-the two
Supreme Court cases relied on by the
government, Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,
328 US. 395, 90 L. Ed. 1332, 66 S. Ct. 1086
(1946), and Mitchell v. Robert DeMario
Jewelry, Inc., 361 US. 288, 4 L. Ed 2d 323,
80 S. Ct. 332 (1960). I believe these two
cases control this case and compel the
conclusion that district courts may impose
any equitable remedy for RICO violations.
In Porter, the Supreme Court considered
whether a district court had authority to
order restitution in a suit brought by the
Price Control Administrator against a
landlord who had violated the Emergency
Price Control Act (EPCA) by charging too
much rent. The act contained no specific
provision for restitution or disgorgement,
but-like RICO-authorized a broad array
of other remedies, both criminal and civil.
. . . [T]he Court concluded-and I quote at
length since the language is so critical to the
disposition of this case-that
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such a jurisdiction is an
equitable one. Unless otherwise
provided by statute, all the
inherent equitable powers of the
District Court are available for
the proper and complete
exercise of that jurisdiction.
And since the public interest is
involved in a proceeding of this
nature, those equitable powers
assume an even broader and
more flexible character than
when only a private controversy
is at stake. . . . The court may
go beyond the matters
immediately underlying its
equitable jurisdiction and
decide whatever other issues
and give whatever other relief
may be necessary under the
circumstances. Only in that
way can equity do complete
rather than truncated justice.
Moreover, the
comprehensiveness of this
equitable jurisdiction is not to
be denied or limited in the
absence of a clear and valid
legislative command. Unless a
statute in so many words, or by
a necessary and inescapable
inference, restricts the court's
jurisdiction in equity, the full
scope of that jurisdiction is to
be recognized and applied.
Id. at 398 (citations omitted). The Court
concluded that because the EPCA, despite
the very detailed and specific nature of the
authorized remedies, did not rule out
restitution by a "necessary and inescapable
inference," the district court could order
restitution even if not expressly authorized
by the statute. See id at 398-400; see also
Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 291 (discussing
Porter).
The court's opinion today sounds a lot like
the Porter dissent. The court observes that
the language of section 1964(a)-a court has
"jurisdiction to prevent and restrain
violations"-does not explicitly open the
door to all of equity, but neither did EPCA
section 205(a) (a court may issue orders
"enjoining" violations or "enforcing
compliance"). The court asserts that reading
full equitable jurisdiction into RICO will
render section 1964(a)'s language largely
meaningless, but Porter rejected just this
concern with regard to EPCA section
205(a). The court emphasizes that RICO
"already provides for a comprehensive set of
remedies," majority op. at 18, but the EPCA
had at least as comprehensive a remedial
structure. The court further points out that
should restitution be available, the
government could obtain duplicative
recovery (given RICO's criminal forfeiture
provisions) and also escape the applicable
statutes of limitations, but the Porter
majority dismissed similar concerns, 328
U.S. at 401-02; see also id at 406-08
(Rutledge, J., dissenting). Finally, the court
attempts to distinguish Porter on the
grounds that the EPCA had a different
policy goal than RICO (preventing inflation
rather than seeking to eradicate organized
crime), but this has no effect on Porter's
essential holding that "the court may go
beyond the matters immediately underlying
its equitable jurisdiction . . . and give
whatever other relief may be necessary
under the circumstances," see id. at 398. In
sum, the court offers no basis for concluding
that RICO's structure and language get the
statute past Porter's high bar for finding by a
"necessary and inescapable inference" that
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Congress intended to empower district
courts to order only limited equitable relief.
Nor does Philip Morris point to anything in
RICO's legislative history that creates such a
"necessary and inescapable inference.". . .
Mitchell, the second Supreme Court decision
the government relies on, considered
whether district courts could order
restitution of wages lost from unlawful
discharge in suits brought by the Secretary
of Labor under section 17 of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 217
(1960). Relying on Porter, the Court
concluded that where the statute provided
that "the district courts are given jurisdiction
. . . for cause shown, to restrain violations"
of the act, 29 US.C. § 217, district courts
had full equitable powers, 361 U.S. at 291-
95; see also id at 289. ...
Mitchell reinforces the proposition that
district courts may order any equitable relief
in civil RICO suits brought by the
government. My colleagues suggest that in
"the RICO Act, Congress provided a statute
granting jurisdiction defined with the sort of
limitations not present in the FLSA."
Majority op. at 16. The only jurisdictional
hook in the FLSA's text, however, was its
language: "the district courts are given
jurisdiction . . . for cause shown, to restrain
violations" of the act, 29 U.S.C. § 217. If
this language opens the door to all equitable
relief, then RICO's language-"the district
courts . . . shall have jurisdiction to prevent
and restrain violations"-certainly does the
same. And if the possibility of duplicative
recovery did not circumscribe the district
court's equitable authority under the FLSA,
then neither should that possibility under
RICO do so.
Instead of following Porter and Mitchell, the
court relies on a later Supreme Court
decision, Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516
US. 479, 134 L. Ed. 2d 121, 116 S. Ct. 1251
(1996). In Meghrig, the Supreme Court
considered whether private citizens could
seek restitution under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) for
the cost of having cleaned up a prior
landowner's toxic waste. The statute
provided that the "district court shall have
jurisdiction . . . to restrain any person who
has contributed or who is contributing" to
waste problems, "to order such person to
take such other action as may be necessary,
or both." Id. at 482 n.* (quoting 42 U.S. C. §
6972(a)). The Court held that it was
"apparent from the two remedies described .
. . that RCRA's citizen suit provision is not
directed at providing compensation for past
cleanup efforts." Id. at 484. While not
explicitly defining the limits of the two
remedies described, the court suggested that
these remedies should be equated with
prohibitory and mandatory injunctions. Id.
Moreover, relying in part on the fact that an
analogous statute expressly authorized
damages, the Court concluded that "neither
remedy . . . contemplates the award of past
cleanup costs, whether these are
denominated 'damages' or 'equitable
restitution."' Id at 484-85. According to
the Court, it "'is an elemental canon of
statutory construction that where a statute
expressly provides a particular remedy or
remedies, a court must be chary of reading
others into it."'
The Meghrig Court noted that in arguing
that the district court had inherent authority
to award equitable remedies, the plaintiffs
relied on Porter and its progeny. Id. at 487.
Without expressly distinguishing those
cases, the Court explained that "the limited
remedies described in [RCRA], along with
the stark differences between the language
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of that section and the cost recovery
provisions [of the analogous statute], amply
demonstrate that Congress did not intend for
a private citizen to be able to undertake a
cleanup and then proceed to recover its costs
under RCRA." Id. at 487. Notably for our
purposes, Meghrig did not overrule Porter.
Indeed, even after Meghrig, the Supreme
Court has cited Porter for the proposition
that "we should not construe a statute to
displace courts' traditional equitable
authority absent . . . an 'inescapable
inference' to the contrary." Miller v. French,
530 U.S. 327, 340, 147 L. Ed. 2d 326, 120 S.
Ct. 2246 (2000).
At one level, reconciling Meghrig with
Porter and Mitchell is difficult. . . . These
tensions cannot be dealt with simply by
dismissing Porter and Mitchell....
In my view, Porter and Mitchell, not
Meghrig, "directly control" this case.
Several reasons support this conclusion, and
nothing points the other way. First, RICO's
statutory scheme resembles the EPCA more
than the RCRA. Both RICO and the EPCA
stand alone in grappling with a broad social
issue, whereas the RCRA had a closely
related statute on which the Court in
Meghrig relied heavily. Second, as in both
Porter and Mitchell, the government brought
the suit rather than a private party like the
Meghrig plaintiff, and Porter makes clear
that district courts may have "even broader
and more flexible" equitable powers where
the public interest is involved, 328 U.S. at
398. This point has particular traction if the
government is the only party that may seek
equitable relief under RICO. Finally,
Meghrig's suggestion that "restrain" in the
RCRA refers only to prohibitory injunctions
cannot apply to section 1964(a), since that
section explicitly authorizes other
remedies-e.g., divestment-to "prevent
and restrain" RICO violations. For these
reasons, in determining whether the phrase
"prevent and restrain" limits the district
court's equitable powers, I think it makes
more sense to look to Porter and Mitchell,
not Meghrig.
Finally, while Congress modeled section
1964(a) on the antitrust laws. I disagree
with Philip Morris that the Supreme Court's
antitrust decisions provide useful guidance
as to whether the phrase "prevent and
restrain" limits the equitable remedies
available to district courts. On the one hand,
the Court once ignored, though did not
explicitly reject, an invitation by Justice
Douglas to apply Porter to antitrust actions.
On the other hand, some antitrust cases
suggest that courts may impose equitable
remedies beyond those intended merely to
stop future violations from occurring. As
these cases illustrate, antitrust precedent
offers little reason to doubt the applicability
of Porter and Mitchell to the case at hand.
To sum up, Porter and Mitchell rather than
Meghrig control this case, and no "necessary
and inescapable inference" limits the district
court's jurisdiction in equity. If the district
court concludes that the government has
shown that the tobacco companies have
committed RICO violations by advertising
to youth despite assertions to the contrary
and by falsely disputing smoking's
addictive, unhealthy effects, then it may
order whatever equitable relief it deems
appropriate. Of course, the court must work
within the bounds of equitable doctrines,
recognizing defenses like laches and unclean
hands, paying due regard for the rights of
the innocent, and generally exercising its
discretion. With these principles in mind,
the district court can "do complete rather
than truncated justice," Porter, 328 U.S. at
398.
386
B.
In addition to rejecting the government's
argument that district courts may impose
any equitable remedy on RICO violators, the
court rejects the government's alternative,
narrower argument-that even if district
courts may order only remedies that
"prevent and restrain" RICO violations,
disgorgement can appropriately accomplish
that purpose. Because the court's analysis of
this argument is as flawed as its analysis of
the government's broader argument, I add
this discussion of the issue. In my view, the
court transforms what should be a question
of fact-what remedies appropriately
prevent and restrain future violations-into
a question of statutory interpretation in a
way that disregards section 1964(a)'s plain
language and ignores Supreme Court
precedent recognizing the equitable
flexibility of district courts.
The government offers expert testimony to
the effect that a disgorgement order will
deter the tobacco companies from violating
RICO in the future--in the dictionary's
language, it will deprive them of the hope of
succeeding in benefiting from future RICO
violations and hold them back from
committing such violations. In essence, the
government claims that the tobacco
companies, having engaged in a persistent
pattern of deceptive representations over
decades, will be less likely to continue this
illegal behavior if they must surrender their
past ill-gotten profits. Treating the
government's expert testimony as correct, as
we must at this stage of the litigation, see
Anderson, 477 US. at 255, I think it enough
to forestall summary judgment in Philip
Morris's favor. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has accepted just this theory of deterrence,
stating in Porter that restitution "could be
considered as an order appropriate and
necessary to enforce compliance with the
Act" since "future compliance may be more
definitely assured if one is compelled to
restore one's illegal gains." 328 US. at 400.
If restitution helps enforce compliance, then
we should have little doubt that
disgorgement helps prevent and restrain
violations.
This court does not conclude that
disgorgement can never have a restraining
effect on future conduct of the defendants-
the only conclusion that could justify a
holding that district courts can never order
disgorgement under section 1964(a).
Instead, the court offers several
unpersuasive reasons for its conclusion that
as a matter of statutory interpretation
disgorgement is not a permissible remedy
under section 1964(a).
First, the court states that disgorgement "is a
quintessentially backward-looking remedy."
Majority op. at 15. Although I agree that a
court sitting in equity cannot order
disgorgement that exceeds a defendant's past
ill-gotten profits, this does not mean
disgorgement is always backward-looking
and can never have a forward-looking effect
on the defendants....
Second, the court concludes that district
courts are limited not merely by the words
"prevent and restrain," but also "by those
[three remedies] explicitly included in the
statute" by application of the canons
noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis. Even
assuming we should apply these canons,
however, they spell out nothing more than
what everyone agrees on: that the only
"appropriate" orders under this section are
equitable ones.
More important, I doubt the canons apply
here at all. While the canons can prove
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useful where there is otherwise "no general
principle in sight," here the statute provides
the general principle of preventing and
restraining violations. Indeed, the Supreme
Court declined to use these canons
altogether in interpreting a statute which
gave the EEOC the power of enforcement
"through appropriate remedies, including
reinstatement or hiring of employees with or
without back pay," 42 US.C. § 2000e-
16(b). See West, 527 U.S. at 218[.] I see no
reason why we should do otherwise here,
especially since section 1964(a) uses the
even more expansive language: "including,
but not limited to." Finally, noscitur a soclis
and ejusdem generis should not be used to
limit the types of equitable relief available to
district courts given Congress's instruction
that RICO "shall be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes," see supra
at 14, one of which is preventing and
restraining future violations-an aim that,
far from being a "new purpose[ ] that
Congress never intended," expressly appears
in the statute's text. If an equitable remedy
achieves this goal, then the statute
authorizes it.
Third, the court suggests that disgorgement
should be unavailable because it allows the
government to achieve relief "similar in
effect" to criminal forfeiture, raising
concerns that the government can achieve
duplicative recovery and evade the
procedural safeguards girding the forfeiture
provision. See majority op. at 19. To be
sure, such concerns are relevant in
considering whether to infer additional
causes of action. As discussed earlier, supra
at 18, however, given the Supreme Court's
explicit rejection of similar concerns in
Porter and Mitchell, they cannot carry the
day. ...
Of course, that disgorgement may
sometimes serve to prevent and restrain
defendants from committing RICO
violations does not mean that it will always
accomplish that purpose. As the district
court here recognized, a court must first find
that the defendants are likely to commit
future RICO violations. 321 F Supp. 2d at
75-76. This is not a foregone conclusion...
. Assuming district courts are limited to
remedies that prevent and restrain, but see
supra Part II.A, I also share the Second
Circuit's apparent conclusion that
disgorgement may be ordered only to
prevent and restrain a defendant from future
RICO violations[.] Because any remedy
imposed for a solely exemplary purpose
(i.e., to dissuade others from committing
RICO violations) would amount to
punishment, it goes beyond what Congress
intended, see S. Rep. No. 91-617, at 81, as
well as pushing the boundaries of what
equity permits, cf Tull, 481 U.S. at 422. In
this case, however, the government offers
evidence that the defendant companies
themselves are likely to commit future
RICO violations by misleading the public
about the health consequences of smoking
and the addictive effects of nicotine, as well
as by persisting in marketing to young
people.
[A]s noted earlier, record evidence in this
case suggests that disgorgement will in fact
"prevent and restrain" defendants from
committing future RICO violations. As one
of the government's experts stated,
"Requiring defendants to pay proceeds will
affect their expectations . . . about the
returns from future misconduct." Appellee's
App. at 813. The expert added that, even if
coupled with an injunction laden with
contempt penalties, disgorgement will
"provide additional economic incentives to
deter future misconduct" by "strengthening
the credibility of existing laws" which the
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defendants have allegedly violated in the
past. Id. at 814. . . . At this stage of the
litigation, then, we must assume that the
government expert is correct and that
disgorgement will "prevent and restrain"
future RICO violations. Should Philip
Morris offer expert testimony along the lines
suggested by the concurrence, then it will be
up to the district court to evaluate the
competing evidence and make appropriate
findings of fact. Should either party appeal,
this court, unrestrained by the inferences
required at summary judgment, would then
review that factual determination pursuant to
Rule 52's clear error standard.
C.
In sum, were this case properly before us, I
would hold, in accordance with Porter and
Mitchell, that district courts have authority
to order any remedy, including
disgorgement, necessary to ensure complete
relief. As the concurrence points out, sep.
op. at 9 (Williams, J., concurring), my
approach would create a circuit split, since
Carson did not apply Porter and Mitchell to
RICO (and, indeed, the parties do not appear
to have brought these cases to the Second
Circuit's attention). Even if, as Carson
holds, district courts may only impose
equitable remedies for the purpose of
keeping defendants from committing RICO
violations, I would still affirm the denial of
summary judgment, leaving it to the district
court to determine, on the basis of a fully
developed record, whether disgorgement
will help accomplish this purpose. I
disagree with my colleagues' conclusions
not because they have created a circuit split
of their own by rejecting Carson's holding
that disgorgement may prevent and restrain
RICO violations, but because they have
done so by accepting an interlocutory appeal
that we should not hear and by disregarding
both Supreme Court precedent and section
1964(a)'s plain language.
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"U.S. Seeks Higher Damages in
Tobacco Industry Suit"
New York Times
July 19, 2005
Eric Lichtblau
The Justice Department on Monday asked
the Supreme Court for the legal authority
once again to seek $280 billion in damages
from the tobacco industry in a lawsuit that
has become a growing political liability for
the Bush administration.
Even though the trial judge in the case has
not yet issued a final ruling, the Justice
Department asked the Supreme Court to
intervene by overturning an appellate ruling
in February that limited the damages it could
seek.
The department said that the February
decision, if allowed to stand, would hurt the
government's ability to bring similar
racketeering cases against businesses and
industries and that it would have "enormous
consequences for the American public."
The decision to appeal was another shift for
the government in the six-year-old case. At
the close of a nine-month trial, Justice
Department lawyers stunned a federal
courtroom last month by cutting the amount
of damages they were seeking to $10 billion
from $130 billion.
Senior Justice Department officials said they
had little choice but to reduce their demands,
in light of the adverse decision in February
by the circuit court for the District of
Columbia.
But internal Justice Department documents
showed that the decision drew fierce
objections from the career lawyers on the
tobacco team, who said it was legally
groundless, would be seen as politically
driven and would undermine the
department's position in possible settlement
discussions with the tobacco industry.
Several members of the trial team threatened
to quit over the decision, officials said.
Health advocates and Democrats in
Congress also objected to the decision to
reduce the requested damages, prompting
the Justice Department to open an ethics
inquiry, still under way, into charges of
political interference.
While the Justice Department said its
decision was driven solely by legal
considerations, Democrats pointed to the
tobacco industry's frequent political
contributions to the Bush administration and
its ties to some senior Justice Department
officials as evidence of possible political
motivations.
Justice Department officials declined to
discuss their thinking in their decision to ask
the Supreme Court to overturn the damage
limit. Some tobacco industry lawyers and
others involved in the case speculated that
the public reaction last month might have
played a role.
"Nothing in this case surprises me
anymore," said William B. Schultz, a former
Justice Department lawyer who led the
tobacco team at the outset of the lawsuit. "I
think the government has been
schizophrenic in how they've litigated this
case, but maybe now they've resolved to
treat it as an advocate would."
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The Justice Department maintains that the
nation's tobacco companies have engaged in
a half-century pattern of fraud and deceit in
marketing cigarettes and have been running
what amounts to a criminal enterprise. But
in February the appellate court ruled that the
government could not seek $280 billion in
damages against the industry. It said federal
racketeering laws did not allow the
government to recover illegally generated
profits as a way of preventing future
violations.
In its request for Supreme Court review, the
Justice Department said the ruling would
have "potentially far-reaching implications"
for the government's ability to collect
financial damages in racketeering cases.
The decision, government lawyers said, was
"a mistaken precedent that will continue to
misdirect other courts."
Tobacco opponents said they were pleased
by the Justice Department's move.
The ruling "had really tied the hands of the
Justice Department in pursuing the most
serious racketeering cases," said Matthew L.
Myers, who is president of the Campaign for
Tobacco-Free Kids and testified for the
government in the case. "The concept that
someone could engage in a massive criminal
enterprise without any risk of giving up their
ill-gotten gains turned the racketeering
statute into a paper tiger."
The tobacco industry has 30 days to respond
to the request for a Supreme Court review.
An industry lawyer, speaking on condition
of anonymity because he did not want to
give away legal strategy for a case still in
litigation, said the cigarette makers would
probably argue that the appeal was "ill-
timed," because the judge in the case,
Gladys Kessler, has not yet ruled on
damages.
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"Government Appeals on Tobacco Remedy"
SCOTUSblog
July 18, 2005
Lyle Denniston
The Justice Department on Monday
afternoon asked the Supreme Court to rule
that the tobacco industry may be ordered to
give up corporate revenues obtained from an
alleged four-decade campaign of deception
about the health hazards of smoking. (An
earlier post, below, examines some of the
reasons for and against Supreme Court
review of the case.)
The industry has not yet been found by a
U.S. District Court to have violated the
federal anti-racketeering law, popularly
known as "RICO." The surrender of gains
would be a remedy only if the Supreme
Court allowed it, and only if liability were
first found at the trial that is ongoing. The
government has said the industry should be
required to surrender $280 billion in "ill-
gotten gains."
Ending uncertainty about whether it would
take the long-running case on to the highest
court, the Department filed a petition for
review (U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., et
al., docket 05-92). It poses a single
question:
"Whether the District Court's equitable
jurisdiction to issue 'appropriate orders' to
'prevent and restrain' violations of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 USC 1964-a,
encompasses the remedial authority to order
disgorgement of illegally-obtained
proceeds."
Solicitor General Paul D. Clement is not
taking part in the appeal. The petition said,
without explanation, that he "is disqualified
in this case." The lead attorney on the case
is one of his deputies, Acting Solicitor
General Edwin S. Kneedler.
The appeal, calling the case "extraordinarily
important," challenges a February 4 ruling
by the D.C. Circuit. Dividing 2-1, a panel of
the Circuit Court ruled that RICO does not
give federal judges power to require a
violator to disgorge its gains from past
illegal activity, as a remedy for a civil
violation of the Act. The civil remedies
allowed by RICO, the panel found, must be
limited to "forward-looking remedies that
are aimed at future violations."
That ruling, the Justice Department appeal
contended, "is inconsistent with this Court's
decisions, squarely conflicts with the
decisions of other courts of appeals, wrongly
decides an important issue and, if left
uncorrected, will impede, rather than
advance, the ultimate resolution of the
proceedings in this extraordinarily important
case."
"The court of appeals," the government
contends in the petition, "has disabled the
government from employing a critically
important remedial tool-equitable
disgorgement-for achieving Congress's
objectives. That court has done so in a case
of vital interest to the American public."
The government did not ask the Court to
expedite its handling of the new appeal, so it
will come up in regular order in the Court
Term that starts Oct. 3. The industry has 30
days to file its opposition. The
government's appeal is from a Circuit Court
so it is not mandatory that the Court hear
and decide it; that is a matter left to its
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discretion.
In arguing for review, the petition not only
laments the denial of a disgorgement
remedy, but also complains that the Circuit
Court ruling threatens the scope of any other
remedy that could emerge if a RICO
violation is found. The petition noted that
the industry is now arguing in District Court
that the February ruling prohibits any
remedy that would cure the ill effects of past
unlawful conduct, including a stop-smoking
campaign aimed at those who previously
had become addicted to nicotine-laced
cigarettes.
The government noted that U.S. District
Judge Gladys Kessler had not yet issued a
final ruling on remedies, but that she had
commented that the Circuit Court ruling
"simply does not permit non-disgorgement
remedies to prevent and restrain the effects
of past violations."
As a result, it noted, the government has
curtailed its proposal for remedies, cutting a
cessation and education program down to
$14 billion lasting no longer than ten years.
(It had previously sought a $130 billion
plan, to run for 25 years.)
Even though the case is not yet over in
District Court, the new appeal argues that
the Supreme Court should step in now to
resolve the availability of a disgorgement
remedy. "If the Court postpones correction
of the court of appeals' mistaken guidance
until after the district court issues an
artificially constrained final judgment and
this complex case traces a new route through
the court of appeals, then the district court
will be precluded from correctly resolving
this litigation until remand proceedings can
be convened at a far distant date."
The petition suggested that the case might
not get back to the Supreme Court until the
summer of 2007, putting off a final decision
until 2008. If the Court takes the case in its
next Term, and resolves it by the summer of
2005, the District Court could issue a final
ruling by the summer of 2006, it said.
The case has already run on in the lower
courts for nearly six years.
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"Huge Tobacco Case Seems Court-Bound"
SCOTUSblog
April 20, 2005
Lyle Denniston
A 3-3 split in the D.C. Circuit on
Wednesday, denying rehearing en banc on a
key remedies issue in the government's
massive and long-running lawsuit against
the tobacco industry, probably will be the
signal for the Bush Administration to move
on to the Supreme Court. Indeed, it would
be astonishing if the government were now
to abandon its attempt to recoup $280 billion
of profits made by six tobacco companies-
a goal it has pursued relentlessly for nearly
six years.
The tobacco case, now rivaling the fabled
Jarndyce v. Jarndyce in Charles Dickens'
Bleak House, has just gone through its 95th
trial day this week. District Judge Gladys
Kessler in Washington has issued 927
orders, and there have been 5,261 docket
entries. No entry in that case was more
controversial than Kessler's Order No. 550,
issued on April 24 last year, refusing to
throw out the government's plea that the
companies "disgorge" corporate earnings
made on sales of nicotine-containing
tobacco products. That claim has been a
part of the case since it was first filed, on
September 22, 1999, under the anti-
racketeering RICO Act of 1970.
That order was overturned by the D.C.
Circuit, in a 2-1 ruling on February 4 this
year (Philip Morris USA, et al., v. U.S.,
docket 04-5252). Judge Kessler has since
described the decision as "a body blow to
the government's case." The Justice
Department sought rehearing en banc,
arguing that the panel ruling threatened to
cripple the "remedial force" of RICO. That
was the request turned down on Wednesday.
Three judges on the D.C. Circuit did not
take part, without saying why, and the
remaining six divided evenly; under Circuit
rules, five votes were necessary to grant en
banc review. Kessler has said she expected
the government to take the case on to the
Supreme Court if it lost in the Circuit Court.
Nothing in the government's actions up to
this point suggests it would surrender now.
Here is the way Kessler, in her Order 550 a
year ago, described the issue: "The
government seeks. .. disgorgement of $280
billion dollars of ill-gotten gains for what it
alleges to be defendants' unlawful
conspiracy to deceive the American public.
The government's amended complaint
describes a four-decade long conspiracy,
dating from at least 1953, to intentionally
and willfully deceive and mislead the
American public about . . . the harmful
nature of tobacco products, the addictive
nature of nicotine, and the possibility of
manufacturing safer and less addictive
tobacco products." The disgorgement was
sought under RICO. Kessler ruled that
RICO did not bar a disgorgement remedy
even if it was aimed, at least in part, at
punishing the companies for past conduct, as
a deterrent to prevent future violations. She
thus refused to grant the industry summary
judgment on the point.
The six companies took the issue on to the
D.C. Circuit, and the divided panel ruled
that RICO only allowed "forward-looking"
remedies. The Act, the majority said, gives
federal courts authority to issue orders "to
prevent and restrain" RICO violations.
"This language indicates that the jurisdiction
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is limited to forward-looking remedies that
are aimed at future violations. . . .
Permitting disgorgement . . . would . . .
thwart Congress' intent in creating RICO's
elaborate remedial scheme."
The appeal was interlocutory, and the trial
continues before Kessler, with heavy new
controversy already developed over what
other remedies the government may still
seek if Kessler, in the bench trial, rules that
the companies did violate RICO. The latest
tussle there was over a government request
to call a Harvard Business School professor,
Max Bazerman, as a witness to discuss
possible removal of senior executives of the
tobacco companies, as one possible remedy.
The industry denounced that as "a draconian
new remedy to replace its now-dismissed
$280 billion disgorgement claim."
Judge Kessler on April 9 refused to strike
Bazerman as a witness or to take any
'corporate restructuring remedy" off the
table. The government has not yet begun its
case-in-chief on the remedies issue, so the
"corporate restructuring" dispute is likely to
recur. The judge and the Justice Department
contend that the entire remedies case has
shifted as a result of the D.C. Circuit ruling
on the disgorgement question. That, no
doubt, will be a key facet of any appeal the
government takes to the Supreme Court.
395
"Political Leanings Were Always Factor in Tobacco Suit"
New York Times
June 19, 2005
Eric Lichtblau
The case started as a bombshell: deep into
his State of the Union address in 1999,
President Bill Clinton surprised even the
most ardent antismoking advocates by
announcing that he was unleashing the
considerable resources of his Justice
Department to prepare a lawsuit against Big
Tobacco.
Nine months later, a team of lawyers
working in the bowels of the Justice
Department made good on the president's
promise by filing what amounted to one of
the biggest federal lawsuits in history,
accusing cigarette makers of a half-century
of fraud, deceptive advertising and
dangerous marketing practices.
The career lawyers working the case saw
themselves on the cutting edge of a novel if
controversial piece of litigation, several
recalled in interviews. But exuberance
turned to trepidation for some of the lawyers
15 months later when the Bush
administration inherited the case. Some
senior officials in the new administration
saw the case as an albatross that prompted
clear ambivalence, if not outright hostility.
John Ashcroft, who had opposed the lawsuit
while a senator, pronounced it weak after
taking over as attorney general, and tried to
cut the money for it. And President Bush
himself, asked about the lawsuit in an
interview in early 2001 on Fox News, said,
"I worry about a litigious society." Noting
that many states had already sued the
tobacco industry and forced settlements, Mr.
Bush said, "At some point, you know,
enough is enough."
Nearly six years after the lawsuit was
brought, that point may finally have come.
At the close of a nine-month trial, the Justice
Department has now reduced the penalties it
was seeking from the tobacco industry to
$10 billion from $130 billion. Senior
political appointees at the department made
the move despite strong objections from
leaders of the trial team running the case,
who argued that the decision was not based
on the facts of the case, would appear
politically motivated and would undermine
the government's position in a possible
settlement, according to a May 30
memorandum disclosed last week in the
New York Times. With speculation swirling
about a possible settlement, the government
filed a sealed motion in the case late on
Thursday. The judge, who must now decide
what penalties, if any, to impose against the
tobacco industry, scheduled a last-minute
hearing for Monday, which will apparently
be closed to the public. Officials would not
discuss the nature of the government's
motion or the topic of the hearing.
The case has created a political tempest for
the Bush administration, as health advocates
and Democrats in Congress have protested
the decision as politically calculated, and it
has prompted an internal ethics investigation
by the Justice Department.
"There is no clearer example of this
administration's view that government and
the courts should protect big corporations
first and real people last," Senator Edward
M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts,
said in a speech on the Senate floor. "They
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made a political decision to back Big
Tobacco."
Janet Reno, the attorney general under Mr.
Clinton, who brought the case in 1999, said
the Bush administration needed to do a
better job of explaining why it changed
course so abruptly at the 11th hour in the
case.
"I've never heard of a party changing its
position in a manner so inconsistent with its
past positions," Ms. Reno said in a
telephone interview. "To have this case
pulled out from under the career lawyers
like this deserves an explanation, and if
there was no political interference, we can
dispel that notion."
The district court judge hearing the case in
Washington, Gladys Kessler, said in court of
the Justice Department's abrupt shift,
"Perhaps it suggests that additional
influences have been brought to bear on
what the government's case is."
But the Justice Department has resolutely
defended its position, saying that its
decisions have been based not on political
considerations but on legal ones, particularly
in light of a February appellate court
decision that limited the types of penalties
the government could seek.
The tobacco case has always been politically
tinged, whether a Democrat or a Republican
was in the White House. Mr. Clinton's
critics accused him of demonstrating
excessive exuberance and an overly litigious
nature in ordering up the lawsuit, while Mr.
Bush's critics see his administration's
ambivalence toward the lawsuit as evidence
of its close ties to big business in general
and the tobacco industry in particular.
Past and present members of the tobacco
trial team say that during the Clinton and the
Bush administrations, the political leanings
of whichever administration was in charge
were always a factor in a case involving so
much money and so many powerful players.
"I don't know that what the Bush
administration has done is any more
politically based than what Clinton did in
bringing the case in the first place," said
Paul Honigberg, a lawyer who worked on
the Justice Department's case from its
inception and left as deputy director of the
trial team in September 2001. "A high-
profile case like this represents a place
where policy and the law inevitably cross,
and you have to figure senior officials in the
Justice Department have a right to make
decisions based on their view of policy and
the law," he said.
At the center of the shifting political
dynamics are the several dozen career
Justice Department lawyers on the trial
team, who have reviewed millions of pages
of documents and interviewed hundreds of
witnesses over the last six years. Lawyers
traveled to far-flung spots from Minnesota
to England and Australia in search of
evidence to corroborate their theories of
fraudulent conduct by the tobacco industry.
The cost of prosecuting the case topped
$135 million as of the latest official tally
from the Justice Department last October.
At the outset of the case, recalled Thomas J.
Perelli, a Justice Department official in the
Clinton administration who oversaw the
lawsuit's inception, skeptics among the
lawyers doubted whether a huge civil case
could be brought. The lawyers threw out
some theories altogether, like an antirust
claim.
"But the more people started getting into the
facts of the case and saw the pattern of fraud
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by the industry, the more people started to
really believe in the case," Mr. Perelli said.
The Justice Department has had its share of
legal setbacks in court. Early on in the case,
Judge Kessler threw out one of the
government's central claims-that the
tobacco industry should reimburse the
government for the Medicare costs for
people made sick by smoking in past
decades.
And an appellate decision in February
denied the government the chance to seize
any ill-gotten profits from the tobacco
industry's past practices and imposed a
"forward-looking" model on any penalties,
That decision, Judge Kessler acknowledged
in a February order, "struck a body blow to
the government's case," and it forced the
government to rely on what some lawyers
called a Plan B, seeking damages from the
tobacco industry to pay for a program to
help nicotine addicts stop smoking. Months
after the appellate court ruled, the Justice
Department put on a health expert who said
the smoking cessation plan would cost $130
billion over the next 25 years, and it filed a
motion just a month ago, signed by senior
officials, backing that plan.
The Justice Department said the appellate
decision left it with little choice but to limit
the damages it sought from the tobacco
industry. In the view of the tobacco
industry, that department's decision to scale
back reflected years of over-reaching by the
career lawyers in the case.
"The government lawyers running this case
were creative and tenacious and were
basically pounding a square peg in a round
hole," said William S. Ohlemeyer, a vice
president with the Altria Group, which owns
Philip Morris USA, one of the tobacco
defendants. "But sooner or later, the law
catches up with a case like this."
Health advocates and Democrats maintain
that it was not the law, but politics, that
drove the recent turn of events. Democrats
have circulated a long list of financial ties
that they say run deep between the Bush
administration and the tobacco industry.
Those ties include $2.7 million in industry
contributions to Republicans in 2004, the
past work of several senior Justice
Department officials at law firms that have
represented tobacco companies, and political
consulting work that Karl Rove, a senior
Bush advisor, did for Phillip Morris in the
1990's.
The Justice Department's decision to cut its
proposed penalties "was a decision that
looks like it was made for other than legal
reasons," said Matthew L. Myers, who is
president of the Campaign for Tobacco-Free
Kids and testified for the government in the
case. "All too often, the Republican
leadership has been perceived as doing the
bidding of the American tobacco industry,
and I'm afraid that's what we may be seeing
here."
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Bank of China v. NBM, LLC
(03-1559)
Ruling Below: Bank of China v. NBM, LLC, 359 F.3d 171 (2nd Cir. 2004), cert. granted 125 S.
Ct. 2956 (U.S. June 27, 2005).
Bank of China sued defendants, individuals and companies, allege a civil RICO claim based on
bank fraud. A jury trial returned verdict in favor of the bank, finding that the defendants
breached contracts with the Bank of China. The district court entered judgment for the bank in
an amount in excess of $106 million. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the
judgment and remanded, holding that the district court erred in instructing the jury that the bank
could be defrauded regardless of whether its officers and employees were aware of or
participated in the fraud. The district court also erred in not requiring the bank to prove
"reasonable reliance." The Second Circuit held that this was not harmless error because it failed
to inform the jury of an essential element of a civil RICO action predicated on fraud.
Question Presented: Did the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit err when it held that civil
RICO plaintiffs alleging mail and wire fraud as predicate acts must establish "reasonable
reliance" under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)?
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"Second Circuit Reverses $106 Million Fraud Award
Due to Erroneous Jury Instruction on Reliance"
Commercial Lending Litigation News
March 5, 2004
In a case that proves the devil is in the
details, a lender lost a 106 million award for
bank fraud because a District Court
misstated the applicable law when it gave a
jury instruction. The 2d U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled that the instruction, which
did not require the lender to show that it
reasonably relied on borrowers' fraudulent
misrepresentations, relieved the lender of its
burden of proof and warranted a reversal of
the verdict. (Bank of China v. NBM LLC, el
al., No. 02-9267 (2d Cir. 02/17/04).)
The Bank of China sued several
corporations and individuals, including a
former employee, claiming they defrauded it
of 34 million over a 10-year period through
a series of loan transactions. A jury
awarded the lender 35.4 million in
compensatory damages, and the U.S.
District Court, Southern District of New
York trebled the award as permitted under
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (see Oct. 3, 2002 issue, p.
2). The debtors appealed.
To prevail on a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff
must show that the defendant's fraudulent
acts were the proximate cause of its injury.
For certain types of fraud, including mail,
wire or securities fraud, a plaintiff can
establish proximate causation by proving
that it reasonably relied on the defendants'
representations. The debtors argued that the
District Court's jury instruction, stating that
the bank could be defrauded even if its
employees knew the true nature of the loan
transactions, was erroneous because it did
not require the bank to prove reasonable
reliance.
U.S. District Judge Shira A. Scheindlin,
sitting with the 2d Circuit by designation,
noted that no Circuit or District Courts had
explicitly addressed whether a plaintiff must
prove reasonable reliance when it bases a
RICO claim on bank fraud. However, the
judge pointed out that civil RICO plaintiffs
must satisfy the proximate cause
requirement, regardless of whether the
defendant committed bank fraud or some
other prohibited action. Determining that
recovery is not warranted unless a plaintiff
can show that the defendants caused its
losses, the court concluded that the Bank of
China needed to prove it reasonably relied
on the debtors' misrepresentations.
Although the District Court instructed the
jury that the lender needed to prove
reasonable reliance to establish common law
fraud, it also stated that the lender could be a
victim of bank fraud even if its officers and
employees participated in the debtors'
fraudulent activities. If the lender's
employees knew the true nature of the loan
transactions, the lender could not have relied
on the debtors' misrepresentations when it
approved the loans.
"These two instructions are at best
confusing, at and worst irreconcilable," the
judge wrote.
Because the cumulative jury instructions
failed to inform the jury about an essential
element of the lender's bank fraud claim,
Judge Scheindlin explained, the lender did
not have to sustain its burden of proof and
the debtors were not able to present their
best defense. The jury could have inferred
400
from the evidence that the lender's
employees knew about the debtors'
fraudulent misrepresentations and that the
lender did not rely on the statements.
Concluding the error was not harmless, the
2d Circuit reversed the lender's 106 million
award and remanded the case for a new trial.
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Wachovia Bank, National Association v. Daniel G. Schmidt III, et. at
(04-1186)
Ruling Below: (Wachovia Bank, National Association v. Daniel G. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414 (4th
Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 2904, 73 U.S.L.W. 3540, 73 U.S.L.W. 3713, 73 U.S.L.W.
3718 (U.S. June 13, 2005) (No. 04-1186)).
Wachovia is a national banking association with a principal place of business in Charlotte, North
Carolina. Wachovia has branch offices in several other states, including South Carolina. Daniel
G. Schmidt is a citizen of South Carolina. Schmidt accused Wachovia of fraud, and filed suit
against Wachovia in South Carolina state court. Wachovia removed the case to federal district
court, claiming that the federal district court had diversity subject matter jurisdiction. The
district court ruled against Wachovia on the merits of the claim, and Wachovia appealed to the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. At the court of appeals, Schmidt argued that there was no
diversity of citizenship between Wachovia and Schmidt. He claimed that according to 28
U.S.C.S. § 1348 Wachovia was "located" in South Carolina for purposes of determining
citizenship because Wachovia had branch offices within the state. The court of appeals agreed
with Schmidt, concluding that a national bank is the citizen of any state in which it operates
branch offices. This ruling contradicts with decisions in the Fifth and Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Questions Presented: Whether, for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction, a national banking
association is "located" in, and thus deemed to be a citizen of, every state in which the
association maintains a branch, as held by the court below, or instead has a more limited
citizenship, as held by three other courts of appeals; and (ii) whether the word "located," as used
in, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1348 is ambiguous?
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"National Bank's Branches Destroy
Diversity Jurisdiction, 4th Circuit Holds"
Daily Record (Baltimore, MD)
November 8, 2004
Barbara Grzinci
National banks with branches in Maryland
cannot use the federal courts to litigate state-
law claims by or against Maryland citizens,
the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has
held.
The court broke ranks with two other federal
appeals courts that recently decided the
same issue, setting the stage for a possible
Supreme Court battle-a fact that left the 2-
1 majority unconcerned.
"Questions of statutory interpretation are not
decided by majority vote of the courts of
appeals"," Judge J. Michael Luttig wrote for
the majority. "That our sister circuits may
disagree with us in any given case is
significant only insofar as their reasoning is
persuasive. Here, that reasoning is simply
unconvincing."
The disagreement arose over the proper
boundaries of a federal court's diversity
jurisdiction, that is, its authorization to hear
disputes between citizens of different states.
Federal law provides that, for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction, national banks are
deemed to be "citizens of the States in which
they are respectively located."
Under the plain meaning of the statute, "a
national banking association is 'located'
wherever it operates branch offices," Luttig
wrote.
That decision echoes a comment made last
year by the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals interpreting the same federal law,
28 U.S.C. §1348, Luttig noted.
However, the 5th and 7th Circuits reached
the opposite conclusion in opinions this year
and last; so, too, did the 9th Circuit in 1943,
interpreting a 19th-century version of the
law.
The majority last week found
interpretations "utterly implausible."
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Writing in dissent, Judge Robert B. King
said national banks should have the same
access to federal courts as state banks and
corporations, for which a branch office in
one state does not automatically destroy
diversity jurisdiction.
"The Comptroller of the Currency has also
endorsed this view," King noted. "[O]ur
creation of a circuit split on this issue is
unwarranted," he wrote. "Because the
majority has unjustifiably circumscribed
federal court jurisdiction of disputes
involving national banks, I respectfully
dissent."
Last week's decision sends a dispute
between North Carolina-based Wachovia
Bank N.A. and a South Carolina investor,
Daniel G. Schmidt III, back to the South
Carolina state court where it was filed.
Schmidt and other plaintiffs claimed
Wachovia fraudulently induced them to
engage in a risky, tax-motivated investment
scheme.
Wachovia removed the action to federal
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court and appealed to the 4th Circuit after
the federal judge refused to compel
arbitration.
On appeal, Schmidt argued for the first time
that the federal court lacked diversity
jurisdiction because Wachovia had branches
in South Carolina. The majority agreed and
vacated the ruling, ordering the case
remanded to state court.
The 4th Circuit's decision is binding on
federal courts in Maryland, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia.
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